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This thesis investigates central banking theory and policy, by critically analysing, 
testing the existence mainstream approach and then provide an alternative 
framework for Central banking theory and policy from a post-Keynesian’s 
perspective. My main contribution is to deliver a comprehensive understanding 
of the nature, roles, functions, and objectives of a modern central bank, to 
achieve economic stability and promote the well-being of our society. 
Besides some theoretical chapters that provide a more in-depth understanding 
in central banking theories and policies, this thesis could mainly be divided into 
three main parts: the first part, investigating the role of central banking in the 
financialisation era, by discussing and analysing the impact of monetary policy 
on securitisation. Our finding indicates a weak role of the central bank as a 
bankers’ bank, as banks’ behaviour in term of increasing liquidity via 
securitisation is reducing the efficacy of central bank’s intended policy. The 
second part investigates the crucial interrelationship between central banks and 
governments. I critically discuss the competing theories of monetary-fiscal policy 
relationship, and I apply a Stock-Flow Consistent modelling to provide an 
alternative framework in understanding the importance of monetary-fiscal policy 
interrelation within a post-Keynesian approach in order to achieve a sustainable 
financial and economic stability. The third part goes beyond the central bank 
role towards banks and the government, to critically shed the light and assess 
the role of a central bank as a social regulator. Investigating the relationship 
between central banking and inequality, and the role of policy rate of interest as 
a distributive macroeconomic variable within different economic paradigms, then 
applying a SFC modelling to provide an alternative fair rate of interest rule to 
reduce inequality and achieve sustainable economic growth. 
Although other researchers have studied these issues, this study has the 
distinctive feature of providing a broader theoretical and empirical guideline to 
central banking. Furthermore, this study will be the first one to develop a holistic 
and comprehensive alternative framework, guideline and dynamics of central 
banking in a macroeconomic model in the advanced world economy.  
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A Ph.D. thesis is not only a good written specialized work in a certain field of 
study. As the title suggests, it is Doctor of Philosophy recognition, which is 
granting you with the very powerful profession ‘Philosophy’. To be a philosopher, 
you must know history, sociology, psychology in addition to the science of arts 
of reasoning. Thus, you are able to reflect and possess a critical thinking open 
type of mind within a wide range of contexts. More importantly, a Ph.D. is not 
only a certificate; it is a long social process of deep and critical learning, thinking 
and teaching continuous training and development, acquiring in-depth 
knowledge, investigating ideas across the various research questions, going 
through numerous literature and methodological discussions. 
 
A Ph.D. thesis is also a product of its time, which reflects and creates its own 
social reality, in the sense that a thesis’s reflections of the social, economic and 
political background represent of when the thesis was written. That clearly 
means that it cannot but embrace the roots, motivations, and agonies of the 
author- as these unfold in real time- as well as the debates and “hot” questions 
of its era. To put simply, ‘nothing is written on stone’. Especially when to comes 
to economics. And in particular, living in times of great economic recession, my 
thesis inevitably came to engage with the agenda of its day. The collapse of 
economic growth, the sky-rocketing of unemployment, the rise in income 
inequality, the shrinkage of space for public policy; these were all real issues 
seeking for real answers. It was such concerns that primarily acted as a 
navigator throughout my Ph.D. journey. 
 
Somewhere along that journey I came across many pieces on the topic of the 
critical role of central banks in our economy.  Being at the centre of debate and 
analysis of how modern capitalist economy works, it felt to me that there was 
something more to be said. What are those organizations? What is their 
relationship with banks and financial institutions, governments, and the society? 
Why can they play an essential role to promote the well-being of our economy?  
I took up the challenge, channelling my thoughts and energy in that direction. 
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The result is now materialized into five years of work and a few hundreds of 
pages aligned behind this one. 
 
All in all, living in Canada and Europe at the times of the crisis, one cannot but 
still be angry at the social realities of today.  Realities that kill democracy in the 
name of “solidarity”, attack the welfare state in the name of “sound finances” 
and deplete peoples’ incomes in the name of “fostering full employment”.  
Realities that force disinvestment in the name of “investment”, and that push 
economies into depression in the name of “growth”.   On what has to do with 
economics, one can think of those realities as reflecting nothing more but the 
voices of defunct economists, as Keynes would put it.  While a Ph.D. thesis is 
certainly not enough to change the world, it can nevertheless make a step 










The 2007/08 severe financial crisis has put the role of the central bank in 
industrialised economies under scrutiny. What has occurred could be called a 
central banking crisis, as major central banks in advanced economies failed to 
foresee the financial crisis. Central banks’ policy focus had been on a rule-based 
policy, using one tool (the nominal interest rate) to achieve one objective (price 
stability), disregarding other important objectives such as financial stability and 
economic stability. For this reason, in this thesis I investigate central banking 
theory and policy, analysing the role of the central bank in a modern, complex 
financialized capitalist economy in relation to the treasury, the banks, and other 
financial institutions. In a broader sense, I investigate central banks’ 
responsibility to the economy as a whole. The main contribution of this thesis is 
to analyse central banking theory and policy critically and to provide an 
alternative framework from a post-Keynesian perspective to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature and functions of a modern central 
bank. I emphasize its unique role with respect to the government, the banks, 
and society: achieving sustainable economic stability. 
This thesis has three main purposes. Firstly, it investigates the role of central 
banking in the financialisation era. Financialisation is characterised by the 
increasing power of finance and the expansion of financial innovations in 
advanced economies. That combined with deregulation has increased the 
inherent financial instability of the economy. Securitisation is one of the most 
complex and controversial financial innovations, and it has generated another 
dimension of instability in the financial sector. In addition to the instability, 
central banks’ policies become less effective in the presence of such financial 
innovation. For these reasons, I have studied and analysed the impact of 
monetary policy on securitisation activities and the consequences of 
securitisation on the effectiveness of monetary policy. The main reasons for 
banks to securitize their loans are to increase their profitability and liquidity and 
to transfer risk. By transforming illiquid assets—long-term loans and 
mortgages—into liquid assets, the banks’ traditional practice of originating and 
holding has changed to one of originating and distributing. To study the 
interaction between the policy interest rate and securitisation (measured as a 
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country’s total securitized assets divided by total assets), I use a panel VAR 
econometric model using data from the UK and nine eurozone countries. My 
findings indicate that a contractionary monetary policy, with an increase in the 
policy interest rate, leads to a decrease in issuing banks’ loans; however, banks’ 
issuance of securitisation increases, which increases liquidity and banks’ ability 
to issue new loans. That could suggest that banks’ securitisation activities make 
central banks’ policy rates ineffective. Secondly, the thesis investigates the 
crucial interrelationships between central banks and governments. I critically 
discuss competing theories concerning the relationship between monetary policy 
and fiscal policy, and I build a closed-economy stock-flow-consistent model that 
consists of a firm sector, a household sector, a bank sector, a government sector, 
and a central bank. I emphasise the behavioural equations and how the 
interaction of these public entities determines the state of the economy. The 
main objective here is to provide an alternative framework incorporating the 
importance of interrelations between monetary policy and fiscal policy within a 
post-Keynesian approach in order to foster financial and economic stability. The 
third goal of the thesis goes beyond the central bank’s role in relation to banks 
and the government to shed light on the role of the central bank as a social 
regulator. That involves investigating, from different economic paradigms, first, 
the relationship between central banking and inequality, and second, the role of 
the policy rate of interest as a distributive macroeconomic variable in a 
financialized economy. I build a closed-economy stock-flow-consistent (SFC 
hereafter) model that consists of a firm sector, a worker households sector, a 
capitalist households sector, a bank sector, a government sector, and a central 
bank. The goal is to provide an alternative fair-rate-of-interest rule to reduce 
income inequality in order to promote an equitable and fairer society for 
sustainable economic growth. 
Although other researchers have studied these issues, this study has the 
distinctive feature of providing a broader theoretical and empirical guide to 
central banking. Furthermore, this study develops an alternative framework, 
guideline, and dynamics of central banking in a macroeconomic model in the 
advanced world economy. 
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The thesis structure is as follows: Chapter 1 is an introductory history of central 
banking in the advanced economies, investigating the different stages of 
development in terms of functions, objectives, and roles. Particular attention will 
be given to the relationship of central banks to governments and banks and the 
economy. In the second chapter, the focus is on the main characteristics of New 
Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) paradigm in the era before the recent 
financial crisis, and its main criticisms from post-Keynesians. The aim is to 
provide a clear understanding of the current issues on central banking and shed 
light on post-Keynesians’ view on these matters. The first two chapters lay the 
foundations for the following chapters. 
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of securitisation on the efficacy of monetary 
policy, particularly in European countries. To be able to answer this question, I 
explain the financialisation era and how financial innovations such as 
securitisation have changed the behaviour of banks, by increasing the ability of 
banks to create liquidity and increase risk-taking behaviour. Securitisation 
reduced the efficacy of monetary policy and diminished the role of central banks 
as the ultimate provider of liquidity. Thus, the role of central banks as the 
‘bankers’ bank should be re-examined. 
Chapter 4 investigates the theoretical background of the nature of the 
relationship between central banks and treasuries. It asks whether separation, 
cooperation, or interrelation between monetary and fiscal policies provides a 
better outcome for our economy. In order to understand this issue, this chapter 
sheds light on the main competing views and differences between New 
Consensus Macroeconomics (hereafter NCM), the fiscal theory of the price level 
(FTPL), and the post-Keynesian perspectives. It shows how in a monetary 
production economy post-Keynesians provide a more comprehensive and 
realistic view of the nature of the relationship between central banks and the 
governments. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the existing macroeconomic modelling used in economic 
research, and mainly criticises the current dominant dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models, providing an alternative Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) 
model from a post-Keynesian perspective. This alternative approach offers a 
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better understanding of the reality of interactions between economic agents and 
the stock-flow operations of our economy. 
Chapters 4 and 5 build a background for chapter 6, where I investigate the 
cooperation of monetary and fiscal policies from a post-Keynesian perspective 
in an SFC model. As the relationships between central banks, the banks, and the 
government have been previously discussed and investigated, chapter 7 goes a 
step further to investigate the role of central banks in the society. The impact of 
central banking on inequality is studied, and a post-Keynesian perspective based 
on a ‘fair rate of interest’ to tackle this issue is put forward, also using an SFC 




Chapter 1:  History of Central Banks (Functions & Objectives) 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the past and present of central banking practices and 
purposes. The origin of central banking goes back at least to the late 
seventeenth century with the creation of the Riksbank in Sweden. I investigate 
the evolution and history of central banking at different stages of development. 
In particular, I analyse the development of central banks’ relationship with the 
government and the banks, mainly at the national level. I focus on the Bank of 
England, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that central banking history 
matters. That the Keynesian Era could be viewed as a ground floor or an anchor 
for today central banks, with respect to its functions and objectives, its 
relationship with governments and banks in addition to its role to the overall 
economy.  The discussion is divided into five sections chronologically as follows: 
The first section reviews the period before the First World War. The second 
covers the interwar era. The third section is focused on the Keynesian era 
between 1945 and the 1970s, while the fourth part seeks to understand the 
status of central banking during the era of the 1970s to 2007. The fifth part 
discusses the era between the emergence of the crisis in 2007 and the current 
situation. Finally, I will critically assess the evolution of central banking and 
conclude. 
1.2 Before the Second World War 
 Early central banks aimed in large part to finance their affiliated governments. 
The most important central bank, during the era before the First World War, 
was the Bank of England (BoE). BoE was established in 1694 with private 
ownership, to finance the war and purchase government debt mainly. And the 
Banque de France (BoF) was established by Napoleon in 1800 to stabilize the 
currency after the hyperinflation of paper money during the French Revolution, 
and to finance the government. 
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Early central banks also acted as a note issuer and as a government bank. The 
Reichsbank, for example, was created in 1876 as an entirely private institution 
as to ownership but it was guided by the public or imperial interest and it did 
not attempt to maximise returns to shareholders. Following the unification of 
Germany after 1870, one of the Reichsbank's primary objectives was to be the 
primary note issuer and to unify the currency. It also acted as a clearinghouse 
for German banks in the whole German economy. The Reichsbank also made 
loans directly to business (as well as to government and banks).  Thus, the 
Reichsbank did not only contribute to the financial integration of Germany, but 
it also helped to foster the emergence of a new economic superpower (Goodhart 
1988: 105–11).  Not until 1901 did the Reichsbank act as a lender of last resort. 
That was when the Leipziger Bank and Dresdner Kreditanstalt collapsed, and it 
intervened to avert contagion. By 1900 the Reichsbank evolved into a genuine 
central bank, offering a wide range of services to government and the private 
sector (Lexis 1910, quoted in Singleton (2011)). 
On the other side of the world, the BoJ was established in 1882 as the first 
central bank outside Europe. Mainly after the Japanese economy opened to the 
West, there was a period of financial experimentation and instability.  BoJ was 
given the power of note issue and to offer a range of financial services to the 
government as well as to major banks. The BoJ became the lender of last resort 
during the crisis of 1890.  The Bank made an important contribution to the 
development of the Japanese banking system. As in Germany, the BoJ was 
involved in the development of the payments and interregional transfer systems, 
and branches were opened in some cities (Ohnuki, 2007; Goodhart, 1988). 
These early central banks were private entities that mainly helped to fund the 
government's debt in the time of war, and they also engaged in banking 
activities. Because they held the deposits of other banks, they came to serve as 
the bankers’ banks, facilitating transactions between banks or providing other 
banking services. They became the depository for most banks in the banking 
system because of their large reserves and extensive networks of correspondent 
banks. These factors allowed them to be the lender of last resort in the face of 
a financial crisis. In other words, they were willing to provide emergency cash 
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to their correspondents in times of financial distress. Thus, a central bank can 
be defined as an institution that stands between the government and the banks. 
However, the role of central bank tends to change over time depending on 
economic and political factors. 
Before the First World War, central banks’ main objective was to sustain the 
gold standard’s rule of maintaining gold convertibility above all other 
considerations (Goodhart, 1988). Gold convertibility served as the economy’s 
nominal anchor. That is, the amount of money banks could supply was 
constrained by the value of the gold they held in reserve. Typically, the central 
bank adjusts the Bank Rate in order to manage the level of gold reserves and 
the ratio of reserves to liabilities, or to liquidity (Giovannini 1986). 
Central banks also learned to act as lenders of last resort in times of financial 
stress since 1790. Earlier on, given that BoE’s main concern was maintaining the 
convertibility to gold, it precipitated major world financial panics in 1825, 1837, 
1847, and 1857, which led to severe criticism of the Bank (Singleton, 2011). In 
particular by Walter Bagehot, who criticised the bank for not taking responsibility 
for the public interest of the banking system as a whole. The Bank began to 
follow ‘Bagehot's rule,' which was to lend freely on the basis of any sound 
collateral offered—but at a penalty rate (that is, above market rates) to prevent 
moral hazard (Singleton, 2011). Thanks to the application of ‘Bagehot’s rule’ no 
banking crises occurred in England for nearly 150 years after 1866. There was 
a secondary banking crisis in 1973/75. Not until August 2007 did Britain 
experience its next banking crisis. 
The BoE was by far the most sophisticated and experienced central bank at the 
beginning of the 20th century. By 1900 the Bank saw itself as a public agency 
and not as a commercial operation, and was committed to upholding the stability 
of the banking system (Goodhart, 1988). In other words, it had made the 
transition from a bank of issue to a central bank. 
Even though the BoF was less experienced than the BoE due to the undeveloped 
financial market, it was the duty of the BoF to facilitate the provision of 
affordable credit to the French economy, to industrial firms as well as to banks.  
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To this end, the Banque focused on maintaining a low and stable rediscount rate 
(around 3%). In this sense, the BoF had much more of a developmental role 
than did the BoE. The Banque also acted as a lender of last resort to the Paris 
and Lyons stock exchanges in 1882, to prevent a crisis spilling over into the 
banking system. Advances were also made to several banks after the collapse 
of the Union Générale. In 1889 and 1891 the Banque stepped in again to support 
and restructure ailing banks (Goodhart 1988). 
Elsewhere, in the United States, the experience during the nineteenth century 
was an era of considerable financial instability due to the domination of the free 
banking school of thought (the banking sector is a robust and self-adjusting 
system). Banks were free to enter and exit with minimal requirements, which 
led to frequent banking crises. Not until 1913 did this instability lead to the 
creation of the Federal Reserve (Fed), which was given the mandate of note 
issues and to serve as a lender of last resort. 
Interwar Era 
With the occurrence of the First World War and the Great Depression, central 
banks were faced with difficulties in performing their roles. They failed 
tremendously, especially during the recession of the early 1930s (Goodhart 
1988). 
During the First World War (1914-1918), central banks, such as BoE, BoF, BoJ, 
and Reichsbank, played an essential part in managing the war economy. Acting 
as lenders of last resort, they provided liquidity to financial markets during the 
initial panic in 1914. They were required to purchase increasing amounts of 
short-  and long-term government securities. As Montagu Norman (1932), who 
was long-serving governor of BoE, put it: ‘With the outbreak of war in 1914 the 
traditional practices of Central Banks were gradually abandoned under the 
pressure of political expediency’. 
The dominant view of managing the trade-off between stabilizing the internal 
price level and the external exchange rate had central banks aim to maintain 
gold convertibility. The latter was a concern because a high inflation period after 
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the First World War led to the outflow of gold from Europe to the USA. Central 
banks tightened monetary policy to maintain gold convertibility. For instance, 
after the UK suspended the gold standard in 1914, it returned in 1925 at the 
pre-war nominal exchange rate which was widely regarded as an over-valued 
real exchange rate. It was forced to leave the gold standard in 1931. The upshot 
was that the UK had high inflation in 1919 followed by rapid deflation and a 
further tendency towards deflation during the 1920s. In contrast, the only 
central bank to face the trade-off differently and to opt to target price stability 
explicitly during the interwar period was the Riksbank following Sweden’s forced 
withdrawal from the gold standard in 1931 (Berg and Jonung, 1999). 
In A Tract on Monetary Reform, Keynes questioned why jobs should be sacrificed, 
and firms bankrupted merely for the sake of convertibility?  He concluded that 
when ‘stability of the internal price level and stability of the external exchanges 
are incompatible; the former is generally preferable.'  The gold standard was a 
‘barbarous relic' and an ‘outworn dogma' (Keynes 1923: 163– 4, 172, 173). 
Indeed, in the early 1930s major European countries were obliged to leave the 
gold standard.  
Further, the gold standard era and the commitment to convertibility principle to 
promote price stability was under question by Keynes (1934). He doubted that 
price stability objective would be enough to smooth the business cycle or achieve 
full employment after a major shock (Singleton, 2011). In some circumstances, 
monetary policy could become impotent. For instance, if nominal interest rates 
were already close to zero, but the price level was falling, so that real interest 
rates were positive, the traditional tools of the central banker would lose their 
power to counteract deflation, this situation is similar to the famous liquidity trap. 
However, it is important to distinguish between Liquidity Trap and what’s called 
the Zero Lower Bound Problem (ZLBP). In ZLBP, the central bank pulls down the 
interest rate to zero and the economy cannot be stimulated anymore, because 
the interest rate cannot go any lower. Whereas, Liquidity Trap differs from ZLBP 
owing to the fact that even after involvement of the central bank in both cases, 
in liquidity trap the interest rate doesn’t get lowered at all. During the 1930s, 
Keynes put a strong emphasis on the role of fiscal policy in economic 
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management. In the same vein of Keynes ideas, in 1934 the Roosevelt 
administration appointed Marriner Eccles, as governor of the Fed Board.  Eccles 
was a progressive economist who believed that reflationary fiscal policy was the 
key to recovery. He also doubted the ability of monetary policy to achieve 
recovery, and Eccles had wanted a mandate to stabilise ‘production, trade, 
prices, and employment' (Meltzer, 2003). He was also of the view that the 
central bank should act in support of the general economic strategy of the 
government. In practice, this meant keeping interest rates moderately low. 
To sum up, central banking evolved in the era between the world wars. It 
continued to do so in the Keynesian era. 
1.3 The Keynesian Era (1945 to 1970s) 
During and after the Second World War, the world of central banking witnessed 
an important transformation by a spate of nationalisations. For instance, the BoE 
and the BoF were state-owned in this period while the Fed was subject to 
government regulations (an analogous form of control). The period was 
characterised by the close cooperation between central banks and governments 
over monetary and banking policy. The noticeable effects include low interest 
rates, low inflation, low unemployment, and central banks’ strong support for 
their respective governments (Dow, 2017). 
What is crucial is the emergence of a new generation of central bankers with 
more tolerance for modern concepts of economic management, and more 
inclination to work with governments. The quality of the relationship with the 
government was crucial, and it could be viewed as a cooperative and active 
partnership.  
The emergence of the Keynesian view on the macroeconomic policy 
encompassed an emphasis on the goal of full employment and a change towards 
fiscal policy. The 1950s macroeconomic policymakers, including central bankers, 
were aiming for the multiple objectives of full employment, low inflation, a stable 
balance of payments, and high economic growth. They performed well in this 
respect. In Europe and USA, the 1950s and early 1960s era experienced both 
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low inflation and unemployment, and more importantly, there were hardly any 
banking crises (Goodhart, Hofmann, and Segoviano 2004). 
Fiscal policy was considered to be the strongest leg of macroeconomic policy in 
the 1940s and 1950s (Sawyer, 2003). With the support of central banks’ desire 
for low and stable interest rates to reduce the burden of servicing a public debt, 
governments could stimulate the job market, encourage reconstruction and 
development, and help powerful interest groups including exporters, farmers, 
and home purchasers. 
In monetary policy, in the post-war era major European central banks kept 
interest rates low (around 3%), directly regulated banks, and provided 
accommodating monetary policy. Low interest rates were likely to encourage 
spending, but also to fuel inflationary pressure, and weaken the balance of 
payments. Central banks also imposed administrative controls on bank lending 
and access to foreign exchange. 
The nature of the partnership between government and central bank evolved in 
different ways in different countries. Sometimes it was close, sometimes distant. 
Ultimately, though, government–central bank relationships were based on 
cooperation in the mid-twentieth century (Fforde, 1992). As Keynes proposed, 
there was an equal status between the BoE and the treasury. 
In the United States, the Fed did not only maintain a low interest rate, but full 
employment was added to its mandate, creating what is often referred to as the 
dual mandate, in 1977 (Fontana, 2006). Having a dual mandate objective means 
that the Fed has a relatively discretionary policy which could not be pursued or 
achieved without close cooperation with the treasury.  Meltzer wrote, ‘The 
Treasury and the Fed System have reached a full accord concerning debt-
management and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering their common 
purpose of assuring the successful financing of the government's requirements 




The Deutsche Bundesbank experience was not different. In legislation in 1957, 
‘the main duties of the Bundesbank were those of regulating the amount of 
money in circulation and of credit supplied to the economy with the aim of 
safeguarding the currency, as well as arranging for the execution of domestic 
and international payments' (Stern, 1999).  The central bank was to support 
government economic policy in so far as this did not undermine the performance 
of its primary duties. The Stability and Growth Act 1967 outlined a group of 
macroeconomic objectives for the West German state, including price stability, 
high employment, external equilibrium, and economic growth. 
In this period, the Deutsche Bundesbank was considered the most independent 
central bank. However, Stern (1999:  154) writes of a ‘subtle and balanced 
regulation of the relationship between the Federal Government and the 
Bundesbank' and attempts ‘to unite independence and cooperation'. The 
Bundesbank achieved its main goals and succeeded in building up a strong base 
of public support, or ‘stability culture'. While the Bundesbank was not immune 
to political intrigue, it resisted most attempts by the central government to 
influence policy decisions (Neumann 1999). 
Meanwhile, Article 1 of the BoJ Law 1942 stated that ‘the purpose of the BoJ 
shall be to adjust currency, to regulate financing and to develop the credit 
system in conformity with policies of the state, to ensure appropriate application 
of the state's total economic power'. Article 2 reiterated that ‘the BoJ shall be 
operated exclusively intending to accomplish the purposes of the state' (Werner 
2003: 54). But according to Singleton (2011), the BoJ and the Ministry of Finance 
were rivals as well as partners, and they often seemed to be locked together 
like ‘sumo wrestlers' while they vied for control over monetary policy. That active 
partnership resulted in good Macro-policies outcomes. That was evidenced by 
Japan's economic performance between the 1950s, and the late 1980s was 
impressive, and the BoJ won respect for its contribution to this record (Cargill, 
Hutchison, and Ito 1997). 
Concerning the relationship between central banks and the banking sector, the 
former did not only act as a clearinghouse or as a lender of last resort, but also 
took responsibility for banking supervision in response to the increased burden 
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of regulating the financial system. This ultimate supervision role went beyond 
the role in monetary policy and regulation and added an important dimension to 
central banking in the mid-twentieth century, a role at which it proved 
reasonably effective. 
An essential feature of the post-war decades was the emphasis on implementing 
monetary policy through the manipulation of quantities (including bank reserves, 
liquidity, and bank lending, but not the money supply) rather than by variations 
in interest rates. Bindseil (2004) regards this approach as part of a longer 
‘quantitative detour' in monetary policy implementation, lasting from the 1930s 
into the monetarist era of the 1970s and early 1980s. Central banking put more 
emphasis on instruments such as the ‘control of credit', discount rate policy, 
open market operations, variable reserve requirements, ‘other methods' 
including selective and quantitative controls on lending and ‘moral suasion', and 
exchange controls (Bindseil, 2004). 
Monetary authorities relied a great deal on regulatory controls. Credit controls 
were used especially in limiting lending for consumption purposes. Monetary 
authorities commonly issued guidelines or instructions concerning the 
permissible quantity and direction of bank lending (Singleton, 2009).  Such 
guidelines had two purposes. First, they were used to restrain aggregate 
spending at a time of low real interest rates.  Secondly, they were supposed to 
encourage desirable spending, such as capital formation in export industries and 
the housing sector, while limiting spending on luxuries such as holidays and 
consumer goods. 
Other controls on commercial banks such as reserve ratio and liquidity ratio were 
imposed to create a system to be used for monetary control, even though it was 
based on powers assigned to the monetary authorities for banking supervision 
purposes. For instance, UK commercial banks were required to make non-
interest-bearing ‘special deposits’ at the central bank when additional monetary 
strictness was required (Ross, 2004). 
As a by-product of the distinctive post-war approaches to monetary and banking 
policy, central banks and commercial banks were brought into closer touch than 
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ever before. Relations of the central bank with the commercial banks were 
multifaceted. It is difficult to encapsulate the relationship between central banks 
and commercial banks, which was marked by elements of collusion and coercion 
as well as of cooperation (Singleton, 2011). Such tools as window guidance and 
moral suasion were a sort of administrative guidance as part of every central 
banker’s toolbox, especially in states with highly concentrated banking sectors. 
The more concentrated the banking industry, the fewer the banks in need of 
swaying. Central banks sought to influence the lending of banks by lecturing 
them in public and chatting to them in private.  In the UK the entire system of 
controls over reserves, liquidity, and lending was based on moral suasion. The 
BoE preferred to regulate by consent. However, British banks understood that 
outright refusal to cooperate would be punished (Capie, 1990). 
Another dimension of the relationship between central banks and commercial 
banks concerned the former’s stance on the industrial organization of the latter. 
In the UK, between 1918 and 1967 the BoE and the Treasury made it very clear 
that they would oppose any mergers between the ‘Big Five' UK clearing banks 
(Cottrell, 2003). But that ended with the merger between National Provincial and 
Westminster in 1967 to form National Westminster. 
In the USA, commercial banks with the membership of the Fed System had a 
say in the governance of the Reserve Banks. At the national level, there was 
consultation between the Fed Board and banking industry associations, but the 
relationship was not as close as it was in some countries. Woolley (1984: 69–
87) saw little evidence to suggest that the Fed was captured by the banking 
industry. The Fed had to be sensitive to a number of constituencies, including 
Congress and the president, as well as the Treasury and other business groups, 
such as farmers and manufacturers, each with their own policy preferences 
(Kettl 1986). As a result, it was insulated from control by any one constituency, 
including the bankers. 
In the USA, new regulations starting in the 1930s had a major impact on the 
structure of the banking industry. The separation of commercial from investment 
banking was achieved in the second Glass Steagall Act (officially the Banking Act 
1933).  The 1933 and 1935 Banking Acts empowered the Fed to place ceilings 
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on the interest paid on time and savings deposits (Regulation Q). No interest 
was permitted on demand deposits.  One of the aims of the Congress, in 
establishing Regulation Q, was to encourage country banks to focus on lending 
to local communities by making it unprofitable for them to hold large balances 
at banks in financial centres.  By restraining price competition for deposits, the 
Congress also hoped to reduce the temptation to engage in risky lending.  
Regulation Q was extended to thrift institutions in 1966, and at the same time 
interest rate ceilings were allowed to bite in order to ease the burden on certain 
classes of borrowers. Thrifts were permitted to offer slightly higher interest rates 
than commercial banks, so as to encourage the reallocation of deposits and an 
increase in mortgage lending (Gilbert 1986). 
Though regulation held back the most innovative banks, it helped the banking 
system as a whole to achieve healthy profits at little or no risk. Low interest 
rates brought excess demand for credit, enabling banks to select only the best 
applicants for loans. Goodhart (2004) contends that because of regulation, 
‘banking was an extremely safe, and boring, occupation between 1945 and 1973'.  
According to Cobham (2012), this was possible because of the existence of the 
wide options of managerial and supervisory panels to which the banks had to 
adhere. 
More generally, the regulatory policy, the main macroeconomic arguments in 
this duration were concentrated in the determinants of the entire demand in the 
economy and the factors that ensure financial stability. More interestingly, there 
was a consensus between central banks about the effectiveness of the interest 
rate as a tool of economic management, with the belief that interest rates should 
be kept low and stable to encourage investment and economic growth (Bindseil, 
2004). The rediscount rate was an important signal of the monetary authorities’ 
intentions. Market interest rates were also influenced by open market operations, 
changes in reserve requirements, moral suasion, and, finally, market conditions. 
In the mid-twentieth century, much weight was given to overall economic 
stability by major central banks, as an expression of the public’s aversion to 
uncertainty and its fear of banking crises after the events of the 1930s, mainly 
in the USA. 
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The 1950s and 1960s constituted a golden age for the industrialised capitalist 
economies. Growth was strong throughout the developed world. Outcomes were 
satisfactory, despite the vast discrepancy between the objectives and techniques 
of policy then and best practice today. Inflation rates were moderate 
notwithstanding rapid economic growth, though they began to creep up in the 
late 1960s (Fischer et al. 2002).  Furthermore, there were no serious banking 
crises. Nothing could have been more unlike the interwar period. 
In the late 1960s, though, the global structure, in the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates with restricted capital movements, was starting to collapse 
under the effect of global tensions. That was attached to the failures of monetary 
policies employed in the United States in the situation of its conflict of Vietnam 
and the Great Society expenditure plans of President Johnson. Consequently, by 
late 1960s, all major exchange rates in terms of the currency were fluctuating 
against each other and inflation apparently emerged as a significant issue. The 
Bank of International Settlement argues the mid-1970s saw cumbersome major 
shifts in strategy setting. From less or more of the Keynesian ideas on the causes 
of price rise and the duty of monetary in relation to the fiscal policy, to more or 
less of the monetarist perceptions on the increase in the general price level and 
the introduction of the monetary targets. 
1.4 Monetary Targets and the New Consensus Era (the 1970s to 
2007) 
Inflation was one of the most serious economic challenges confronting the 
developed world between the late 1960s and the 1970s.  Inflationary pressure 
was rising in many countries, partly for domestic reasons and partly as a result 
of monetary inflows from the USA. But it was not the only problem. Exchange 
rates fluctuated unpredictably after the collapse of Bretton Woods, while there 
were frequent banking and other financial crises. Economic growth decelerated 
after the early 1970s, unemployment rose to a post-war peak in the early 1980s, 
other reasons for the inflationary pressure are for global reasons such as 
commodity price boom in 1972; the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, for 
example, led to confusion amongst policymakers.  The macroeconomic theory 
was in flux as Keynesians fought it out with the monetarists. According to Meltzer 
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(2005), the turning point for the USA came in 1965, ‘the last year of strong 
productivity growth and the first year of rising inflation'. Perhaps this was also a 
symbolic turning point for Keynesianism. 
This era witnessed an aggressive struggle between Keynesians and monetarists; 
the struggle was known as ‘the Matadors' (Singleton, 2011). In the Keynesian 
paradigm of the post-war era, inflation was either ‘demand pull' or ‘cost push' in 
origin. However, monetarists held that inflation could not occur unless the 
money stock were permitted to increase faster than productive capacity. This 
conclusion followed from the quantity theory of money, which entails that 
inflation is a monetary phenomenon (Friedman, M.  1956). Monetarists denied 
that fiscal stimulus could generate inflation unless financed by central bank 
purchases of government debt or printing money. The monetarist ideas came in 
addition to the neoclassical beliefs of rational expectations, perfect information, 
and the temporary trade-off between unemployment and inflation. For 
Keynesians, cost-push inflation should be fought with controls, either voluntary 
or statutory, over wages and prices. But monetarists were adamant that the only 
answer to inflation was control of the money supply. Milton Friedman (1960) 
recommended, in particular, a policy rule involving a fixed percentage annual 
growth of a selected monetary aggregate. He continued to argue that price 
stability could be achieved by setting the target monetary growth rate equal to 
the average rate of growth of real GDP. A monetary aggregate was an 
intermediate target, offering indirect control over spending and inflation. 
Monetarists opposed the fine-tuning of the monetary aggregates. Any sort of 
fine-tuning was destabilising in their eyes because of lags and uncertainties in 
measurement, policy formulation, and implementation. 
Most central bankers strongly endorsed the view that money was important after 
all, money was their business. But they were reluctant to commit themselves to 
a rigid and exclusive theoretical perspective such as monetarism (Meek, 1983). 
Gordon Richardson, the governor of the BoE, indicated, in a speech in 1976, 
that control of the money supply, while desirable, was only part of the story. ‘I 
think it must be right to aim publicly for a growth in money supply which will 
accommodate a realistic rate of economic growth but not accommodate, more 
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than in part, the rate of inflation. [But] Monetary and fiscal policy – and I would 
add incomes policy – each has their part to play and should form a coherent 
whole' (McClam 1978: 7). 
Monetary targets were announced publicly in a number of countries in the mid-
1970s, including the USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Japan, and several Continental 
European countries. West Germany and Switzerland led the way, proclaiming 
monetary targets in December 1974 ( Fratianni and Salvatore 1993). By 
announcing a target, the authorities hoped to establish credibility. If the 
authorities' commitment to the target was believed, inflationary expectations 
and exuberance in the labour and product markets would recede. According to 
Friedman (1982: 102), Japan was the ‘outstanding example’ of a developed 
country following monetarist principles (West Germany also received some 
credit). BoJ used the M2 monetary aggregate as an indicator of demand 
pressure. 
Monetary targeting was adopted using the standard tools of monetary policy, 
ranging from the rediscount rate to open market operations (OMOs) to reserve 
requirements and administrative controls. However, there was a growing 
emphasis on OMOs. Two strategies presented themselves. Under the first, the 
central bank focused on maintaining the short-term interest rate that was 
compatible with the money supply target given the position of the demand-for-
money function. Under the second, the central bank determined the money 
supply independently and let the interest rate find its own level. Monetarists 
preferred the second approach and were inclined to recommend control of the 
narrowest aggregate, the monetary base.  By contrast, most central bankers 
preferred to smooth interest rates for the convenience of financial market 
participants, including governments, and found monetarist proposals 
disconcerting (Capie et al. 1994: 85). 
Monetary targeting gradually fell out of favour in the 1980s. Hitting the targets 
proved embarrassingly difficult. The velocity of circulation (or demand for money) 
became less predictable in the early 1980s than before (Capie, Goodhart, and 
Schnadt 1994:31). That is because of the development of new financial products 
including interest-bearing current accounts, the growing use and sophistication 
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of computer and communications technology, and the drive towards financial 
deregulation. Further, targeting’s validity depended on the stability of the 
velocity of circulation and the demand for money (Laidler, 1969). According to 
Cobham (2012), the formal discussion in the Anglo-Saxon nations, such as that 
at the BoE in 1986, held that the framework shift in the financial system implied 
that the demand for money had become unstable for targeting the money supply. 
To be realistic, the essential problem with the monetarist view, it is not that 
central banks did not have the instruments to regulate the money supply 
adequately. However, it is that money is endogenously created by commercial 
banks consequently central banks basically cannot control money supply. Hence 
they gave up any attempt to control credit creation. 
In the majority of the Anglo-Saxon countries, monetary targeting 
implementation led to a period of no clear structure to monetary policy. 
Meanwhile, Continental Europe, including the Bundesbank and BoF, maintained 
its monetary targets but resorted to a stricter exchange rate arrangement 
(Singleton, 2011). The latter arrangement—specifically, the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), of the European Monetary system—became mandatory for 
members of the European Economic Community. However, the United Kingdom 
joined the ERM in 1990 at what was clearly an overvalued rate, which then 
generated pressures to devalue, which happened in September 1992. 
Though the 1974–9 British Labour government introduced monetary targets, it 
was not until the election of the Conservatives, led by Margaret Thatcher, in 
1979 that fighting inflation became the top priority and monetary targeting took 
centre-stage (Britton 1994). The Thatcher government accompanied monetary 
targeting (control of M3) in the first half of the 1980s, with the so-called ‘big 
bang,' by 1986 which in effect broke the self-regulation of the London Stock 
Exchange. The era of monetarism in the UK was accompanied by the beginnings 
of the privatisation programme and anti-trade union legislation. 
Together with financial innovation, the trend towards financial deregulation and 
increased competition made it harder for the authorities to manage £M3, and 
the early targets were overshot. A debate ensued over whether £M3 was a good 
indicator of the tightness of monetary policy, as did a debate on whether control 
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of M3 was feasible. The link between money growth and inflation in practice 
was very imprecise. The monetarist framework was wound down, and in 1987 
the UK government ceased to announce monetary targets. 
In 1979, the Fed’s Volcker implemented something approaching a monetary 
base target through an interest rate target. Interest rates rose sharply between 
August 1979 and April 1980. Reflecting on British and American experience with 
monetary targeting, Charles Goodhart (1989:  377) notes that whatever its 
theoretical and practical defects, this approach facilitated ‘much tighter 
[monetary] policies. High interest rates (US) and a higher exchange rate (UK), 
that would have been adopted under more discretionary management. That did 
cause such severe deflation that inflation and inflationary expectations and 
psychology were tamed, if not broken.' 
Around this time, in the 1980s and 1990s, the doctrine of central bank 
independence (CBI) acquired an almost mystical status.  CBI is a difficult concept 
to define and measure; the associated concepts of accountability and 
transparency are no less slippery.  Forder argues that ‘those with the most to 
gain from central bank independence are central banks’ (Forder 2002: 52). Yet, 
the most ardent proponents of CBI were academic economists and politicians. 
Central bankers themselves could not afford to participate in what was after all 
a political debate on the nature of the relationship between the central bank and 
the state. 
As for cases relating to CBI, in England, though the BoE lacked formal 
independence, it retained considerable prestige and the capacity to influence 
events behind the scenes. When the bank gained independence in 1997 and the 
Monetary Policy Committee MPC was created, the context and significance of 
monetary targeting changed considerably (Singleton, 2009). Such targeting was 
initially introduced in 1992 following withdrawal from the exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM). In America, the Fed System was ultimately accountable to 
Congress. Critics said that the Fed was in reality either a tool of politicians or an 
unaccountable bureaucratic empire. 
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According to Goodhart, Capie, and Schnadt (1994: 48–9), central banking 
history has been marked by alternating periods of high and low independence. 
The pendulum swings in response to dissatisfaction with the status quo. The 
mid-twentieth century saw the repudiation of the brand of CBI associated with 
the gold standard. In the late twentieth century, however, a new type of CBI 
was forged in reaction to many years of political interference and inflation. CBI 
today is rather different from CBI before 1914.  In many (but not all) cases, the 
relationship between the central bank, the government, and society is now set 
out with greater precision. 
As for specific aspects of governance related to CBI, ‘instrument independence' 
or operational autonomy is distinguished from ‘goal independence' or the 
capacity of the central bank to set its own objectives. The distinction between 
goal and instrument independence was made by Debelle and Fischer (1994): 
the state should set the objective (or objectives) of monetary policy while 
allowing the central bank freedom in operational matters. Further, it is now 
accepted that CBI should be combined with arrangements to ensure 
‘accountability', though there is no consensus as to the form of accountability. 
Transparency is often viewed as vital for accountability and for the smooth 
implementation of monetary policy (Siklos 2002). The contemporary focus on 
transparency is a genuine innovation (Geraats 2002). 
Central bank reform coincided with a wider programme of public sector 
restructuring in the late twentieth century. Studies of the ‘new public 
management' in the 1980s and 1990s discuss accountability and the concept of 
rules versus discretion in the context of the public sector as a whole (Hood 1995:  
96). Advocates of public sector reform regarded civil servants and politicians as 
self-interested actors. In their view, civil servants spent taxpayers’ funds on their 
own empires, while politicians manipulated public sector agencies to buy votes. 
Under the principles of the new public management, public sector entities were 
(if not privatised) to be run in a business-like manner (Singleton, 2011). 
Managers were given clear objectives, and ministers were expected to refrain 
from interfering in operational matters. Public sector managers were held to 
account for their performance in relation to targets. 
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Returning to CBI specifically, Rogoff (1985) suggested delegating monetary 
policy to an independent central banker (or central bank) with preferences that 
are more inflation averse than those of society in general to establish credibility. 
The benefits of CBI in terms of lowering inflation without causing serious 
damage to the real economy were demonstrated empirically, notably by 
Cukierman (1992: 347– 455), though not to universal satisfaction. However, 
according to Mervyn King (2004), whatever the current benefits of delegating 
monetary policy to an independent central bank, the institutional framework 
cannot be set in stone. Further, King not only found that it is impossible to tie 
the hands of later generations in the area of institutional design, but it is 
impossible to predict what arrangements and policies will be most effective and 
appropriate in the future. 
During the 1990s, many nations amended their laws to promote CBI for their 
central bank. Central banks in the developed nations had no obligation to lend 
to their governments, but they had a statutory obligation to pursue price stability 
and formulate their policy rates. These freedoms of the central banks came as 
a result of the assessment of the central bank independence criterion (Goodhart 
2010). There had often been an argument about the standards of CBI and the 
association between the CBI and economic performance. Specifically, CBI 
standards have some explanatory power in cross-section, but not in the time-
series evaluation, which led to informal independence, which stressed factors 
such as social and political feelings regarding the apportioning of the duties 
between the government and the central banks. 
In one outcome of the discussion over CBI, states that intended to participate 
in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were legally bound by the 
Treaty on European Union to grant their central banks more autonomy prior to 
the formation of the European Central Bank (ECB). For example, the Bank of 
Italy and the BoF achieved independence with respect to the conduct of 
monetary policy in 1992 and 1993 respectively (McNamara 2002). The ECB, 
created in 1998, became the world’s most independent central bank as a result 
of political deals in the 1980s and 1990s. The weak accountability of the ECB 
(Forder 2002), which is the flipside of its independence, is reminiscent of the 
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situation at the Bundesbank, which should be no surprise because the ECB’s 
‘role model’ was the West German central bank (Baltensperger 1999: 513). 
Elsewhere in Europe, following the 1992 sterling crisis, when the UK was forced 
to leave the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), the credibility of British 
monetary policy was in tatters. Norman Lamont, the chancellor, called for the 
adoption of CBI in order to restore confidence in British policy (Singleton, 2009). 
However, Independence of BoE was first economics announcement by incoming 
Labour Chancellor Gordon Brown: announcement in May 1997. The new BoE 
Act came into force in June 1998 (Rodgers 1998). Priority was accorded to price 
stability, but the central bank was also required to strive for other 
macroeconomic objectives, including growth and employment, provided that the 
primary objective was not undermined. The BoE was stripped of the banking 
supervision function, which passed to the new Financial Services Authority, but 
it continued to be responsible for systemic stability. In 1998 responsibility for 
the management of government debt was transferred to the Treasury. 
In the USA, despite possessing substantial legal autonomy, the Fed appears to 
have been amenable to political pressure, especially in the late 1960s and 1970s.  
But this charge is harder to sustain for the 1980s and 1990s when Volcker and 
Greenspan were at the helm.  To be sure, under the Fed Act as amended in 
1977, the central bank has a dual mandate ‘to promote the goals of maximum 
employment [and] stable price effectively.’ But the Fed has been allowed to 
choose the weights to be given to the twin objectives of maximum employment 
and stable prices. Chairman Bernanke (2008) later stressed that the Fed 
independence and that the fed has to report to Congress semi-annually and 
being questioned by Congress for its policies promoted transparency. That made 
it easier for everyone to understand what the Fed was trying to do, enabling 
monetary policy to be implemented more smoothly and effectively. 
CBI was not the only change in the latter half of the 20th century. As I have 
discussed previously, financial regulation was tightened after the global 
depression of the 1930s. But by the late 1960s, regulation was coming to be 
seen as a drag on efficiency. At the same time, instruments such as credit 
controls had come to be perceived, by New Consensus Macroeconomics 
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followers, as expensive and not efficient in advanced nations. However, there 
was a push to financial liberalisation in that era. That was based on the idea 
that financial repression is detrimental to economic growth since it retards 
financial development and intermediation leading to reduced levels of 
investment (Singleton, 2011). Then, the banks pushed for liberalisation where 
the financial system had extended to a greater scope of the economy. Most 
central bankers supported deregulation. Central banks (and other financial 
institutions) lacked the experience of coping with banking instability, which was 
rare between 1945 and 1970 (Goodhart, 2016). (Refer to table 1 in Appendix I). 
Starting in the USA, Canada, West Germany, and the UK, financial liberalisation 
gradually spread through the developed, and then the developing, world. 
Liberalisation embraced the relaxation or abolition of controls over international 
capital flows, the domestic financial sector, and the stock market, as well as the 
lowering of barriers to entry into the banking and insurance sectors.  The role 
of technology was significant. Equipped with computers and improved 
telecommunications, banks and other financial institutions proved nimbler than 
their regulators. The pace of deregulation varied between market segments, 
countries, and regions. West Germany was a pioneer, allowing interest rate 
controls to lapse in 1967 (Franke 1999: 257). And in 1971 the BoE unveiled a 
strategy entitled Competition and Credit Control (CCC). Leslie O’Brien, the 
governor, explained that CCC was intended ‘to permit the price mechanism [i.e. 
interest rates] to function efficiently in the allocation of credit, and to free the 
banks from the rigidities and constraints which have for too long inhibited them’ 
(Roberts, R. 1995:  180).  CCC represented a major change of direction for the 
UK, and it was quickly followed by a massive credit boom which included house 
prices doubling in a year. 
The USA was an early starter of deregulation but proceeded at a more sedate 
pace than West Germany, Canada, and the UK.  For example, US banks were 
not allowed to combine investment (merchant) and commercial banking until as 
late as 1999, with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Barth, Brumbaugh, and Wilcox 
2000). A little earlier, the Fed welcomed the landmark Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 1980, noting that many of the scrapped 
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regulations had been ‘obsolete', and pointing out that the Fed Board had 
expressed ‘strong support' for key aspects of the new legislation (Brewer 1980: 
3). The old regulations had also made it costly for banks to retain membership 
in the Fed System, inducing many to quit. 
None of this is to say that central bankers were sanguine about the risks 
accompanying deregulation and the onset of genuine competition (West 1983). 
Steven Solomon (1995: 45) concluded that ‘central bankers were uncomfortable 
with the added … technical challenges being thrust upon them’. Nor did central 
bankers present a united front, as the Swedish Riksbank resisted deregulation 
in the early 1980s (Englund 1999: 83). 
Liberalisation was accompanied by the return of a phenomenon rarely, if ever, 
seen since the 1930s, namely the banking crisis. Most financial crises between 
1945 and 1971 were a result of unsustainable exchange rate parities (currency 
crisis) and did not involve the banking industry. After 1971, however, there were 
numerous banking crises and twin currency and banking crises, as well as more 
crises overall (Eichengreen and Bordo 2003).  In fact, in 2001 a study by the 
World Bank shows that there were 112 systemic banking crises in ninety-three 
countries between the late 1970s and late 1990s (Singleton, 2011). (See table 
1, list of banking and currency crisis, Appendix I). 
The cost to the taxpayer could be severe when governments or central banks 
bailed out or recapitalised failing banks or had to meet generous guarantees to 
depositors. The fiscal cost of systemic banking crises was 13 percent of GDP on 
average, but much higher in some cases, reaching 50 percent of GDP in 
Argentina in the early 1980s and Indonesia in 1997–9. As for overall costs (fiscal 
costs, output losses, and increases in public debt), comparing the USA vs. Euro-
zone, the recent crisis’s outcomes and costs have been comparable in magnitude 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2012). (See table 5 in the Appendix I for further details) 
Banking crises were frequent in the first few years after deregulation of the 
banking sector in advanced economies. Credit explosions often followed 
domestic financial liberalisation, as pent-up demand was released, and banks 
and other financial institutions fought to gain or defend market share. The lifting 
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of capital controls also encouraged cross-border financial flows. Sometimes 
these processes were linked – a credit boom might lead to a surge in equity and 
property prices, attracting capital from abroad.  Rising interest rates after the 
lifting of financial repression also sucked in foreign capital, much of it ‘hot' and 
capable of departing at short notice. Lacking experience of managing risk in a 
deregulated environment, banks and financial institutions often made unwise 
lending decisions to clients wishing to buy property and financial assets at 
inflated prices. In addition, Prudential policy was weak in this phase, as central 
banks and other supervisors struggled to develop and implement new 
procedures. When the asset price bubble burst, banks were left with non-
performing loans on their balance sheets. Some banks failed and/or were bailed 
out. Short-term foreign investors might also take flight, bringing down the 
exchange rate. 
Notwithstanding important local variations, the same basic pattern fits a range 
of countries, from the UK in the mid-1970s to the USA and New Zealand in the 
1980s, to Scandinavia and Japan in the early 1990s, and Thailand, Indonesia, 
and South Korea in 1997–8. The boom-and-bust cycle was more dramatic in less 
developed countries (Singleton et al. 2006). Further, emphasising a more benign 
aspect of liberalisation, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) argue that after an 
initial period of instability could occur, the incidence of crises recedes and the 
net benefits of deregulation become more evident than before. In addition, 
approaches to the management and monitoring of risk and the supervision of 
financial institutions become more efficient. However, as we all know, crises can 
still happen. 
With crises come central bank responses via prudential policy. Arguably, a 
central bank with prudential responsibilities could be diverted from its primary 
responsibility of securing price stability. Faced with serious problems in the 
banking industry the central bank might be tempted to inject large amounts of 
liquidity into the system, allowing the inflation target to slip out of sight. Indeed, 
a central bank with reason to believe that macroprudential stability is in jeopardy 
has little alternative but to provide emergency liquidity, even if it is not the 
banking supervisor. Continuing with the distinction between macroprudential 
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powers concerning liquidity on the one hand and supervisory powers on the 
other, developments in supervision often stimulate financial innovation, which 
in turn leads to new headaches for central bankers and other supervisors. 
Consider one financial innovation in particular. In the late twentieth century, 
banks made increasing use of securitisation, or the packaging and sale of 
bundles of loans in order to reduce their exposure to capital requirements. In 
principle, there was nothing wrong with securitisation. Due to the complexity of 
the packaging, however, the purchasers of securitised debt often did not know 
how much risk was being traded, and neither did the supervisors. 
Another role of central banking is to secure price stability. Central bankers have 
always been interested in price stability. Sweden adopted a price level target 
after leaving the gold standard in 1931. The objective of the Riksbank was price 
stability, though it was to reverse deflation and not to counter inflation (Berg 
and Jonung 1999). In 1951 it was proposed in West Germany for the ‘central 
bank to be assigned – to put it in modern terms – a concrete, statutory inflation 
target, more precisely one of zero per cent’. A sort of inflation target was implicit 
in the monetary targeting apparatus of the Bundesbank and the Swiss National 
Bank from the mid-1970s. The Bundesbank employed a quantity theory equation 
to set the monetary target for the coming year. After 1984 the assumed inflation 
rate was zero. The Swiss followed a similar procedure (Bernanke et al. 1999: 
57–8, 63– 4). 
Notwithstanding these early efforts at indirectly targeting inflation, New Zealand 
was the first country to introduce the direct targeting of inflation through 
monetary policy. After 1984, monetary policy in New Zealand was tightened by 
allowing interest rates to rise to market levels. Further, the exchange rate was 
floated in 1985.  Rising interest rates and exchange rate appreciation started to 
exert downward pressure on inflation from 1986. Canada was the second 
country to announce an inflation target.  In a speech in January 1988, John 
Crow, the governor of the Bank of Canada, argued that price stability was the 
appropriate goal for monetary policy, but he did not define this term precisely 
(Crow 2002: 16, 160 –1). 
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Inflation targeting was contagious. The feature of Inflation targeting is the link 
with interest rate policy. Hence, it became the mainstream way of thinking about 
monetary policy. One study found that at least fifty-four countries were applying 
inflation targets by 1998 (Mahadeva and Sterne 2000: 38).  Mervyn King (1994: 
115) described the UK as one of several countries ‘following the earlier lead of 
New Zealand and Canada' over inflation targeting. The UK had introduced a 
target of 1 to 4 per cent for underlying annual inflation in October 1992. From 
1995, the BoE was required to ‘aim consistently to achieve an inflation rate of 
2.5% or less some two years ahead.' (King, Mervyn 1997: 91). Inflation 
targeting was intended to provide a new anchor for monetary policy after the 
forced departure of sterling from the ERM. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union), price stability was 
declared to be the primary objective of the prospective ECB. To join the euro, 
the treaty required countries to meet various criteria. That is related to inflation, 
the long-term interest rate, exchange rate stability, the ratio of public debt to 
GDP, and the ratio of the fiscal deficit to GDP. Though not all countries allowed 
to join the euro actually met those criteria. The national central bank being 
independent was also a criterion, and the one which had to be met whereas the 
other criterion were often not met. The Bundesbank insisted on strict entry 
conditions on the grounds, which were not universally accepted, that strains on 
the single currency could be alleviated if member countries had similar rates of 
inflation and fiscal positions (Wyplosz 1997: 7). The treaty did not define price 
stability. The ECB's Governing Council determined in 1998 that price stability is 
its main objective and interpreted price stability as inflation between 0 and 2 % 
per annum. Following the Bundesbank’s desire, the ECB must be committed to 
price stability. The ECB was to also be independent from political control because 
only thus could German interests, as perceived by the Bundesbank, be 
safeguarded. Monetary conservatism and institutional independence were 
principles the ECB pays close attention to the monetary aggregates because of 
their relationship to the underlying as opposed to the proximate causes of 
inflation. The framers of the ECB's approach monetary policy seem to have 
courted ambiguity, creating a mechanism that contains elements of monetary 
targeting as well as inflation targeting. 
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Inflation targeting has often failed to meet its target – e.g. in euro-area inflation 
exceeded 2 per cent limit during the 2000s though marginally, UK’s inflation rate 
has often exceeded the 2 per cent limit; also following Angeriz and Arestis (2009) 
found that non IT countries as successful in reducing inflation as IT countries. 
Event that IT countries did achieve further reductions in inflation, and enjoyed 
better overall macroeconomic performance during the 1990s, but so too did 
other countries, including the USA, that did not target inflation explicitly (Ball 
and Sheridan 2003; Lin and Ye 2007). (In the USA, the Fed was unwilling to 
abandon some form of the dual mandate.) Angeriz and Arestis (2008) argued 
this particularly with respect to reduced inflation. Many other countries have also 
experienced low inflation in spite of never implementing inflation targeting. 
A new policy consensus extended to all central banks in the developed world 
and many in the developing world at the end of the twentieth century, but this 
was a consensus designed for a particular environment. When that environment 
was undermined in the mid-2000s, the inflation targeting framework began to 
look rather inadequate. Central banks followed the Greenspan Standard, starting 
with ‘keep your options open’, and ‘don’t let yourself get trapped in doctrinal 
straightjackets’ (Blinder and Reis 2005: 83–4). 
In the late 20th century, central banks appeared to be moving towards a 
consensus on the conduct of monetary policy that has been dubbed ‘flexible 
rules cum constrained discretion' (Arestis and Mihailov 2009). Studies based on 
the Taylor rule, for example, suggest that in practice central banks tried to 
smooth deviations in both inflation and output, whether or not they subscribed 
formally to inflation targeting. That was a fudge, but then so was the brand of 
monetarism applied in the Volcker and Thatcher era. 
In articulating the problem with inflation targeting, Greenspan thought that an 
inflation target would merely introduce a spurious precision. Specifically, John 
Taylor (1993) argued that central banks in the developed world should follow a 
simple rule when setting the policy interest rate. In the refined form of the Taylor 
rule, the policy interest rate reacts with equal force to percentage deviations of 
actual from the potential output (the output gap) and percentage deviations of 
actual inflation from a point inflation target (Asso, Kahn, and Leeson, 2007). 
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This was comforting for central bankers who had never wanted to abandon 
discretion. They saw it as a useful benchmark or rule of thumb. But the Taylor 
rule was not adopted formally either in the USA or elsewhere (Nelson, E. 2008; 
Taylor 1999; Svensson 2003). Even in the 1980s central banks had adopted a 
‘just do it' approach. 
Therefore, from the 1990s to the emergence of the crisis in 2007, monetary 
policy appeared to have achieved a new design, which laid much emphasis on 
the price stability instead of output stability and provided a comprehensive 
answer to all macroeconomic problems. The arrival of this design came as a 
result of both shifts in the macroeconomic theory (from the Keynesian era to 
the neo-classical era) and the shifts in the national and global environments 
(globalisation). New Consensus Macroeconomics followers believed that the 
monetary policy had attained the optimal point of its evolution. 
In the late twentieth-century, major central banks were celebrating the new 
consensus era based on central bank independence (CBI) and inflation targeting. 
According to King (2000), in recent years central banks had achieved a ‘position 
of power and responsibility unrivaled in their history'. Further, Issing (2000) said 
that people could have confidence in central banks (especially the ECB) because 
under the new dispensation of CBI, transparency, accountability, and credibility, 
they were more likely to deliver price stability than in the past. 
1.5 From the Crisis of 2007 to Today 
However, with the onset of the great financial crisis of the twenty-first century 
in 2007–8 the whole central banking profession was brought into question 
(Bordo, 2008). Banks were taking on more risk especially in the area of housing-
related lending. Despite the collapse of LTCM in 1998, the problems in 2007-
2008 in the UK with Northern Rock and RBS, and those in the USA with Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and others, central banks continued to believe that 
underlying conditions were benign. It was commonly believed that these 
financial institutions were appropriately diversified, highly liquid, and well 
capitalised, but in fact they were none of these things (BIS, 2008). Further 
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Iceland has faced a severe outcome of such policies and it was hit the hardest 
in relative terms: the Icelandic banking system and currency collapsed in 2008. 
Basically, the New Consensus Macroeconomics model and central banks failed 
to foresee the Great Financial Crisis. The distress or failure of so many banks is 
prima facie evidence of the failure of banking supervision and ‘macroprudential' 
oversight of the system. The New Consensus paradigm of the 1990s and 2000s 
might prove to be no less vulnerable than the gold standard paradigm in the 
1930s (Singleton, 2009). Further, Willem Buiter (2009) speculates that the 
current financial crisis has ‘signalled the beginning of the end’ for central bank 
independence. According to Cobham (2012), the economy reacted in manners 
that had not been anticipated, and stock cost became a major issue, fiscal policy 
re-surfaced as the major tool for the governments, and monetary policy had to 
devise new mechanisms and tools. Moreover, the interconnection between the 
independent central banks and the government was at stake in this period of 
the crisis. 
Ultimately, there is nearly always ‘joint central bank–government responsibility 
for monetary policy’ and governments nearly always have the power to override 
central banks (Siklos 2002: 303). The exception to this rule may be the ECB, 
which operates under a law that cannot be changed without altering an EU 
treaty. The question of how best to structure the relationship between the 
government and the central bank is a recurring one. Governments might decide 
that a return to macroeconomic policy coordination is desirable, and seek to 
reduce the operational autonomy of central banks. Since there is no consensus 
as to the proper location of banking supervision—central banks or 
governments—there could be further changes in this area too. In 2009 the 
British Conservative Party proposed returning this function to the BoE, an 
approach confirmed by the new government in 2010. 
Returning to the crisis, at the initial stages, central banks began to come up with 
the various ways to provide liquidity to the banks and the financial markets. 
Further, central banks also reacted to the crisis by engaging in ‘unconventional' 
monetary policies. In employing these monetary strategies, the Fed, the BoE, 
and the ECB encountered big expansion in their balance sheets due to their 
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various liquidity strategies (Goodhart, 2012). (See table 2, 3, and 4 in Appendix 
I, for the reaction timeline of the Fed, BoE and ECB in response to the crisis) 
The BoE in particular provided extra reserves to the banks via term selling 
beginning from September 2007. From December 2007, the BoE got involved in 
prolonged liquidity supports, not just of gilts but of housing mortgage-supported 
collaterals and later advanced to other forms of stocks (Cobham 2012). It later 
established a liquidity plan in April 2008. This scheme entailed the exchange of 
the Treasury bills for the high-quality, but momentarily illiquid, securities, for 
example, the mortgage-supported securities held by commercial banks for a 
duration not more than three years. This was not a permanent scheme, as the 
active participation period closed in January 2009, and it became valid until 
January 2012. 
In addition, the BoE also launched the discount window facility from October 
2008, under which the BoE could lend gilts to other banks in exchange of various 
securities (Goodhart, 2016). This scheme was formulated as a permanent facility 
with operations usually up to 30 days, but some were allowed to go for even 
one year starting in January 2009. This discount window facility obligated the 
banks to make modifications to the prevailing arrangements by which banks 
determined their own reserve targets. 
Similarly, the Fed also applied appropriate standards relevant in the context of 
the United States. For example, it operated bi-weekly term selling for dollars in 
December 2007 and January 2008. It also formulated a Term Collateral Lending 
Facility and a Basic Dealer credit facility in March 2008. In July 2008, the Fed 
Launched an 84-day term selling facility. They issued dollars through exchange 
lines to other central banks, for instance, the BoE, the ECB, and the Swiss 
National Bank. 
The ECB also embarked on similar undertakings. It formulated the Term Selling 
Facility from March 2008, which was later extended in size and terms. However, 
more of the facility provided in the euro area is carried out via the bank-based 
system instead of the financial markets as in the case of the Fed and the BoE 
(market-based system) (Arestis, 2017). This approach provided the ECB with 
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direct interconnections with a broader range of banks. It could issue liquidity 
reinforcement easily and directly via those agreements and did not need to be 
concerned with any particular financial market (see reaction timeline of the Fed, 
BoE, ECB in response to the crisis in the Appendix I). 
Another ‘unconventional’ monetary policy is that of near-zero and negative 
interest rates. See timelines of sitting interest rate since the crisis (See figure 1, 
Appendix I)1. For the Fed by December 2008 the interest rate cut went gradually 
from 4.25% to 0.25%, but, in December 2016 the Fed increased to 0.75%. By 
March 2009 BoE interest rate cut reached to 0.5% with a further cut to 0.25% 
on August 2016. On May 2009 the ECB cut interest rate from 4.25% to 1% and 
on June 2014 to 0.00% (negative interest rate). Thereby near-zero and negative 
interest rates become a new tool of monetary policy. The BoE and Fed have 
pushed their interest rates into near-zero. Meanwhile the ECB moved into 
negative territory, in an attempt to increase inflation expectations and raise 
inflation rates to the set targets, as well as enhance growth rates (Arestis, 2017). 
(See figure 1 of the Fed, BoE, ECB in the Appendix I) 
In another realm of policy making, regulations and financial stability came back 
to life with Basel III requirements for macroprudential and microprudential 
measures. Notably, these included a leverage ratio limit, increased capital 
requirements, stress testing, and a proposal to deal with pro-cyclicality through 
dynamic provisioning based on expected losses. However, these measures are 
to be implemented only on ‘too big to fail banks’ (Haldane, 2017). After the crisis 
much more focus has been given to the latest suggestions that central banks 
are to be given regulating power over the banking sector, and toward achieving 
financial stability. In particular, BoE incorporated financial stability as one of its 
official mandates. 
In term of fiscal policy and its relationship to monetary policy, according to 
Goodhart (2010) the majority of the developed countries, especially the United 
States, engaged in major fiscal policies from 2008 to 2009. Most of the 
                                                          
1 Figure 1 shows interest rate decline since the crisis, and the explosion of central banks’ balance 
sheets in response to the crisis. in addition, you can see unemployment graph as a result of the 
central banks’ policies. 
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developed economies experienced a steady rise in the budget deficits. Those 
deficits reduced by a small margin in the year 2010. They were expected to fall 
further due to the fiscal consolidation strategies employed by various economies. 
However, this was not the case, given the slow growth of the economy, which 
makes fiscal consolidation impossible under the deteriorated demand and 
investment, and loss of confidence (Sawyer, 2017). Further, the central banks’ 
support for government’s fiscal stimulus declined because of the perception that 
the central banks and the governments failed to deal with the prevailing crisis. 
consequently, there is an increasing pressure between central banks and the 
governments based on the view of central banks should retain its independency 
(Arestis, 2017). 
To sum up, major central banks in advanced economies pursued ‘unconventional’ 
monetary policy, such as QE, and near-zero or negative interest rate. Further, 
an important objective has been reemphasised, namely financial stability, by 
restoring confidence in the financial system; also, central banks aim to contain 
the impact of crises on the real economy. Despite all this, inflation is still the 
main target. 
1.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, central banks began as small organisations, but they have evolved 
over time. This was partly a reflection of the acquisition of new functions, 
especially in the regulatory arena after the Second World War. Governments and 
central banks partnered to achieve several economic objectives and goals. And 
banking regulation began to substitute for prudential supervision. 
The late twentieth-century wave of reform addressed problems arising from high 
inflation, and the discredited Keynesianism (and later monetarism). Central bank 
independence and inflation targeting became the new orthodoxy in the 1990s.  
Many countries passed legislation to grant autonomy to their central banks, 
often reversing the decisions of the mid-twentieth century. 
In the late twentieth century, central banking seemed to reach ‘perfection’ under 
the new dispensation of CBI, transparency, accountability, and credibility. 
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Central bankers seemed to know what they were doing.  However, with the 
onset of the great financial crisis of the twenty-first century in 2007–8 the whole 
central banking profession was brought into question. Central banks reacted to 
the crisis by engaging in ‘unconventional’ monetary policies, lowering interest 
rates to zero, and acting as a lender of last resort to banks as well as to the 
government. The need developed for regulation and the objective of financial 
stability in the central banking field. 
However, even though central banks have used the ‘unconventional' measures 
to restore the economy, it seems that they were not successful for many reasons. 
Heterodox economists, in particular, post-Keynesians, have heavily criticised 
New Consensus Macroeconomics. The main critiques were not only because of 
the policy failure before and after the crisis but also, more importantly, the very 




1.7 Appendix I 
Table 1 Dating Crises: Narrative Schemes 
 
Country                             Global Financial Crises            Alternative 
Chronologies 
Banking Crises Currency Crises 
DEU 1890-1891 1901-1902, 1893-1894, 
 1907-1908 1931-1932, 1907-1910, 
 1913-1914 2008 1914, 1931- 
 1920-1921  1932, 1934, 
 1931-1932  1949 
 2007-2008   
FRA 1890-1891 1882, 1888, 1888, 1914, 
 1907-1908 1889, 1907- 1923-1929, 
 1913-1914 1910, 1994- 1936-1937, 
 1920-1921 1995, 2008 1948, 1957- 
 1931-1932  1959, 1968, 
 2007-2008  1992-1993 
GBR 1890-1891 1890-1893, 1914, 1931- 
 1907-1908 1974-1976, 1932, 1947, 
 1913-1914 2007 1949, 1961- 
 1920-1921  1962, 1964- 
 1931-1932  1967, 1974- 
 2007-2008  1976, 1992 
JPN 1890-1891 1900-1901, 1900-1901, 
 1907-1908 1917, 1927- 1904-1908, 
    
 1913-1914 1929, 1992- 1917, 1921, 
 1920-1921 1997  
    
 
Note: Dates for global financial crises are from Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010). Dates 
for the other crises are from Bordo and Meissner (2016). 
SWE 1890-1891 1897-1899, 1914, 1931- 
 1907-1908 1907-1909, 1933, 1949, 
 1913-1914 1921-1922, 1971-1972, 
 1920-1921 1931-1932, 1991-1994 
 1931-1932 1991-1994,  
 2007-2008 2008  
USA 1890-1891 1884-1886, 1891-1893, 
 1907-1908 1891-1893, 1930-1933, 
 1913-1914 1907-1908, 1960-1961, 
 1920-1921 1914, 1930- 1971 
 1931-1932 1933, 2007-  
 2007-2008 2008  
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Table 2 Fed and treasury timeline intervention since 2008 
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Table 3 BoE timeline intervention since 2008 
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Table 4 ECB timeline intervention since 2008 
mid-2008 May 2009 June 2009 2014 June 2014 January 2015 March 
2015 
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Initiation of QE; to purchase 
€60 billion of euro area bonds 
and other safe financial assets, 
every month between March 
(2015) and September (2016), 
or until inflation is back to the 
ECB’s inflation target. implies 









as part of its QE 
 To help banks of financing the real 
economy 
    aim is to allow borrowing by the 
banks up to 30% of their non-
mortgage lending, provided they 
expand credit to the real economy. 
The ECB has also increased the 
range of assets to buy. The relevant 
range now includes corporate bonds 
alongside government bonds, asset-






Figure 1 USA, Euro-zone, UK and Japan key macroeconomic indicators 
USA  Euro-Zone UK Japan 
 
 
Sources: National statistical agencies and central banks via the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Bank of England, U.K. Office of National Statistics, 




Table 5 Crises Outcomes and Resolution in the Euro Area and the United States 
 
Source, IMF (Laeven and Valencia, 2012)
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Chapter 2:  New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) and Post-
Keynesians Critiques 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent great financial crisis (2007-2008) has shown the inadequate theories 
and policies of what is called New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) (Arestis 
and Sawyer, 2011). In order to analyse the NCM, I critically analyse NCM theory 
and policy from a post-Keynesian perspective. NCM ideas pertaining to 
macroeconomic policies have assumed that markets and particularly financial 
markets are stable and efficient, such that leaving financial institutions to self-
regulate would ensure market efficiency. The NCM model has continued to take 
an active approach to the overall research and has also been accommodated in 
higher-education institutions. Also, a lot of funds have been directed to NCM 
studies by research organisations. Most research conducted by the government 
as well as by the central bank has been based on NCM ideas since the early 
1990s. 
It is certain that before witnessing the financial crisis, a considerable number of 
mainstream economists were claiming the effectiveness of their established 
policies and theories pertaining to macroeconomics. For instance, Rajan, the 
chief economist of IMF (2005), claimed that macroeconomics at that time was 
‘progressive’ in a methodological sense of advancing rather than politically 
progressive. Further, after the crisis, most NCM advocates have believed that 
the NCM theory and policies had nothing to do with the overall causes of the 
crisis (Bernanke, 2009). According to Taylor (2009) argued that the main cause 
of the crisis is the failure to adhere to the Taylor rule. However, the crisis 
triggered a new debate about NCM and mainstream economics. The debate has 
clearly demonstrated flaws in the NCM policies and models which were not even 
questioned before the crisis. Therefore, heterodox economists have continued 
to derive the notion that there is a need for re-examining the existing 
macroeconomic theory and policies. In the rest of this chapter, I investigate the 
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NCM model then the post-Keynesian critiques of NCM. Finally, a conclusion will 
be drawn. 
2.2 The New Consensus Model 
The New Consensus Model (NCM) is mainly based on the neoclassical school of 
thought. It has been associated with neoclassical economics and with the 
neoclassical synthesis, which combines neoclassical methods and Keynesian 
approach macroeconomics (Olivier J. Blanchard,2008). It is rooted in the 
following key assumptions: a representative agent with maximizing-utility and 
maximizing-profit objectives, rational expectations, and forward-looking 
behaviour. Further, as an implication of these assumptions, the neutrality of 
money in the long run and the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy are key elements 
(Arestis & Sawyer, 2008). Moreover, intrinsically it assumes markets are stable 
by nature, and the laissez-faire economy and flexible price adjustment ensure 
the market clears and reaches equilibrium (Lavoie, 2009).  Further, NCM theory 
and policy were in the interests of the financial sector in its push for deregulation, 
while it led central banks to abandon their main tools for effective and 
independent monetary policy (ibid). Margin requirements, reserve ratios, the 
discount window rate, credit controls, and bank supervision were left behind so 
as to only utilize open market operations, focused on the short-term interest 
rate and targeting the rate of inflation (Singleton, 2006). Singleton (2011) also 
found that by the end of the 1990s most advanced central banks set inflation 
targeting (IT) as a primary objective to be supported by an independent central 
bank maintaining monetary policy credibility, rather than having as their 
objective maintaining financial stability in the financial system. 
Following the NCM model, monetary policymakers believe that inflation is a 
demand-pull-plus-expectations phenomenon, with demand being manipulated 
via interest rate and expectations through the credibility of the central bank to 
fight inflation as its primary responsibility, which is delegated by the government 
(Kriesler, 2015). Consequently, NCM monetary policy used the nominal interest 
rate as the key policy instrument to achieve IT. 
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NCM is viewed as an extension of the New Keynesian and neoclassical way of 
thinking, where the supply side determines the long-run outcome of output and 
employment (Lavoie, 2009). As with the strong emphasis on the long run in 
neoclassical models, this stream of thought believes that monetary policy is 
effective in the short run but is neutral in the long run. This stream emphasizes 
the existence of temporal nominal rigidities in wages and prices, and based on 
"Ricardian equivalence" it remarks on the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy (Arestis 
& Sawyer, 2008, Please see chapter 2 for more details on RE). 
To simplify the NCM model, three equations are used: 1) Aggregate demand 
equation, 2) Phillip curve equation, and 3) monetary rule or Taylor rule. 
Essentially, these core equations capture the dynamics of output (output gap), 
inflation, and the interest rate. 
The aggregate demand equation has been described in more depth by Creel and 
Fontana (2010) as 
Equation 1 
〖(y-y ̅)〗_t=a_0+a_1 〖(y-y ̅)〗_(t-1)+a_2 E_t 〖(y-y ̅)〗_(t+1)+a_3 〖(i_t-
E_t (π)〗_(t+1))+s_1 
y: current output, y ̅: potential level of output, t: time, E_t: expectation operator, 
i_t: short-term nominal interest rate, π: the rate of inflation, s_1: stochastic 
shocks 
In this equation, the current output gap 〖(y-y ̅)〗_t depends on the past output 
gap 〖(y-y ̅)〗_(t-1)   , the expected future output gap E_t 〖(y-y ̅)〗_(t+1), 
and the real interest rate 〖i-E_t (π)〗_(t+1). As in the previous versions of this 
equation, the interest rate has an inverse relationship with the output gap, given 
that a_3 is a negative parameter. The aggregate demand equation basically 
shows an inverse relationship between the real interest rate and the output gap, 
and that level of output is affected by the nominal interest rate and inflation 
expectations.  




Equation 2 (Creel and Fontana, 2010) 
π_t=b_1 π_(t-1)+b_2 E_t (π_(t+1))+b_3 〖(y-y ̅)〗_t+s_2  
This equation represents the supply side of the economy, allowing for sticky 
prices and rational expectations. Furthermore, it shows that inflation, π_t, is a 
positive function of past inflation, π_(t-1), future expectations of inflation, E_t 
(π_(t+1)), and the output gap, 〖(y-y ̅) 〗_t. The key idea of this equation is 
that there is an output–inflation rate trade-off in the short run, while this trade-
off disappears in the long run. Therefore, it can be considered as the equivalent 
of the model of the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
Phillips’ work (1958) showed an empirical relation between inflation and some 
measurements of economic activity, such as unemployment and the output gap 
(Daly, 2014). According to the Phillips-curve mechanism, there is a short-run 
relationship and trade-off between unemployment and wage inflation, where 
lower (higher) unemployment leads to higher (lower) inflation. Therefore, there 
is a danger of low unemployment, as it could lead not just to a higher rate of 
inflation, but also even to hyperinflation. Implicitly, the Phillips curve includes 
expected inflation and economic activity as determinants of the rate of inflation 
(Forder 2016). We could look to the Phillips curve as an indirect measure of the 
degree of credible commitment of the central bank to the main objective of price 
stability. Both ways of representing the NCM Phillips curve basically show that, 
in the short run, there is a trade-off between inflation and output. 
The main contribution of the NCM was to reject the Quantity Theory of Money 
(QTM) analysis, by rejecting the targeting of money supply to control inflation 
in favour of the interest rate tool and by implicitly rejecting exogenous money 
supply in favour of a weak form of endogenous money (Lavoie, 2009). The 
utilization of the interest rate tool came from Wicksell’s work, where he 
introduced two interest rates, the natural rate of interest (which is used in Tylor’s 
role as a given), determined by supply and demand in the goods market, and a 
loan interest rate, determined by the banking system (Fontana, 2006). 
According to Wicksell, an inflationary (deflationary) process, where the price 
level becomes higher (lower), will start whenever the loan rate is lower (higher) 
than the real natural interest rate (ibid). Moreover, the difference between 
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investment and savings, which is a function of the difference between the loan 
rate and the natural rate of interest, causes changes in price levels or inflation 
(ibid). However, Keynes (1936) in his General Theory contradicts the idea of a 
specific interest rate, such as the natural rate of interest that equilibrate savings 
and investment, by arguing that a natural interest rate corresponds to each level 
of demand and results in bringing investment and savings into balance. He 
assumes that asymmetric information and credit are considered nominal 
because of circumstances where bank loans’ interest rates differ from policy 
interest rates. 
A particular monetary reaction function, often referred to as the Taylor rule 
(Taylor, 1992), is the third equation of NCM, and it can be represented as follows: 
Equation 3  
it = r* + c1 (π – πT) + c2 (y –  ̅y) 
This equation shows that central banks have power to set a short-term nominal 
policy interest rate, giving them the capacity to determine the natural interest 
rate, r*. In addition, this equation indicates that the real interest rate is not only 
influenced by the inflation gap, which is the difference between inflation and the 
inflation target, but also by the output gap. In other terms, the nominal interest 
rate is explained by the current output gap, the deviation of current inflation 
from its target, and the natural rate of interest (Arestis, 2009). 
These three main equations in effect summarise the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium approach (see chapter 5 for further discussion on the DSGE model), 
which central banks have used in addition to other Macro forecasting models. 
These equations represent the core conceptual framework of the operations of 
many central banks around the world, whereby they use the interest rate tool 
to achieve long-run price stability as well as output stability in the short run. 
However, post-Keynesians have criticized NCM and its misconceptions. The main 
criticisms are discussed in the following section. 
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2.3  Post-Keynesian Critiques of NCM 
Post-Keynesian economists have criticized the NCM in numerous ways. They 
argue first that the NCM is unrealistic in its views of financial stability, rationality, 
risk, and micro-foundations. The second of the main critiques is to reject, first, 
the apparent absence of money and banks in the NCM model, which is implicitly 
based on the Quantity Theory of Money, and, second, the separation between 
the monetary sphere and the real production sphere (Chick, 2013). Those 
features are similar to those of ‘monetarism,' where the money supply is 
exogenous and monetary policy is neutral in the long run (Lavoie, 2009).  Third, 
it is argued that inflation is not a monetary phenomenon (demand-driven); 
rather, it is driven by supply (cost-push) factors such as wages, profits, 
exchange rate changes, and international prices (Sawyer, 2003). Fourth, 
rejecting the notion of the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy, they consider fiscal 
policy as a powerful stabilizing tool that can provide a "floor" for the economy 
(Arestis & Sawyer, 2008). Fifth, they reject financial market deregulation, and 
consider financial stability as the main objective of central banks, given the 
inherent instability of the financial system. 
Start with the first set of criticisms, and specifically the problem of how NCM 
views the  financial sector. Following the neoclassical paradigm, NCM designed 
a macroeconomic model based on an idealistic approach and a perfect world 
with no default or bankruptcy, one representative rational agent, and individuals 
optimising over infinite time horizons in a self-correcting and self-regulating 
market (Dow, 2017; Goodhart, 2016). Goodhart (2016) argued that the NCM 
model assumes no defaults because of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Unsurprisingly, this assumption is based on the free banking school, which 
assumes that a freely competitive banking sector (financial market) will always 
be in equilibrium in the long run. In the 1930s, the free banking school was 
revived in the debate between Keynes and Hayek. The latter, in addition to 
Friedman later, was a true believer in the stable nature of the banking sector in 
the sense that a free, competitive, and self-regulating financial market will 
enhance stability in the financial market and the economy (Goodhart, 2010). 
Therefore, such theorists argue, there is no need for a central bank in the first 
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place, and no need for regulation, as this will be a destabilising force. In contrast, 
Keynes, and Minsky later, argued that the banking sector and financial market 
are instable in nature, that the free-market mechanism and self-adjusting 
market are myths rather than a reality. Thus central banking and 
macroeconomic policies are a must for stabilizing such an unstable economy 
(Minsky, 1986). 
Another aspect of reality the NCM model explicitly disregarded is animal spirits. 
The atomic nature of society is essential to the NCM, reducing all individuals to 
a rational representative agent who is a utility-and-profit maximiser. The rational 
representative agent is rather unrealistic, as sentiments and animal spirits of 
investors and markets, in general, are an economic reality (Dow, 2013). 
Dow argued that fundamental uncertainty introduces an important dimension in 
the market which further challenges such an unrealistic assumption as rationality. 
The notion of fundamental uncertainty is fundamental to post-Keynesian theory. 
That simply means the future is unknown and unknowable. As Keynes (1937,) 
put it, fundamental uncertainty says that ‘We simply do not know.' This notion 
is different from probabilistic risk. In this vein, predictions and forecasting based 
on calculable probability cannot provide a true economic model, mainly because 
of the limited availability of information. In a sense, expectations cannot be 
based on a true model of the economy, and will themselves feedback on the 
outcome of economic processes (Hein, 2016). Basically, fundamental 
uncertainty prevents precise maximisation strategies from being applied by firms 
or households; satisficing rather than maximising behaviour dominates the 
scene. Davidson (1988) considers uncertainty to be a major characteristic of 
human life as such. 
Another controversial aspect of NCM is what is called ‘the micro foundations of 
macroeconomics', in the sense that macroeconomics is a simple aggregation of 
microeconomic decisions and actions, and the direction of causation goes from 
the micro level to the macro level. Individual behaviour is aggregated to one 
representative agent who is rational and an optimiser in nature, and who also 
has an infinite life horizon. Sawyer (2018) argues first that the relationship 
between micro and macro analysis goes both directions, and not only one 
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direction, which means from micro to macro as well as from macro to micro. 
Second, aggregating micro behaviour means that it is necessary to understand 
macroeconomics as psychological, collective, coordinated behaviour in an 
uncertain world, rather than as based on one representative agent who 
represents all. This reflects the view of political-economy analysis where 
institutions and power are essential to understanding macroeconomics. Thirdly, 
some macro concepts cannot be simply disaggregated, such as interest rate, 
inflation, and unemployment, as they can only be understood and analysed at 
the macro level. Sawyer further states: "Macroeconomic analysis, whether in 
theoretical terms, for empirical forecasting or pedagogical reasons, has generally 
proceeded by invoking relationships between macroeconomic aggregates” 
(Sawyer, 2018). 
For instance, the NAIRU is a level of unemployment at which (according to the 
theory at hand) the rate of inflation would be constant. The rate of inflation and 
the rate of unemployment are macro concepts, and the NAIRU cannot be derived 
from summing individual experiences. The NAIRU is a macroeconomic concept 
that is derived at the economy-wide level, but inflation and unemployment 
change continually depending on business cycles and other factors.  Given that 
there is no warrant that NAIRU is an attainable notion, thus it may not act as a 
‘strong attractor' for economic activity (Sawyer, 2016; Sawyer, 2001). Therefore, 
there are many concepts and relationships which are macroeconomic in nature 
in the sense that they cannot be derived by the summation of individual 
microeconomic behaviour. 
Moving on to the second major post-Keynesian criticism, the absence of money 
and banks in the NCM is very critical from a post-Keynesian perspective. As 
Lavoie (2009) described NCM, it is ‘Monetarism without money’ or, as it was 
described elsewhere, ‘Hamlet without the prince’. The absence of banks is based 
on the free banking school view. Further, the neutrality of money is based on 
the view of money as a nominal phenomenon that does not have any real effects. 
Money is viewed mainly as exogenous to the economy and its main function as 
a medium of exchange (it is just a price), thus having no social value. In contrast, 
post-Keynesians view money as an endogenously created by the banking system 
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and more importantly as a social phenomenon. It is based on the right-obligation 
commitments between banks and firms which have developed over time. In a 
wider sense, the existence of money and its value is derived from trust and 
social reality (Lawson, 2016). 
NCM ‘upgrades’ the role of central banks through interest rate policy as the only 
macroeconomic policy instrument. But the NCM downgrades the role of the 
central bank as a monetary authority (by excluding money from the model) and 
as a bank of banks (by making a model with no banks; indeed, banks do not 
appear in the NCM index of Woodford’s book [Fontana and Passarella, 2018]). 
In NCM, given its abstraction from money and banks, the real sector and the 
monetary sector can be separated (Chick, 2013). However, given that our 
economy is a monetary-production economy, as it was described by Keynes, 
money is endogenous—the sectors cannot be separated. Investment and 
spending decisions (demand for loans) drive the supply of money. Thus, 
money/credit creation is essential to our integrated monetary-production 
economy for two reasons. First, in order for production to take place, credit must 
be issued first. Second, since the future is uncertain, and money has a store-of-
value function, economic agents would prefer to hold cash, so that could cause 
fluctuations in effective demand and in investment decisions (Lavoie, 2009). 
Therefore, money and banks play an essential role in a monetary-production 
economy and the monetary transmission mechanism. From an endogenous-
money point of view, banks have a crucial role in creating (money) loans for 
firms. Since loans create deposits, the failure of banks to supply loans (credit) 
would affect production and the whole of the real economy, and would constrain 
any expansionary policy led by government or monetary authority (ibid). 
Therefore, money is non-neutral in the short- and in the long-run, which means 
that there may not be any long-run equilibrium position for the economy that is 
independent of monetary policy (Epstein 2013). Empirical evidence suggests 
that interest rate variations can have long-lasting effects over investment and 




The third post-Keynesian critique concerns the central bank’s monetary-policy 
focus on price stability, deriving from NCM’s view of inflation as the major threat 
to economic stability. NCM considers inflation a monetary phenomenon and a 
demand-pull phenomenon (Hein, 2017; Dow, 2017). The NCM theoretical 
aspects have incorporated the real business cycle (RBC) mode of thought as a 
basic methodology with some alternatives that include recommendations for 
policy and market friction possibility (Hein, 2017). The framework of this theory 
resulted in the belief that the main goal for central banks when forming 
monetary policy is to maintain prices in a relatively stable state (Lavoie 2012). 
Besides, the existence of various conditions in the model enhances output 
growth, and as a result, there is stability of inflation. In order to enhance inflation 
stability, there is a need for monetary institutions and authorities to actively seek 
a nominal anchor (ibid). Thus, for NCM a central bank committed to achieving 
price stability would increase its accountability and credibility, which would 
enhance the independence of central banks, and this would ensure economic 
stability (ibid). Several countries have adopted the use of this model as it was 
seen as a simple, perfect model that captured and resolved all the economic 
problems. 
Post-Keynesian economists dispute the ideas based on monetarism and QTM 
that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, and that money supply is the one and 
only cause of inflation. Rather the causality is the inverse. Expansion of the 
money stock is a consequence of inflation (Lavoie, 2014). They emphasise 
supply side factors and cost-push as the main causes of inflation. However, post-
Keynesians do not reject the possibility of demand-pull as one possible cause of 
inflation (Sawyer, 2008). 
Some studies found that there is no relation between interest rate and inflation 
rate as is claimed by the NCM. Consider as evidence recent experience with the 
low interest rate policy that was practiced by major central banks while inflation 
rate stayed low among developed countries for almost ten years (Lavoie, 2016). 
Thus, a close-to-zero interest rate was not able to increase inflation rate in most 
of the advanced economies. To support demand after the financial crisis, there 
was a necessity to ease monetary policy, but the nominal rate of interest rapidly 
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met a lower zero bound, hence creating a liquidity trap (Lavoie 2012). Thus, one 
lesson I would draw from the past decade is that Taylor rule has not been 
adhered to. 
In accordance with the theory of Monetary Circuit, some mainstream economists 
suggest that an increase in interest rates will increase inflation, that will 
correspondingly increase the scope of monetary policy. Cochrane (2014) has 
argued that as the optimal solution for the low-interest-rate and inflation-rate 
issue in the recent period, a higher target of inflation should be set so as to 
maintain higher nominal rates. This means a higher interest rate is needed to 
increase inflation, which is inconsistent with the NCM policy reaction function. 
 In addition, post-Keynesians also denied the role of price stickiness in explaining 
unemployment, and they also rejected the Philips curve and its trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment (Arestis & Sawyer, 2011). The Phillips 
curve was originally an empirical observation on the wage 
inflation/unemployment rate relationship, which has moved to be a theory-
driven idea about the price inflation/output gap relationship. Sawyer (2014) 
argued that the Phillips curve does not capture cost pressures on inflation, nor 
does it capture wage-price spiral effects in which price inflation pushes up wage 
inflation, and wage inflation pushes up price inflation. It also ignores any 
conflicts over income shares, which come to the fore in other explanations of 
the inflationary process. In contrast, following Keynes and Kalecki, for post-
Keynesians, employment, income, and inflation cannot be understood outside 
of the monetary-production economy, where credit and money play an essential 
role. Furthermore, unemployment is a feature of a capitalist economy, with the 
notion of active price setting of firms in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets. 
That is also based on the fundamental notion of effective demand and full 
employment, as capitalist economies are faced with unemployment and excess 
capacities beyond the short run and they take the rate of capacity utilisation as 
an adjusting variable also in the medium to long run (Hein, 2017). Therefore, 
whether prices are flexible or not is not the issue; what matters is the 
fundamental fact of unemployment as an outcome of the distributional effects 
in a capitalist underutilised monetary-production economy. 
68 
 
The fourth post-Keynesian critique asserts that fiscal policy, using price and 
income policies, is a better macroeconomic policy to deal with price level 
instability, and more broadly, the post-Keynesians look to a fuller set of policy 
instruments than just monetary policy. As recognised by Keynes, government 
intervention and monetary policy are essential for investment decisions, contrary 
to the sole utilization of interest rate that is low. What is more, many post-
Keynesian economists consider that achieving the full-employment objective 
could promote financial stability as well (Forder 2016). Conversely, it is hard to 
maintain full employment in the economy without having a stable financial 
structure. Therefore, a crucial role of monetary policy is to effectively promote 
stable full employment, through the financial-stability objective (Lavoie, 2012). 
In this vein, some post-Keynesians consider that financial stability should be the 
main objective of central banks (Arestis & Sawyer, 2009). Fiscal policy is the 
only existent tool for countering the recent prolonged crisis in particular when 
both monetary policy and quantitative easing have reached their limits (Lavoie, 
2012). Thus, post-Keynesians rejected the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy in NCM, 
by rejecting Ricardian equivalence (Sawyer, 2008). Fiscal policy is intended to 
underpin full employment and enhance economic stability. In addition, it also 
helps to avoid disaster in the financial markets, which usually comes in the form 
of a drastic increase in public debt and deficit. Further, investment decisions are 
insensitive to the interest rate, or at best low sensitivity; thus, investment 
decision is based on many other factors such as ‘animal spirits', future 
profitability, and uncertainty (Sawyer, 2008). Further, central banks could 
achieve financial stability through their lender of last resort, accommodative, 
and defensive functions, as well as employing the interest rate, supervision, and 
regulatory tools, all in coordination with fiscal policy (Lavoie, 2012). 
Further, post-Keynesians denied Friedman’s argument that the central bank’s 
seeking to maintain price stability is more effective in promoting financial 
stability (Schwartz Hypothesis) than regulating the banking sector or intervening 
in the financial market. For instance, Kriesler (2015) argued that central bank 
inflation targeting to maintain price stability may lead to financial instability: by 
generating optimistic expectations for macro agents, inflation targeting could 
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lead to a credit boom and rising assets prices, and thus, financial instability. 
Following a similar line of thought, the Bank of International Settlements 
concluded that assets prices could be good indicators of output growth and 
future inflation. Thus, it could be argued that stock market prices are based on 
discounted future dividend payments, and thereby linked with future output and 
inflation. 
On the fifth post-Keynesian critique, according to the efficient financial market 
hypothesis in NCM, deregulating the financial markets and removing legal 
limitations on financial institutions’ actions provide incentives to arbitrage 
regulatory and economic controls purporting to avoid excessive leverage and 
risk-taking (Bernanke, 2006). This could be interpreted as saying that 
deregulation enhances financial stability. However, post-Keynesians following 
Minsky argued that financial markets are inherently unstable. Banks and 
financial institutions are primary agents for the spreading of the financial crisis 
in the market. Thus, central banks' intervention as lenders of last resort because 
of inadequate liquidity and insolvency is crucial to save the economy from 
collapse and to avoid deflationary growth of the monetary system (Epstein 2013). 
It is prudent to combine regulatory controls with interest rate policies and to 
increase the range of monetary policy with rules that are flexible (ibid). Interest 
rate policy addresses aggregate variables whereas the regulation policies solve 
specific problems. 
Finally, as credit and finance matter, post-Keynesians have extensively studied 
and analysed the changing roles and structures of financial markets and 
institutions, what it is termed ‘financialisation'. They put emphasis on changing 
financial norms, new financial instruments (credit card debt, home equity 
lending), deterioration of creditworthiness standards triggered by securitisation 
of mortgage debt, and ‘originate and distribute’ strategies of commercial banks. 
Those strategies made increasing credit available to low-income, low-wealth 
households (Hein, 2017). Financialisation will be studied in the next chapter, in 




In the light of the recent great recession, the NCM theory fallacies explain very 
clearly why existing policies are inadequate and why all the recent 
‘unconventional' measures have not succeeded. It is mainly due to the 
unrealistic and static theory and assumptions such as one representative agent; 
rational expectations; agents' optimising behaviour; no money; no banks; free, 
self-regulating and self-adjusting markets; and the possibility of predictions and 
forecasting. Also, NCM is a simple mathematical model that policies depend on. 
Central banks are still following Greenspan the ‘Maestro' in dealing with the crisis, 
and following Bernanke and Gertler (1999), central bankers think they should 
limit themselves to “cleaning up” after busts, rather than worry whether they 
can “lean” against booms. Further, instead of questioning the ontology of central 
banking, central banks are event-led: while committing to IT, central banks keep 
their options open. Given their critiques of the unconventional standards, free 
market followers blame the Keynesian approach for the unsuccessful recovery. 
Here I would disagree. Calling these measures as Keynesian measures is 
misleading. 
Alternative, realistic theories and policies should be allowed in the central 
banking arena if central banks want to really solve the ‘unsolvable’ crisis. For 
instance, post-Keynesians provide an ontologically more realistic approach 
which is based on economic and social reality. Post-Keynesian theory is based 
on uncertainty, irrationality, collective rather than individual behaviour, 
interrelation and interaction, conflict of power, the existence of institutions, 
endogenous money, the unstable nature of our economy, the importance of 
macroeconomic policies, and the role of cooperation between monetary and 
fiscal policies to achieve different goals and objectives. Before the recent crisis, 
many advanced central banks adopted the inflation target following the NCM 
model. The overnight rate has been considered as a viable policy instrument to 
fight inflation and ensure price stability. NCM paradigm based on free market 
mechanism, efficient financial market hypothesis, deregulation, the 
ineffectiveness of fiscal policy, and central bank independence has spread into 
academia and policymakers. However, the recent financial crisis has shown the 
71 
 
inherent flaws of NCM model. In order to enhance and provide a suitable set of 
instruments that lead to economic crises, there is a need to re-examine the NCM 
paradigm. Post-Keynesian perspective shows the fundamental elements of a 
monetary production economy. Money is inseparable from production decision 
(Hein 2012). The crucial role of banks lies in providing credit for financing 
investment and economic activity. The inherent instability of the financial market 
evidences the need for macroeconomic policies to promote financial stability. 
Monetary and fiscal policy interdependency is crucial to achieve full employment 
and promote financial and economic stability. Macroeconomic policies 
addressing the increasing role of financial sector ‘financialisation’ should be 
seriously taken into consideration. Thus, macroeconomic theory and policy 
should be re-examined to avoid the next economic crisis. The following chapter 
will challenge NCM monetary policy in the arena of securitisation.  
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Chapter 3:  Financialisation and Central Banking: The Impact of 
Monetary Policy on Securitisation  
3.1 Introduction 
For the past three decades, the role of finance has escalated, changing the 
dynamics of the world economy, with a dramatic evolution and an increasing 
role of the financial sector at the macro and the micro levels of our world 
economy. Such a phenomenon is known as financialisation, which is defined and 
elaborated below. It has been the centre of attention among economists, 
particularly heterodox economists. 
This phenomenon of ‘financialisation’ is associated with the influence of neo-
liberal policies, which have been widely adopted since the 1980s, whereby policy 
makers pursue ‘laissez-faire' economics and push for deregulation in the 
financial market. Furthermore, monetary theory and policy ruled by mainstream 
economics have limited the role of a central bank to one instrument (short-term 
interest rate) and one objective (price stability through inflation targeting). 
In contrast, heterodox economists, particularly post-Keynesian ones, have 
stressed the role of money and banks in our monetary production economy and 
have identified the role of the central bank as a ‘bank of banks' as a crucial one, 
where the central bank should focus on financial matters and financial stability. 
In addition, the dramatic increase of complex financial innovations, such as 
‘securitisation', has changed the banking model from ‘originate and hold' to 
‘originate and distribute'. This newer model involves banks’ transforming illiquid 
assets to liquid, creating more liquidity by expanding their balance sheets (off-
balance sheet activities), lowering lending standards, increasing risk taking, 
increasing their ability to create liquidity, and more importantly being less 
dependent on central banks’ liquidity. 
Given the effects of securitisation, it is therefore important to re-examine the 
role of monetary policy and its transmission mechanism through bank credit 
channel. This paper aims to address the question of whether, and how 
securitisation offsets the effects of monetary policy on bank balance sheets.  We 
empirically investigate the interdependencies between monetary policy and 
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banking activities using data from 1995 to 2015 for a panel of 10 countries.  Our 
sample falls in the period of what is known as the ‘Financialisation era’.  We 
particularly focus on the interactions between securitisation activities and 
monetary policy using a panel VAR model, estimated using a GMM system.   Our 
paper contributes to the evolving literature on the interactions of monetary 
policy and banks behaviour. 
This study will first shed light on the financialisation era by providing a general 
description and understanding of this phenomenon. Second, I study monetary 
policy as formulated by mainstream economists. The third section will analyse 
the securitisation process to give a better understanding of this phenomenon, 
including its evolution and its financial structure. Then, the role of central bank 
policy will be analysed in relation to securitisation in order to investigate the 
efficacy of monetary policy and its transmission mechanism through the bank 
lending channel (balance sheet channel). Then the data will be considered, an 
econometric model applied, and the results analysed. Finally, I critically assess 
the role of securitisation and draw conclusions. 
3.2 Financialisation 
In the last thirty years, the increasing role of finance has changed the way the 
world economy works, shifting it from a real production economy to a finance-
led capitalist economy. This phase of capitalism is what Minsky (1986) called 
‘the money manager phase of capitalism'. Minsky has described this phase as 
the outgrowth of a new banking business model with risky short-term 
performance and behaviour rather than a stable-long-term model of the overall 
financial sector's performance where the sector would play a role that serves 
the overall economy. The shift to this phase is called financialisation, one of the 
most popular terms used by heterodox economists to characterize the present 
phase of capitalism, in which it is ruled by neoliberal ideas (often supported by 
mainstream economists). Epstein (2005) defined financialisation as ‘the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies’. Financialisation refers as well to the growing engagement of non-
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financial corporations in the financial sector or the shift to shadow banking in 
financial markets (Nersisyan and Wray, 2010). 
By way of context, since the early 1980s neo-liberal policies have been widely 
implemented. With deregulation of labour markets, reduction of government 
intervention into the market economy and of government demand management, 
a shift of income from (lower-income earners’) wages to profits and top 
management salaries, and deregulation and liberalisation of national and 
international financial markets (Hein, 2011). Post-Keynesian economists have 
found in these paradigms and concepts the root cause of the current crisis. 
Furthermore, following Minsky’s work (Minsky, 1986), some post-Keynesian 
economists have argued that financial fragility and instability is a systemic 
problem in such a neo-liberal system. It is a result of internal market processes 
that allowed fragility to build over time (Nersisyan and Wray, 2010; 
Stockhammer, 2010; Hein, 2011; Lapavitsas, 2010). In post-Keynesian terms, 
the financial system evolved from hedge to speculative, to, finally, a Ponzi 
scheme (Nerisyan and Wray, 2010). 
Such an evolution mirrors a process of financialisation, which can be presented 
as the increasing and excessive use of financial innovations and products such 
as credit default swaps (CDS), derivatives, options, and mortgage-backed 
securities, as well as the excessive growth of leverage. 
In a system with financialisation, the model of non-financial firms has completely 
changed from ‘retain and reinvest' to ‘downsize and distribute' or ‘retain and buy 
financial assets'. Firms’ long-term vision substituted for a shorter-term one, and 
firms are more involved in managing financial portfolios and financial matters 
than in production, affecting real investment in the economy (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000). Firms' sales growth is driven by higher incentive management 
fees, higher dividends and stock options, and a booming stock market, along 
with looser credit standards and thus higher household debt ratios (Lavoie, 
2008). Furthermore, industry, banks, workers, and financial markets have 




I focus on one important financial innovation: securitisation, which changed the 
traditional mode of operation of banks from ‘originate and hold loans’ to 
‘originate and distribute loans’ by transforming their illiquid assets – long-term 
loans – into liquid ones that can be removed from their balance sheets, in the 
sense that the securitised loans are sold to other financial institutions. This 
securitisation mechanism helped banks to expand their balance sheets and have 
more power in liquidity creation. It delinked interest rate policy’s impact on the 
volume of credit. Indeed, this dramatic change helped banks to be less 
dependent on central banks’ policies and their transmission mechanism, in 
particular liquidity creation and the bank lending channel (BLC) through the 
balance sheet channel (off-balance sheet activities). Securitisation, first, helps 
banks to be at the centre of liquidity creation in the wholesale market (Dymski 
et al., 2016). Second, it gives them relief from Basel capital requirements, which 
allows them to increase credit volume with less constraint (Chick, 2016). Finally, 
it allows them to compete in the financial market, increasing their short-term 
profitability, thus banks’ profits become based on fees rather than the interest 
rate spread (Dymski et al., 2016). 
Securitisation is one of the most notorious and complex financial innovations of 
the last three decades. This phenomenon has undergone an expansive growth, 
which has produced profound changes across the financial sector, particularly 
the way in which banks create liquidities and generate income.  
Simply, the securitisation process chain (see figure 2 below) starts when banks 
(originators) sell their account receivables, such as residential and commercial 
mortgages, auto loans, credit cards and student loans, which are known as ‘true 
sale', to special purpose vehicles (SPVs). The latter then issues securities and 
usually acquires the underlying asset from the originator. SPV creates pools of 
loans depending on maturity and interest rate, then sells these pools of loans or 
securities in ‘tranches' (senior, mezzanine, and unrated equity tranches) to 
investors. At the same time, the SPV appoints a servicer, usually a bank, to 
collect interest and principal payments on the underlying loans (Marques-Ibanez 
and Scheicher, 2012). This process guarantees the separation of the underlying 
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assets from the solvency of the originator. In this process, there are three other 
parties involved, the swap counterparty, the trustee, and the rating agency. The 
swap counterparty is usually involved in hedging the interest-rate and currency 
risk, while the trustee ensures that the money is transferred from the servicer 
to SPV and that investors are paid as well. Rating agencies are responsible for 
rating senior and mezzanine tranches using credit risk management techniques. 
Figure 2: The process of Securitisation  
Source: A Resource Guide, European Securitisation Forum (2006). 
Functionally, securitisation can be defined as transforming illiquid assets to liquid 
ones as far as the banks are concerned and hence helps banks to increase their 
liquidity. We could summarize the motivations for securitisation in three 
categories. First, when banks sell their loans to what is called special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) and obtain a lump sum value by using off-balance-sheet 
techniques, it increases liquidity and profitability. By doing so, the banking 
system can secure additional funding, and it can satisfy the credit demand 
(Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). Moreover, when banks service the securitized 
loan, they also obtain revenue from this process, increasing profitability. Second, 
by selling loans and getting involved in off-balance sheet activities, banks can 
transfer credit risk to SPV's and other financial institutions in the securitisation 
process chain. Indeed, Menton, Sanders, and Strahan (2004) and Bannier and 
Hansel (2008) found that the primary purpose of securitisation is credit risk 
transfer, as well as to serve as a new funding tool, which helps banks to be more 
77 
 
efficient, share risk, and increase liquidity. Furthermore, according to Pennacchi 
(1988), this process provides a lower cost method of financing for banks facing 
a competitive deposit market. Third, banks obtain regulatory capital relief by the 
removal of loans from their balance sheets, which allows for increased liquidity. 
I focus on the first motive, which relates to the increase of liquidity by the 
expansion of balance sheet through securitisation. This self-feeding process, 
based on the recirculation of loans, encourages banks to increase their credit 
supply and lower their credit standards, by giving loans to non-worthy clients 
and allows them to be less impacted by central bank’s policy rate. Moreover, 
through securitisation, banks were able to escape the reserve constraints, and 
thus, monetary policy will not be effective through banking lending channel 
(Romer and Romer 1990). However, banks in some countries like Canada and 
Australia (and UK for sometimes) are not subject to reserve constraints. 
In the USA, securitisation can be traced back to the 1930s, when the Federal 
National Mortgage Association was created to buy and sell insured mortgages 
federally. However, it was not until the 1970s that securitisation developed in 
the residential mortgage market. The USA was first to implement this financial 
innovation by the public law of the US Housing Ministry where the Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae) has purchased mortgage 
loans and issued securities on them to support undercapitalized regions (Kotz 
2010). The market for assets-backed securities started to develop by means of 
government-sponsored agencies, such as the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, known as Freddie Mac, which enhanced mortgage loan liquidity by 
issuing and guaranteeing but not originating asset-backed securities. The 
secondary market for mortgage-backed securities was around $7.5 trillion in the 
middle of 2008 (Fed 2009). In the US, securitisation evolved under the 
framework set by the Glass-Steagall Act (1933), where investment banking, 
commercial banking, and securities firms were separated. In 1999 this regulation 
was replaced by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which allows banks to 
associate with securities firms, in order to accommodate the needs of the 
financial sector. The growth of securitisation in the US, before and after the 
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crisis, saw Mortgage-Backed Securities issued by government-sponsored 
agencies and private labels over time and saw the growth of assets backed 
securities, as is illustrated in figures 3 and 4 below. 
In contrast to the US experience, the development of asset securitisation market 
started relatively late – at the end of the 1990s – in the Euro area. The reasons 
for the growth in securitisation activities were technological and financial 
innovations, and the introduction of the Euro, as well as the increase of demand 
for asset-backed securities. Since the introduction of the Euro, the increase of 
financial integration and the removal of exchange rate risk among Euro area 
countries have contributed to the growth of the securitisation market (Baele et 
al. 2004), as shown in figure 3. As in the US, the growth of securitisation in the 
Euro area has been supported by the financial sector regulatory framework, 
which has adapted to the needs of this sector. For instance, with the introduction 
of Law 130 (1999), known as the Italian Securitisation Law, Italian financial 
institutions were allowed to securitize and act as SPVs. The increase of 
securitisation activities was different among Euro area countries. Countries such 
as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and the Netherlands have experienced a 
significant increase due to the rise in real estate prices. Furthermore, by 2005 
commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities represented 
approximately 68% of all Euro area securities (European Securitisation Forum, 
2005). Figures 5 summarizes the growth of securitisation issuance in the UK and 
the Euro-Zone countries. 
A different approach to securitisation originated in the late eighteenth century 
in Denmark and Germany, where covered bonds are more active than mortgage-
backed securities (Golin, 2006). In the case of covered bonds, the originator 
creates pools of the illiquid assets, and banks keep these covered bonds 
recorded and registered before then offering them to investors (Smallman, 
2006). That is different from securitisation, where the illiquid assets are off the 
balance sheet. Instead, assets remain on the originators’ (banks’) balance sheet. 
Therefore, through this mechanism, the issuing bank will increase liquidity 
without transferring risk. In addition, given that assets in a pool are recorded 
and registered, in the event of the insolvency of the originator, investors can 
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claim the assets backing the pool. In this way, payment through covered bonds 
is backed by the originator and the underlying assets. 
Figure 3: US origination: Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Vs Private Label 
issuers. Source:  
 
SIFMA, 2018. 
Figure 4: ABS Issuance: US. 
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Figure 5: UK & Euro Area countries  
 
Source: SIFMA, 2018. 
Figure 6: Outstanding Securitisation as % of GDP, UK & Euro Area Countries 
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The rapid growth of securitisation, before the crisis, in the US, the UK, and the 
Euro area, and its impact on the financial market and banks, leads us to research 
its effects on central banking and monetary policy. Such research is especially 
relevant with the call for a revival of securitisation in US and Europe, based on 
the idea of restoring liquidity in the market (BoE & ECB, 2014). 
3.4 Securitisation and Monetary Policy 
Securitisation has changed the financial structure and the way banking business 
is conducted. Many economists have pointed out that banks changed their 
traditional way of working from ‘originate and hold’ to ‘originate and distribute’, 
with the aim of generating income from the spread of interest rate (Kregel 2007). 
Furthermore, during the last thirty years, the role and the nature of banks have 
changed dramatically in the financial markets, where commercial banks lost their 
prominent role in the economy to the advantage of investment banks and 
financial markets (Seccareccia 2012). 
An important aspect of securitisation is its impact on monetary policy and its 
transmission mechanisms, where changes in liquidity and credit-channel 
transmission mechanisms have reduced policy effectiveness (Estrella, 2002) due 
to the deep connection between banks’ funding and financial markets. Through 
securitisation, banks are not subject to reserve constraints, and thus, monetary 
policy will not be effective through banking lending channel (Romer and Romer 
1990). Banks’ lending becomes more dependent on financial markets’ conditions 
than on banks’ deposits from the public. Indeed, securitisation could have a 
remarkable effect on the banking sector’s ability to lend (ECB, 2008b). This is 
mainly due to the relief of the illiquid assets from banks' balance sheet. In this 
manner, by securitising the illiquid assets banks do not need to wait for the loans 
to be repaid. These findings are supported by Altunbas, Gambacorta, and 
Marques-Ibanez (2009), who used European banks' data to demonstrate that 
securitizing banks are less responsive to monetary policy because of the 
loosening of the link between central bank policy rate and banks’ loans and 
deposit interest rates. Furthermore, they found that securitisation weakened 
banks’ lending channel (in contrast to Aysun and Hepp (2011), who found that 
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the higher the degree of securitisation, the higher banks’ responsiveness to 
monetary policy). Similarly, Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, Berger 
and Bouwman (2010) studied the influence of monetary policy on banks' liquidity 
creation (on and off-balance sheet) in the US, and found that medium and large 
banks' liquidity creation is not significantly affected by monetary policy. 
Furthermore, they have found that during economic crisis, banks’ liquidity 
creation is even less responsive to monetary policy. The significance of these 
findings is evident when considering that medium and large banks in the US are 
responsible for the creation of approximately 90% of USA banks' liquidity. 
Moreover, the increasing influence of financial market forces towards 
determining credit expansion has limited the ability of the Fed to affect the 
economy through its monetary policy (D'Arista, 2009). 
Nevertheless, according to Bernanke (2007), the then Fed chairman, “the 
globalization of financial markets has not materially reduced the ability of the 
Fed to influence financial conditions in the United States,” but has only “added 
a dimension of complexity to the analysis of financial conditions and their 
determinants.” Furthermore, Woodford explained: “all that matters is that the 
Fed be able to control overnight interest rates; this gives it the leverage that it 
needs in order to pursue its stabilization objectives [including price stability]” 
(Woodford, 2002:88). 
Securitisation has also affected the lending standards of banks. Diamond (1984) 
and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) have pointed out that the profitability of 
transferring assets from banks' balance sheets to markets has discouraged the 
screening of borrowers, changing the monitoring function of banks. That is 
consistent with the lowering of lending standards observed in economies with 
high securitisation rates, such as USA (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008), and with the 
fact that securitizing banks make more loans (Altunbas et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the lowering of lending standards will increase banks' default rate. 
Lower lending standards have another cause as well: Maddaloni and Peydró 
(2009), who studied the determinants of banks’ lending standards in the 
Eurozone. They have found that low interest rates for extended periods of time 
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(‘cheap money') lower lending standards, regardless of borrowers' 
creditworthiness, while increasing banks' risk-taking. 
And banks' risk-taking is accentuated by the use of securitisation under short-
term low interest rate, along with weak lending-standards supervision. In 
addition, the more risk banks take with the ownership of mortgage- backed 
securities, the higher housing risk will be (Dong 2011). Furthermore, as the ECB 
admits in agreement with Kregel, "[securitisation] worked well for more than 
thirty years, but, in practice, instead of dispersing the risks associated with bank 
lending, securitisation had the perverse effect of concentrating them in the 
banking system" (ECB 2010, p. 77). 
Therefore, given the impact of securitisation on banks' liquidity, lending 
standards, banks' risk-taking, and effectiveness of monetary policy, the role of 
the central bank as the bank of banks should be re-examined. 
What should the primary objective of the central bank be? With the changing 
behaviour of financial markets and of banks, the central banks should focus on 
financial matters, taking into consideration the fragility of the financial market 
and system, rather than focus on interest rate policy to achieve inflation 
targeting (as prescribed by NCM). Therefore, given the central bank’s 
importance as the centre of monetary and financial systems, it should play an 
important in directing banks and financial institutions as well. Put differently, 
central banks should maintain their ability to regulate and control financial 
institutions, portfolio strategies, and loans’ conditions. In other words, it should 
be the one to write the rules of the game (Minsky, 1975). Economists such as 
Minsky consider that central bank should play its ‘bank of banks' role by focusing 
on the banking system, financial matters, and financial stability rather than 
inflation rate and price stability, and do not sympathize with the stance central 
banks adopted towards financialisation. Minsky argued that changes in the 
structure of the financial market should have led central bank actions and 
efficacy to be re-examined (Minsky, 1957). 
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3.5 Empirical analysis 
3.5.1 Data and Methodology  
To explore the efficacy of monetary policy and understand its transmission 
channels through the bank-lending channel (i.e., the balance-sheet channel), I 
use annual data from 1995 to 2015 for a panel of ten OECD countries (nine 
Euro-Zone countries and the UK). The variables in our empirical analysis include 
policy rates r - representing monetary policy; total stock of loans L; and a proxy 
for securitisation, SEC. The SEC activity is constructed as follows: 
Equation 4 
𝑆𝐸𝐶 =  (
𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) . 100, 
where SL stands for the flow of securitised lending in year t in country i, and 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 represents total assets at the end of the previous year. The data for 
securitised assets include mortgages-backed securities (MBS) and assets-backed 
securities (ABS). This measure of securitisation activity is consistent with 
Altunbas et al. (2009). 
In addition, other relevant variables are included that are likely to interact with 
monetary policy as well as the banking sector. These variables include liquidity 
ratio LIQ and real output Y. The data for r, Y, and L are taken from Eurostat. 
The data for securitised assets are taken from Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Associations (SIFMA). 
I employ a panel VAR model, using GMM estimation technique. The 
implementation of a VAR model is a common practice in the literature to study 
the effects of monetary policy. The Panel VAR approach that I adopt has the 
same advantages as the traditional VAR model used for time-series analysis. 
The panel VAR model can be represented as follows: 
Equation 5 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝐴(𝐿)𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  represents a vector of endogenous stationary variables for every 
country (i=1,2,…,T), 𝛼𝑖 represents a vector of country fixed effects, 𝐴(𝐿)𝑖 is a 
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matrix polynomial in the lag operator (L), and 𝛽𝑖 is the contemporaneous matrix 
of the disturbances 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
It is well known that fixed-effects estimation in a cross-sectional time series 
(panel data) is inconsistent because of the presence of lags of the dependent 
variable, resulting in a correlation between fixed effects and regressors (Nickell 
1981). In the presence of correlation between fixed effects and regressors, the 
standard mean differencing leads to biased estimates (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988). 
Following Love and Zicchino (2006), this problem is overcome by adopting the 
GMM procedure, using the forward mean differencing known as the Helmert 
transformation. This procedure involves the transformation of all variables into 
deviations from forwarding means, which preserves the orthogonality between 
transformed variables and lagged regressors. The lagged regressors are used 
as instruments in the GMM estimation to obtain unbiased coefficients. 
To obtain orthogonal impulse response functions by following a Cholesky 
decomposition, the ordering of the benchmark model is as follows: 
Equation 6 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = [ln(Y), r, ln(L), ln(LIQ), ln(SEC)]. 
The ordering of the first two variables is consistent with the vast empirical 
literature on the identification of monetary-policy shocks in VAR models, where 
output precedes the policy rate (see, e.g., Christiano et al. (1996, 1999), and 
Mojon and Peersman (2001) amongst others). The ordering of the last three 
variables is not addressed in the existing literature. However, it can be argued 
that this ordering is consistent with the behaviour of modern central banks. The 
monetary authorities directly respond to output fluctuations to fulfil the objective 
of stable economic growth. Therefore, output shocks have contemporaneous 
effects on output whereas policy rates affect output with a lag. On the other 
hand, monetary authorities do not respond directly to credit growth in the 
economy whereas banking behaviour is directly affected by monetary-policy 
decisions. Therefore, monetary policy shocks contemporaneously affect banking 
behaviour but banks' behaviour, in turn, affects output and policy rates with a 
lag. Finally, our proxy of securitisation is directly affected by all variables 
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whereas securitisation affects all variables in the system with a lag. The results 
of a Cholesky decomposition are usually sensitive to the ordering of variables; 
we, therefore, try different orders to test the sensitivity of our results, as will be 
discussed later. 
Prior to the estimation of a VAR model, I apply several panel unit-root tests. 
First, the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test proposed by Pesaran 
(2007) is used, which accounts for the cross-sectional dependence. For 
completeness, I also apply Levin, Li, and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003). If the variables are found to exhibit a unit root, I difference them and 
re-test them for a unit root. The purpose of this exercise is to ensure that all 
variables comprising our vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 are stationary, which will result in a stable 
model. 
The aim here is to investigate the role of the central bank as the ‘bank of banks' 
in the financialisation era by studying the interdependencies between 
securitisation activity and monetary policy. Considering a panel of UK banks 
during the period 1980-2016 and Euro-area banks for the period 1996-2016, I 
look at the relationship between securitisation and monetary policy in order to 
study, in the presence of securitisation, the efficacy of monetary policy through 
the transmission mechanism whereby its policy rate affects banks’ lending 
behaviour. 
For the Euro-area, Eurostata are used for macro variables and bank-specific 
variables and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associations (SIFMA) 
for securitized assets. In this analysis, only mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
and asset-backed securities (ABS) are considered as securitized assets. 
The main contribution of this data analysis is to show that securitisation 
significantly affects the credit channel, which reduces the efficacy of monetary 
policy, confirming the recent empirical studies (Altunbas et al. 2009). The 
empirical literature about the estimation of this dynamic model (model1) started 




3.5.2 Empirical results 
 
Table (6) shows the results of panel unit-root tests. Overall, it can be concluded 
that all variables contain a unit root except the proxy for securitisation. The first 
difference of the variables containing a unit root is found to be stationary. The 
construction of the proxy for securitisation is based on the flow of loans. Thus, 
it is not surprising that this variable is stationary, as the flow of loans (i.e., the 
first difference of the stock of loans) is stationary. 
Table 6: Unit-root tests 
 
I include stationary variables in this model and estimate a dynamic panel VAR 
model. I use several lag-length selection criteria, all indicating the inclusion of 
one lag. Figure 6 shows the impulse response obtained using a Cholesky 
decomposition. 
I first focus on the interactions between monetary policy and the activities of 
the banking sector. An interesting result emerging from the model is the 
response of securitisation activities to a monetary-policy shock. The results 
indicate that a one-standard-deviation positive shock to monetary policy 
(increase in interest rate) immediately increases the securitisation activities of 
the banking sector. On the other hand, the growth of traditional (non-securitised) 
loans immediately reduces in response to an increase in the interest rate. The 
empirical evidence here is in line with the argument that the banking sector in 
response to monetary policy tightening offloads their balance sheets via shadow 
entities. Thus, monetary policy does not seem to be effective in controlling credit 
growth in the economy but can rather induce credit intermediation, which may 
further increase system risk. This finding is consistent with some of the recent 
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studies including Kashyap and Stein (1995), Ashcraft (2006) Altunbas et al. 
(2009, 2010), and Lopreite (2012), amongst others. 
I focus in part on the interaction between securitisation and other developments 
in the banking sector. My results suggest that a shock to the growth of loans 
has a positive effect on securitisation, as expected. It is well known that an 
increase in the size of banks' balance sheets has greatly strengthened their 
ability to securitise loans over the last few decades. A one-standard-deviation 
positive shock to the liquidity ratio also has a positive impact on securitisation. 
A securitisation shock in turn also raises the liquidity ratio, as can be seen from 
the impulse responses. However, the same shock has a negative impact on loans; 
this could be explained as the banks' off-balance-sheet behaviour, which 
reduces the amount of loans held on their balance sheet through the 
securitisation process. This result is consistent with the fundamental objective 
of securitisation, which involves the transformation of illiquid assets into liquid 
ones, thereby increasing liquidity in the system. 
I also focus on the interactions between real economic growth and the banking 
sector; the evidence suggests that real output shocks increase securitisation as 
well as loans. This result supports the general idea that a rise in economic 
activity is likely to increase the activities in the financial markets. Finally, our 
results indicate that securitisation shocks have a negative but insignificant 
impact on the growth of output and stock of loans. 
My results are consistent with many recent studies such as Nelson et al. (2015), 
from BoE. They found a similar result: with contractionary monetary policy, the 
banks' assets decrease but the shadow-banking assets increase by the increase 
of securitisation activity, which makes the monetary policy less effective. In the 
same vein, Botta et al. (2016) have investigated the role of shadow banking and 
securitisation in macroeconomics, and they found that securitisation activities 
increase banks' liquidity and profitability and shadow-banking activities as well. 
However, they argued that risky activities and instability increase both in the 
real and the financial sides at least in the short run. 
Figure 7: The impulse response obtained using a Cholesky decomposition. 
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Note: 95% confidence bands, lags=1. The shock is defined as a one-standard-deviation 
positive movement in a variable. 
Figure 7 shows the forecast-error variance decomposition of securitisation. The 
variation in securitisation is largely explained by shocks to the growth of loans 
(apart from the shocks to securitisation itself). Monetary policy seems to play a 
minor role in explaining the dynamics of securitisation, once again calling into 
question the efficacy of monetary policy. 





Table 7: Short-run causality 
Note: GMM estimation, n=10, T=20 
 






As discussed earlier, the results of VAR models are sensitive to the ordering of 
variables when Cholesky identification is used. I pay considerable attention to 
the model sensitivities that might emerge from our ordering assumptions. In this 
regard, I estimate the model using various orderings. In particular, I focus on 
the position of our variable of interest, securitisation, which is modelled in every 
possible position in the VAR matrix. It is natural to expect that the shapes of 
impulse responses would differ because of different constraints on 
contemporaneous effects, as can be seen in the first row of figure 8. However, 
it is important to highlight that the results are quite robust to the ordering in the 
sense that they do not affect our overall conclusion in any fundamental way. 
That increases our confidence in the validity of the model. 
3.6 Critical Assessment of the Role of Securitisation in the Financial 
Market  
The changing behaviour of banks has come about so banks could maintain their 
leadership in the changing system, which is characterised by deregulation. 
Deregulation increased complex financial innovations and the beliefs that 
financial actors such as hedge funds and private-equity funds have the ability to 
exceed the market return, and make short-term profits, using diversification and 
simple mathematical formulas and models of risk management to eliminate risk. 
Minsky, anticipating such beliefs, stated that "the total return on the portfolio is 
the only criteria used for judging the performance of the managers of these 
funds" (Minsky 1996). 
The behaviour of these financial actors pushed insurance companies, trust funds, 
and other intermediaries in the same direction. Securitisation promised to best 
match the preferred risk/return and holding-period profiles of market 
participants in general, but it tends to systematically understate risk (Coval et 
al., 2009). Banks' liquidity risk – a key source of vulnerability in an under-
regulated banking system – is apparently less in a system with securitisation, 
but banks' exposure to risk remains because of recourse risk (Dymski 2010). 
And while securitisation improved banks' balance sheets and improved their 
profitability in the shorter run, it led to systemic risk and hid vulnerabilities that 
were brutally exposed by the subprime crisis. In effect, the expansion of 
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securitisation permitted deeper linkages between the major banks originating 
credit and non-bank financial firms in need of higher-return assets to purchase. 
The linkages led to systemic risk. 
No financial expert expected that securitisation might cause such systemic risk 
or be as fertile as equities as a site for zero-sum short-term trading games, or 
that the parameters on which pricing was based might be corrupted. Only 
cautious doubts were registered about credit-rating agencies' accuracy prior to 
the crisis (Fender and Mitchell 2005). And as further evidence of lack of foresight, 
the very opacity of securitized instruments was taken as proof of markets' 
superiority in pricing (Oldfield 2000). 
The increased importance of shadow banking and non-transparent financial 
transactions has made the credit process as a whole more opaque: loans that 
are securitized disappear from bank balance sheets, and the process is made 
more reliant on short-term non-deposit funding (Kroszner and Strahan, 2011). 
Deregulation combined with the increase in securitisation and cross-border trade 
and finance has fed innovations in the practices and organizational logic of these 
firms that have far-reaching consequences. The interconnectedness between 
major banks and the shadow banking has added a huge growth in the 
complexity and size of these institutions, and these developments, in turn, have 
transformed both the character of financial instability and the role of banking 
firms in economic dynamics. 
The banks at issue have not disappeared since the crisis but instead remain, 
with the help of the central banks’ quantitative easing. Securitisation-based 
credit issued by such banks is, if anything, more dominant now than before 2008. 
By 2009, the "big four" banks held nearly half of all loans on the balance sheets 
of US commercial loans (Dymski and Kaltenbrunner 2016); this imbalance would 
be even greater were securitized loans to be included. 
That is not the only cause for worry. All the efforts that have been made since 
the global financial crisis – such as the Dodd-Frank Act and the EU's Banking 
Union – to avoid future crises on the basis of capital requirements that properly 
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structured incentives (enough skin in the game for banks' owners) are thought 
to be sufficient by policymakers to avoid any repeat of this crisis. However, a 
new and more comprehensive account of major big banks' behaviour throws 
doubt on such a conclusion. Even worse, Botta et al. (2016) showed that the 
securitisation process makes legislations on capital requirement not only 
ineffective but also potentially counterproductive. If banks have to adhere to 
strict capital-ratio requirements, while having access to securitisation, they will 
have a strong incentive to take part in the creation of structured finance products 
to lighten their balance sheets, hence harming the stability of the economy as a 
whole (Botta et al., 2016). 
There are many studies that claim that the regulations are working perfectly, 
and that it is a good practice to encourage the securitisation activity to increase 
liquidity in the market. For instance, Adrian (2017), of the IMF, argued that in 
advanced economies, many of the risky activities that led to the global financial 
crisis no longer exist or pose a threat to financial stability. He states: ‘To cite 
just a few areas, securitisation practices have been strengthened, repo market 
activities have been overhauled, money market funds have been made more 
robust, and interconnectedness between banks and shadow banks has declined. 
Reform efforts have aimed at transforming the structural characteristics of 
riskier aspects of shadow banking, as well as the economic incentives. The 
business models of intermediaries have fundamentally changed as a result’. A 
similar work from BoE and ECB (2014) argued for the potential benefits and 
importance of securitisation on increasing liquidity and lowering risk. 
But the new, challenging banking behaviour under financial markets with 
complexity and opaqueness could not be simply controlled through new capital 
requirements for banks, ‘skin in the game' capital standards for shadow-banking 
subsidiaries or affiliates, greater transparency, and more diligent reporting. Most 
of these reforms are being implemented. But beyond these elements is the very 
business model itself that too-big-to-fail banks have embedded at the heart of 
contemporary global finance. The lack of any base-line function within the 
broader economic system and the blind insistence on above-average rates of 
return are, quite simply, an explosive combination, given that the megabanks 
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have become too big to fail and have largely resisted efforts to rein in their 
behaviour to date. This the main reason why shadow banking occurs partly 
inside the boundary of megabanks, and partly outside it. 
All in all, the increasing instability and complexity of the financial sector, 
particularly in megabanks and shadow banking, has changed the fundamental 
role of central banks. Acting not only as a ‘lender of last resort’, where it rescues 
the on-balance-sheet credit commitments of banks, it also acts as ‘dealer of last 
resort’ to rescue the money market positions by which the banks fund 
themselves. It does so to protect the interwoven circuits of borrowing and 
lending that support derivative and repurchase-agreement positions (Mehrling 
2012). More important, the credit-creation process that drives money creation 
is now funnelled through securitisation processes that prioritize asset price 
increases over productive credit. As Keynes argued, ‘when the goal of credit 
issuance is not the financing of productive activities, but the creation of financial 
commodities, the job is likely to be highly noxious for the economy'. As Michell 
(2015) argued, it is clear that mega-banking decenters the money-creation 
process, involving shadow banks in holding and circulating money – and even, 
arguably, in creating it – such that money remains endogenous in a megabank-
dominated system. 
Given the causes of the instability, central banks should urgently apply credit 
controls to govern the link between the issuer of the credit and the securitizing 
system. Central banks should re-examine their role as a ‘banker's bank', taking 
into consideration not only their role in financial stability and bank supervision 
but also their role in the overall economy and the social cost of the changes in 
mega-banking, shadow banking, and financial innovation. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The increasing importance of the financial sector in the last three decades has 
been identified as financialisation by post-Keynesian economists, political 
economists, sociologists, and many others. This era has been led by neoliberals 
and mainstream economists, with their paradigm of "laissez-faire economy" and 
deregulation of financial markets. One of the most important characteristics of 
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‘financialisation' is the rapid growth of financial innovations such as securitisation 
that changed banks’ model from ‘Originate and Hold' to ‘Originate and distribute' 
by selling loans and transforming illiquid assets to liquid ones. This process 
creates more liquidity, which allows banks to expand their balance sheets (off-
balance-sheets activities), issuing more loans, lowering credit standards, taking 
more risk, and more importantly being more independent of central banks, that 
process could be considered as the root of the current crisis. Moreover, the high 
usage of securitisation by banks and other financial corporations benefited from 
the deregulation and monetary policy provided by central banks. Therefore, 
central bank policies focused on price stability (inflation targeting) rather than 
financial matters and financial stability may have played a crucial role that led 
to the crisis. 
It would be a wasted opportunity if this financial crisis did not lead us to think 
deeply about the framework for central banking and monetary policy-making: 
the objective of policy; the models underpinning our analysis; and the indicators 
on which I focus when making policy decisions. Hence, central bank theory and 
policy should be re-examined. 
Having discussed one aspect of central banks’ relationship with banks, in their 
role as ‘banker's banks', in the next chapter I discuss the relationship between 
the central bank and its government. I examine the role of the central bank as 
a ‘government's bank'.  
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Chapter 4:  The Theory of Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interaction in 
Different Paradigms: Separation, Coordination or Interrelation 
4.1 Introduction 
The Great Moderation era, the era from the 1990s until the 2007-8 financial 
crisis, is defined as the decline of macroeconomic volatility and more precisely 
as the decline in the variability of both output and inflation (Bernanke, 2004). 
Policymakers around the world were strongly influenced by New Consensus 
Macroeconomics (NCM), which is mainly based on New-Classical, neo-classical 
and New-Keynesian schools of thought. NCM understands a capitalist economy 
to be stable in nature. It also views the central bank’s and government’s 
behaviour as similar to firms’ and households' behaviour, as they face a budget 
constraint (spending = revenue) like any other economic agent. This view comes 
from the Microfoundations of Macroeconomics premise that I have discussed in 
chapter 2. 
During the Great Moderation era, following the recommendations of NCM, 
governments around the world implemented austerity measures. In particular, 
in the eurozone area, the Stability and Growth Pact sought to reduce the fiscal 
deficit with the aim of balancing the public budget (ECB, 2004). In addition, 
governments ensured a credible and politically independent central bank 
through monetary policy by implementing a Taylor rule (a positive interest rate 
rule), which ensured price stability2 through its impact on aggregate demand 
and output (as I have discussed in chapter 2). These policies were viewed as 
essential to achieving sustained and non-inflationary economic growth. 
In the NCM paradigm, two constraints are needed to ensure that the central 
bank can efficiently conduct its inflation-targeting policy. Firstly, the central bank 
should be independent of the government, so as to not be politically influenced 
                                                          
2. Up to 2008, many countries ran budget deficits, e.g., UK of the order of 2-3 percent of 
GDP; deficits rose sharply in 2009 and some ‘Keynesian' policies implemented, followed 




and to be credible in its pursuit of economic stability. Second, a central bank 
should act within its budget constraint to ensure its solvency and credibility3. 
The ineffectiveness of fiscal policy in the short and long runs is also a crucial 
assumption of the NCM paradigm, and this is based on the Ricardian equivalence 
(RE) hypothesis and the private-investment crowding-out effect. According to 
the RE hypothesis, rational economic agents react to increasing government 
spending by consuming less and saving more today to meet the predictable tax 
increase tomorrow. As a result, government spending will not impact aggregate 
demand (Sawyer, 2009). In other words, fiscal policy is ineffective. Accordingly, 
its main objective should be to balance the budget. 
The recent crisis has challenged this paradigm. In particular, central banks faced 
a zero-nominal-interest-rate lower bound (ZIRB) along with a negative real 
interest rate and falling prices, 4  which made monetary policy impotent 
(Summers, 2014; Curdia, 2015). The loss of interest-rate policy as a primary 
tool to raise inflation in the ZIRB case is an important reason why central bankers 
fear deflation. A ZIRB can induce an unstoppable spiral into a great depression, 
as loss of consumer confidence and pessimism in private investment lead to a 
sharp fall in aggregate demand and negative expected rates of return. In such 
a state, expansionary fiscal policy in the style of New Deal policy is the only 
available tool to pull economies out of a macroeconomic-austerity trap to return 
the economic activity to its wheels. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, some New Keynesian (NK) 
economists working within the NCM framework have prioritized fiscal policy over 
monetary policy, at least in abnormal times and temporarily, to maintain 
economic stability. Those NK economists have developed what is called ‘the 
fiscal theory of the price level' (FTPL) (Woodford and Sim, 1994). According to 
FTPL, fiscal policies are effective in the short and the long runs. They put more 
emphasis on the crucial role of state intervention, mainly automatic stabilizers 
as a fiscal tool and expansionary fiscal policy in exceptional times (time of crisis). 
                                                          
3 Here it is referring to the enlarging of central banks’ balance sheet: acquiring risky assets 
and buying government debt. 
4 Based on Fischer equation nominal interest rate = real interest rate + inflation rate. 
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However, they believe that expansionary fiscal policy should be a temporary 
measure to counteract price stickiness, as by assumption the economy will 
return to its natural equilibrium in the long run. They further argue that policy 
interaction and greater cooperation between fiscal and monetary authorities 
have been inevitable aspects of effective policy initiatives to meet 
macroeconomic objectives in the current financial and economic crisis (Cochrane, 
2014). 
However, Buiter (2017) has criticized the FTPL, and he argued that monetary 
policy has an inevitable fiscal dimension. Central bank money is willingly held 
and accepted even though it is dominated by a pecuniary rate of return (Buiter, 
2017). He proposed the fiscal theory of seigniorage (FTS), which recognizes that 
the Treasury is the owner of the central bank and that a monetized balance 
sheet expansion by the central bank increases the central bank’s fiscal stance. 
Buiter’s view follows Friedman’s Helicopter-money model, which is the parable 
of the fiscal dimension of monetary policy. Thus, he argued that active use of 
concerted monetary and fiscal stimulus can always boost nominal aggregate 
demand, based on the Quantity Theory of Money view. 
Interestingly, Post-Keynesianism shares with FTPL some positions (Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2003), such as the view that fiscal policy could be an important 
macroeconomic tool and dominate monetary policy without hampering 
economic stability. However, FTPL framework is still based on the rules and 
constraints that have continued to be central to NCM fiscal policy (Creel et al., 
2014). 
In contrast to NCM and NK, following Keynes’s work, the Post-Keynesians 
believe in the need for government policies to reach economic stability and full 
employment in particular during a deep recession (Lavoie, 2013). In a capitalist 
economy, appropriate macroeconomic policies are vital to counteract the 
market’s destabilizing tendencies5. Furthermore, given the increasing complexity 
and sophistication in a monetary-financial capitalist economy, the efficient-
                                                          




markets hypothesis simply is not true (Lavoie, 2013). Thus, active and 
permanent state intervention is essential. Furthermore, coordinated monetary-
fiscal policies are vital to constrain the instability of the economic system. 
Post-Keynesians argue that government is an essential part of the mechanism 
by which societies provide for their continued survival, especially given the 
inescapable uncertainty that an economy faces (Dow, 2017). As I have argued 
in chapter 2, Post-Keynesians view is that NCM theory and policy have many 
flaws. If policymakers keep following the NCM doctrine of the neutrality of 
money and the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy, then macroeconomic performance 
will continue to be disappointing and frustrating. 
The final theory I discuss in this chapter is Modern Money Theory (MMT). MMT’s 
advocates, such as Wray, follow Abba Lerner and argue that in a monetarily 
sovereign government, the government possesses a taxing power that gives the 
government unlimited power to create state money through spending. Following 
Post-Keynesians, MMT understood endogenous money as a social necessity.6 
That is a key element to understanding capitalism (Parguez, 2002). However, 
MMT gives more attention to state money as a main driver for the economy. 
Further, MMT views the constraint on government spending and debt as a self-
imposed constraint – a political decision – not an economic constraint (ibid). 
However, it is important to clarify that there are many political and institutional 
constraints in real world economy that should be taken into consideration. 
Further, Post-Keynesians and MMT believe that Macroeconomic concepts and 
analysis should be understood differently than those of Microeconomics, as 
Macroeconomics is not a simple aggregate of Microeconomics (see chapter 2’s 
discussion). That is mainly due to the unique economic and political nature of 
the government and the central bank as public institutions, which face different 
objectives and goals than those of private agents. 
                                                          
6 NCM ideology assumes that money is just a medium of exchange as a commodity and it 
is neutral in the economy. However, Post-Keynesians paradigm offers a deep 
understanding of the philosophy of money creation and its evolution as a social 
phenomenon, which is crucial to understand our monetary production economy. 
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This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I explore NCM’s 
monetary and fiscal policies and their main theoretical assumptions. The second 
section discusses the FTPL, its critics, and the Post-Keynesians and MMT 
perspectives on it. In the last section, I analyse and shed light on the Post-
Keynesians theory of monetary-fiscal policy interrelations. In doing so, I apply 
some ideas from MMT. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn. 
4.2 The Separation of Monetary and Fiscal Policy within the NCM 
The separation principle of monetary and fiscal policies is at the heart of the 
NCM. Monetary policy based on the concept of neutrality of money, which holds 
that the stock of money does not impact real economic activity in the medium 
to long run, has been limited to targeting price stability. Maintaining central bank 
independence from the Treasury is an important element for ensuring the 
credibility of monetary policy in stabilizing inflation. Fiscal policy is said to be 
ineffective due to Ricardian equivalence and the private-investment crowding-
out effect. In this section, I explore these concepts in further detail. 
4.2.1 Central Bank Independence and State Solvency 
 
The concept of central bank independence is very broad. It can be viewed from 
different perspectives. Wray (2014) argued that central bank independence 
could be regarded on different levels. First, the central bank may be said have 
the freedom to choose among monetary policy tools depending on the economic 
situation (at least to some extent). Such choices include the use of discount 
window versus open market operations versus required-reserve ratios and the 
use of the discount window or overnight markets to determine interest rates. Of 
course, such freedom did not exist in recent experience. For instance, in the UK 
and US, the BoE and the Fed turned to their governments for approval to enact 
QE. Second, central banks may have operational independency, whereby they 
maintain a sharp separation from the government and the treasury. Some 
central banks, such as ECB, are prohibited from directly financing governments’ 
budget deficits. The rationale is that the government should turn to private 
banks when in need of finance, as any other economic agent does. In such a 
way, the interest rate monetary tool is made independent of the treasury’s debt 
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policy. Finally, central bank independence can be seen as insulation from political 
pressure and especially freedom from political interference in rate-setting 
deliberations. 
As I have discussed in chapter 1, the high-inflation period that started in the 
late 1960s and 1970s gave way in the 1980s to the emergence of monetary 
targets (only later followed by inflation targeting). That central policy change 
then led to independent central banking in the early 1990s in industrialised 
countries. The main NCM argument for CBI is that CBI is required to allow price 
stability and that if central banks were committed to the price-stability objective 
(through Friedman's monetary targets, which are based on QTM), then 
economic agents' expectations would be more stable. That stability of 
expectations could eliminate ‘uncertainty’ in the market and ensure economic 
stability, as the efficient-markets hypothesis maintains (Buiter, 2007). 
However, after the unsuccessful era of monetary targeting, a Taylor-rule type 
of policy has emerged to control inflation (Taylor, 1992). Major central banks 
around the world adopted a version of this monetary rule: one tool (nominal 
interest rate), one objective (inflation targeting). The main point was to move 
away from discretionary monetary policy to a rules-based policy (Buiter, 2007). 
This policy rule is used to better ensure central bank independence from the 
treasury and from politics to be better able to prevent inflation and stabilize the 
economic activity. According to Bernanke et al. (2010), the inflation targeting 
(IT) regime is the best monetary regime because (i) it improves communication 
between the public and the monetary authorities and thus increases the agents' 
capacity to forecast future inflation, and (ii) it disciplines the central bank's 
monetary policy, thus giving it credibility. Even though central bank 
independence was challenged during and after the recent crisis, it is still 
regarded as an important element of NCM and NCM-based policy-making. 
After the 2007-8 global financial crisis, most of the central banks in advanced 
economies shifted to a policy that has been challenged for undermining the 
price-stability objective and central bank independence. Specifically, central 
banks dramatically decreased the nominal interest rate and increased their 
balance-sheet size by holding government and private debt securities while 
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paying interest on reserves. This central bank behaviour made some economists, 
such as Rudebusch (2011), Carpenter, Ihrig, Klee, Quinn, and Boote (2013) and 
Greenlaw, Hamilton, Hooper, and Mishkin (2013), and Ricardo Reis (2013), raise 
the question of central banks' ‘solvency’. The questioning is based on the use of 
a formal model of central-bank risk, founded on modern finance theory, to 
describe the evolution of a central bank's financial position. According to these 
economists, the increasing of the central bank's balance sheet with large public 
and private bond portfolio creates a risk of losses, either from defaults on the 
bonds or from declines in their market value when interest rates rise (Reis, 2013). 
For instance, Reis (2013) argued that the Fed faces two risks to its solvency. 
First, the huge expansion of the Fed's portfolio and the inclusion of some bonds 
with default risk exposes the Fed to capital losses when interest rates rise. 
Second, the new (post-crisis) obligation to pay interest rates on reserves will 
expand the Fed's reserves as the economy returns to normal and interest rates 
rise (Reis, 2013). 
Reis (2013) continued by arguing that the central bank faces a resource 
constraint that makes it to solve the balance sheet problem, for two reasons. 
Firstly, from an accounting perspective, it is difficult to keep track of the value 
of the assets and liabilities in a central bank's balance sheet. Not only are these 
assets and liabilities peculiar, but there are also no accounting standards that 
naturally apply to a central bank, which is neither a private corporation nor a 
conventional government agency (Reis, 2013). Secondly, from an economic 
perspective, since a central bank is an agent with limited resources, keeping 
track of its resources and uses of these resources reveals what the central bank 
can and cannot achieve. The main conclusion, according to Reis, is that the 
central bank’s main power is to manipulate its interest rate in pursuit of its 
inflation target; its balance sheet gives it little latitude to pursue other goals 
(Reis, 2013). Designing a policy that robustly achieves this goal (inflation 
targeting) requires carefully considering what information to reveal, how 
transparent to be, and how agents learn about the central bank’s intentions (see 
Morris and Shin, 1998, and the large literature that followed). Therefore, 
according to Reis’s argument, the central bank may only be able to buy some 
time before its balance sheet problem becomes more difficult to handle; 
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consequently, central banks should get back to their earlier business: inflation 
targeting. 
Not surprisingly, Christian Noyer, the governor of the Banque de France, has 
argued strongly for a return to normal. He states, “It is all the more important 
to maintain our clarity of purpose and stick to two fundamental characteristics 
of what central banks inherited from the pre-crisis consensus: the focus on price 
stability and, its corollary, central bank independence”1 (Noyer, 2012). Thus, we 
see that central banks’ independence and price stability objective are very crucial 
to NCM, which argues that the two aspects of central banking should be regained 
as soon as possible to ensure economic stability. 
4.2.2 The Neutrality and Ineffectiveness of Fiscal Policy 
 
Also at the heart of NCM dogma is the concept of the ineffectiveness of fiscal 
policy. Fiscal policy has been downgraded to only relying on automatic stabilizers, 
and essentially (according to NCM) it should be concerned with broadly 
balancing government expenditure and taxation. This paradigm is based 
essentially on the usual New Classical (NC) assumptions such as first, crowding-
out of private activity by government deficits, second, the Ricardian Equivalence 
hypothesis, and third, ‘rational expectations' allowing households to optimise 
intertemporally (Arestis 2012). All these assumptions imply that fiscal policy is 
completely ineffective as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. The Ricardian 
Equivalence part of the NCM argument posits the irrelevance of the 
government’s decisions to finance via taxes vs. debt. For instance, an increase 
in government deficit would imply an increase in the future tax burden, with 
rational economic agents expecting to decrease their current consumption and 
savings in anticipation of lower future income (Arestis 2012). That adversely 
affects investment, which is also hampered by higher interest rates caused by 
the increased deficit – the crowding-out effect. A further main theoretical 
property is the assumption of ‘rational expectations', which, along with the Non-
Ricardian Hypothesis (NRH), implies that expectational effects might outweigh 
the Keynesian type of multiplier effects. These arguments and assumptions are 
supported by a large literature within NCM such as Bernanke (2004, 2008, 2009). 
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Fiscal austerity in this approach is expansionary in both the short and the long 
run (NCM researchers use a cyclically adjusted measure for budget deficits in 
the long run). 
To sum up, the NCM maintains that separation between monetary and fiscal 
policies is important to achieve economic stability in a competitive free market. 
Given the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy, empowering the central bank with an 
interest rate tool to maintain price stability and keeping the central bank 
independent from the Treasury ensure the central bank's credibility and solvency 
in order to sustain economic stability. 
4.3 The Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
Notwithstanding the overall NCM consensus, there are some NK economists 
working within the NCM framework who favour fiscal policy over monetary policy 
to maintain price stability – that is, at least in the short run and mainly in 
abnormal time (such as crisis time). Those economists, such as Woodford,  Sims, 
and Cochrane, have developed what's called ‘the fiscal theory of the price level' 
(FTPL). According to FTPL, fiscal policy is considered to be effective in the short 
and the long runs. In this section, I explore the FTPL concept to better 
understand this theory, its application, and its transmission mechanism. I then 
shed light on the main critics of this theory and discuss the Post-Keynesians 
view. 
The main notion of the FTPL is based on the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) 
equation. In accordance with New classical economics’ ‘monetarist doctrine', 
NCM argued that money supply is exogenous (Mt) and is the primary 
determinant of the price level and that inflation arises because too much money 
is chasing too few goods. The velocity of money is stable, fixed and exogenous 
(Vt), and nominal output is the price level Pt times real output Yt: 
Equation 7 
Mt Vt = Pt Yt , t = 0, 1,... 
In contrast to this view, the FTPL maintains that velocity (or demand for money), 
in some circumstances, is unstable and is itself affected by other 
105 
 
macroeconomic variables, such as the nominal interest rate. Furthermore, in 
general, the price level cannot be only determined by Mt. Rather, it and the 
general equilibrium path of the economy are determined jointly by Mt , Yt , and 
Vt. In such a way, there is no unique way to determine the price level, as there 
are several paths of Pt that satisfy QTM (Woodford, 1994). Further, with a 
central bank setting the exogenous interest rate (which reflects an implicit view 
of endogenous money that is consistent with Post-Keynesian as discussed later 
in this chapter), FTPL becomes more valid, as Sargent and Wallace (1975) 
argued that, in this case, the initial price level is then indeterminate, and 
subsequent inflation is subject to ‘sunspots,’ that is, uncertainty driven by self-
fulfilling expectations. Thus, differentiating itself from the QTM, FTPL 
stresses that the price level is determined by government debt and fiscal policy 
alone, with no (or only an indirect) role for monetary policy. 
The FTPL states that fiscal policy, through its fiscal deficit and debt, can directly 
move the price level. This first developed by Woodford a n d  Sims in 1994 and 
Cochrane (2014), models price determination through nominal public debt with 








𝑗=0   
(Nominal debt is the market value of debt.) According to FTPL, this equation is 
not a budget constraint, but represents the valuation equation for government 
debt, or an equilibrium condition (Cochrane, 2016). That equation shows that 
there is no need for monetary policy to target inflation. With no action taken, a 
changing expectation of future deficits can directly move the price level today. 
It is similar to how the stock price is moved today by changing expectation about 
future earnings (present value of expected dividends) (ibid). 
In its simplest form, the FTPL assumes that the government commits to a 
fixed and exogenous present value of primary fiscal surpluses; this is a special 
case of what Leeper (1991) defines as an ‘active’ fiscal policy and Woodford 
(1995) defines as a ‘Non-Ricardian’ fiscal regime. One of the main assumptions 
for FTPL to be valid is the ruling out of a government default on nominal debt, 
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given that the monetary policy rate is set by the central bank’s function as an 
ultimate provider of liquidity and the lender of last resort to the government, 
which allows for unlimited monetization of debt. In this case, the FTPL is just 
a version of a commodity money standard; money, as well as other 
government liabilities, is backed by the present value of future government 
surpluses, just as the value of Microsoft shares is backed by the present 
value of Microsoft profits (Cochrane 2005). Further, for FTPL to be credible, an 
implicit or explicit central bank commitment to prevent a government default 
through an appropriate monetization of debt is essential (Sargent and 
Wallace,  1981). Another crucial notion of FTPL is that government should be 
treated differently than other economic agents in terms of budget constraints 
because government has a special treatment and role: namely, if the private 
banks are not willing to lend to the government to finance its primary deficit, 
then the committed central bank would prevent a government default on the 
debt. The central claim of the FTPL is that equation (8) is only an equilibrium 
condition (as noted earlier) and not an intertemporal budget constraint as in the 
case of a household. 
The FTPL claims that public debt is not neutral in the long term, but that different 
equilibria are possible. The central element of the FTPL is that the price level 
has to "jump" for the initial level of the real public debt to equalize the present 
value of the future flows of primary surpluses. 
Now, it is important to understand FTPL transmission mechanism, which has 
two aspects. First, following Woodford (1995) government debt impacts 
aggregate demand through the ‘wealth effect': if the real value of nominal debt 
is less than the present value of real primary surpluses, then households try to 
consume more goods and services. But due to full employment households 
cannot do this simultaneously, so this "excess aggregate demand” just pushes 
up prices until the real value of debt is again equal to the present value of 
surpluses (Cochrane, 2014). As Cochrane states, “Aggregate demand is nothing 
more or less than demand for government debt, as by the private-sector budget 
constraint the only way to spend more on everything else is to spend less on 
government debt” (ibid). 
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Second: Given the current situation of zero interest rate, interest paid on excess 
reserves, and a large balance sheet, central banks such as the Fed have limited 
power using money supply or interest rate to impact banks' lending7. And due 
to technological progress in electronic transfers, fiscal policy has the ultimate 
power to impact the price level through issuing treasury bills and government 
bonds on demand, which serve the financial sector as interest-paying risk-free 
assets and as accepted forms of payments for tax purposes (Cochrane, 2016). 
The bills and bonds could be bought directly from the central bank, which then 
issues the reserves to the banking sector, or they could be bought directly by 
the private sector (Cochrane, 2014). In this way, fiscal policy coordination with 
monetary policy is very crucial to financial stability, in the sense that private 
sector needs maturing government debt to pay its taxes and to have risk-free 
assets (ibid). 
The ensuing FTPL framework concludes that fiscal policy mildly reacts to debt 
variations combined with a monetary policy with a loose inflation target where 
price adjustments ensure the intertemporal budget balance – a conclusion 
inconsistent with the NCM (see, e.g., Arestis, 2009). Further, Eggertsson (2006) 
suggests that: 
"Without coordination deficit spending has no effect so that the multiplier 
is zero. The reason is that deficit spending works entirely through 
expectations about future interest rate policy (i.e., through the 
expectation of higher future money supply). Under coordinated policy 
deficit spending implies higher nominal debt, and optimal monetary 
policy under discretion implies that this will increase inflation 
expectations because higher nominal debt makes a permanent increase 
in the money supply incentive compatible. Without coordination, however, 
this link is broken because the central bank has a narrow objective that 
does not take into account the fiscal consequences of its actions. Instead, 
                                                          
7. I discuss this in detail later, but the point is that NCM believes that banks' lending 
decision is based on reserves (Cochrane, 2005). 
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there is strong deflation bias of discretionary monetary policy which is 
severely suboptimal when there are deflationary shocks." (p. 5) 
A study by Woodford (2011) suggests that under conditions of ‘zero-bound’ 
nominal rate of interest, a fiscal multiplier more than unity is possible. That can 
happen only when the task of monetary policy to fill the output gap generated 
by the falling real rate of interest, due to inflationary pressures, is undertaken 
by fiscal policy. 
Further, Eggertsson (2010) states that "The principal goal of policy at zero 
interest rates (ZIRP) should not be to increase aggregate supply by manipulating 
aggregate supply incentives. Instead, the goal of policy should be to increase 
aggregate demand – the overall level of spending in the economy". This vision 
also builds on insufficient demand and under-productive capacity. He found that 
at ZIRP and with insufficient demand, an expansionary fiscal policy has short-
run and long-run effects on output and income of more than five times compared 
to normal times. 
According to Goodhart (2012), when the public sector of a country becomes so 
indebted that its fiscal sustainability is potentially at risk, then monetary policy 
has to be closely integrated with debt-management and fiscal policy. This was 
the case in the United Kingdom in the decades after World War II. UK debt-to-
GDP ratio started at around 250 percent in 1945 and fell through the 1960s and 
1970s. In the 1970s budget deficits were often large in nominal terms, but in 
real terms the fiscal account was often in surplus as inflation decreased the real 
value of outstanding government debt. By the 1980s, however, as fiscal policies 
have recently been compromised and debt ratios have become much enlarged 
(in nominal terms), thus, the standing separation principle is becoming subject 
to increasing stress. In addition, ECB (2017) studied the importance of the 
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in the euro area, and they found 
that if a policy arrangement with a non-defaultable Eurobond had been in place 
since the onset of the Great Recession, output could have been much higher 
and inflation kept in line with the ECB's objective. Further, eliminating conflicts 
between the fiscal and monetary authorities can be just as welfare improving as 
adopting a ‘good' policy permutation when the underlying policy regimes remain 
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subject to switches (active and passive) (Leeper and Leith, 2015). Also, Allsopp 
and Vines (2015) have argued that, when interest rates are at their zero bound, 
the debt build-up should be ignored as an object of policy since (a) it is necessary 
for a recovery of demand and (b) can be remedied when other sources of 
demand – and, in particular, investment – have recovered. At the ZIRP, a 
practical fiscal reaction function should target inflation and, subject to that 
constraint, provide as much stabilization of output as possible. That is, it should 
be just like a monetary-policy reaction function: it should target the output gap 
so long as inflation is under control. Recovery would have been faster if fiscal 
policy had been responsible for the restoration of full employment, in an 
environment which tolerated the necessary rises in public debt (Cochrane, 2016). 
In contrast to the above possible alternatives, policies of austerity, designed to 
reduce public debt, have slowed the recovery. Growth will not be resumed until 
the private sector begins to invest strongly again, creating the financial assets 
which the private sector wishes to hold, thereby enabling public debt to be 
retired (Ibid). That has not yet happened because the private sector, correctly, 
does not believe that macroeconomic policy is capable of sustaining a strong 
recovery. As Khon (2009) states, changing policy interaction and greater 
cooperation between fiscal and monetary authorities have been inevitable 
aspects of effective policy initiatives to meet our macroeconomic objectives in 
the current financial crisis and economic crisis. However, as the economic 
recovery takes hold, we will need to return to more normal modes of operation, 
circumstances central bankers are very much looking forward to. In a blog in 
April 2016, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke argued that 
“under certain extreme circumstances - [such as] sharply deficient aggregate 
demand, exhausted monetary policy, and unwillingness of [fiscal authorities] to 
use debt financed fiscal policies - [money-financed fiscal programs, colloquially 
known as helicopter drops] may be the best available alternative” and that “it 
would be premature to rule them out”. Earlier in this vein, in 2003, Bernanke 
had recommended that Japan fight deflation through an expansionary fiscal 
policy financed by permanent purchases of government debt by the central bank. 
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To summarize, in contrast to NCM orthodoxy, FTPL has provided an unorthodox 
approach in regard to fiscal policy where fiscal policy, in contrast to the monetary 
policy interest rate tool, is an effective tool to achieve price stability. In the 
following subsection, I explore NCM critics of FTPL, mainly Buiter, McCallum and 
Nelson. 
4.3.1 NCM Critics of FTPL 
 
NCM proponents have found FTPL an unorthodox approach within mainstream 
economics. Further, FTPL has been criticized heavily by Buiter, who argued that 
given "its logical flaws, an inconsistent theory can have no empirical implications 
and the realism or lack of it of its assumptions is irrelevant" (Buiter, 2017). He 
argued that under the FTPL ‘valuation equation' there exists a magical power of 
the general price level that somehow will do whatever it takes to bring the real 
value of the stock of nominal government bonds to the level required for 
government solvency (ibid). So, explosive government debt will never threaten 
sovereign solvency. Thus, if this delusional theory is to be taken seriously by 
some foolish government the result could be very painful fiscal-austerity 
measures, government default, or even hyperinflation (ibid). 
However, the explosive nominal debt does not happen without a fully monetised 
central bank, which in the end means an increase in money growth, which 
causes inflation. Thus, McCallum and Nelson (2005) argued that FTPL is no 
different than standard monetary theory (QTM), except by giving the fiscal 
stance of monetary policy a more important role than the money stock. Either 
way, fiscal deficit financing does not occur without direct monetisation (printing 
money) or indirect monetisation (interest rate peg), both of which are actions 
by the monetary authority which involve money growth. 
So, compare Friedman (1987) on the link between fiscal expansion and inflation: 
"Government spending may or may not be inflationary. It clearly will be 
inflationary if it is financed by creating money. If it is financed by taxes or by 
borrowing from the public, the main effect is that the government spends the 
funds instead of the taxpayer or instead of the lender or instead of the person 
who would otherwise have borrowed the funds". (Friedman, 1987, p. 17). 
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Further, the role of monetary-fiscal policy coordination in the monetarist analysis 
is implied by the following observations by Schwartz (1985)8: 
“Coordination of debt management by the Bank [i.e., the monetary 
authority] and the needs of the Exchequer [i.e., the fiscal authority] is 
clearly desirable. The question is how to formulate an arrangement that 
recognizes the basic choice to be [between] financing government 
expenditures by the tax on money balances (implicit in the inflationary 
creation of money for government purposes), by taxation in other forms, 
or by borrowing at home or abroad at whatever interest rates are 
necessary”. 
As Friedman stated the archetypal monetarist position on fiscal policy in 1981: 
"I don't think monetary policy has to be backed up by fiscal policy at all. I think 
monetary policy can curb inflation". Therefore, the central bank can conduct 
monetary policy in controlling inflation without the need of fiscal policy and even 
in the existence of large fiscal deficits, and detailed coordination is not needed 
for effective macroeconomic policy. 
Therefore, regarding these assumptions, there is no disagreement between 
FTPL and QTM in regard role to fiscal policy in demand control and the existence 
of pressure to monetize fiscal deficits ‘directly’ or indirectly. However initially this 
is limited by monetary authority and money growth which is consistent with 
QTM9. 
Buiter (2017) argued the fiscal stance emerges from the central bank’s power 
as the ultimate provider of liquidity and the willingness of private agents to hold 
central bank money10. This is the case because a single-period consolidated 
                                                          
8  Friedman (1987) was also thinking along the same lines: “Fiscal policy is extremely 
important in determining what fraction of total national income is spent by government 
and who bears the burden of that expenditure. It is also extremely important in 
determining monetary policy and, via that route, inflation”.  
9 In the words of Brunner and Meltzer (1993): “A viable non-inflationary monetary regime 
requires severe constraints on the fiscal regime.” 
10. Buiter (2007, 2014, 2017) claimed that private agents are willing to hold central bank 
money even at zero interest rate, which gave central bank money a property that he called 
‘irredeemability'. Further, he claimed that central bank money is an asset to the holder but 
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state (treasury and central bank) balance sheet, including a monetized and 
expansionary central bank balance sheet, will allow the treasury to increase 
spending or cut taxes to boost aggregate demand. But notwithstanding that 
ability, the state should always honour its contractual obligations, which means 
act within its budget constraint, or in other words, within its means like any 
other economic agent, in order to ensure its solvency and in turn to contribute 
to economic stability (Buiter, 2017). 
Thus, Buiter returned to Friedman's ‘helicopter money drop' notion, where 
inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. What is more, 
monetary policy always and everywhere has a fiscal dimension. This fiscal 
dimension of monetary policy exists even if the central bank is operationally 
independent. The key insight is that, given the outstanding stocks of state assets 
and liabilities, monetary policy and fiscal policy cannot be specified 
independently if the state is to remain solvent (ibid). Either there is fiscal 
dominance, and monetary issuance becomes endogenously determined (the 
residual), or there is monetary dominance and public spending and/or taxation 
have to adjust (becomes the residual) to maintain sovereign solvency (ibid). The 
active use of concerted monetary and fiscal stimulus can always boost nominal 
aggregate demand. The ability to stimulate aggregate demand through a 
helicopter money drop exists both away from and at the ZIRP, and regardless 
of whether government bonds are nominal bonds, index-linked bonds, or 
foreign-currency-denominated bonds (Buiter, 2017). He claimed that the fiscal 
theory of the price level is dead, but what he called the fiscal theory of 
seigniorage is very much alive (ibid). 
To sum up, I have shown that FTPL provided a relaxed version of the NCM view 
of fiscal policy. FTPL gives fiscal policy a dominant role over monetary policy to 
control the price level, and says that monetary-fiscal policy cooperation plays an 
important role in an economy with high debt and zero interest rate, at least in 
the short to medium run, that is, until the economy gets back to equilibrium. 
The case against FTPL is that the ultimate power of the central bank as an 
                                                          
not a liability to the issuer. From a substantive economic and behavioral perspective, 
central bank money is an outside financial asset - it is net wealth. 
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ultimate provider of liquidity gives monetary policy dominance, and that 
monetary policy has a fiscal dimension. Thus, the main difference between FTPL 
and NCM is about whether fiscal or monetary policy has dominance in the short 
to medium run and about the issue of government solvency and default. 
However, both agree on the NCM assumptions related to central bank 
independence and ineffective fiscal policy in ‘normal times’. 
4.3.2 Post-Keynesians vs. FTPL 
 
Post-Keynesians share some similarity with FTPL regarding the view that fiscal 
policy could be an important macroeconomic tool and may dominate monetary 
policy without hampering economic stability. For instance, both agree with the 
neo-Ricardian agent's behaviour against the classical Ricardian Equivalence 
Hypothesis. Moreover, FTPL shares with the Chartalists and MMT11 the idea that 
the ultimate power of the state comes from its ability to issue money and debt 
and to tax. The main difference concerns how the debt is issued and for what 
reasons. FTPL clearly states that the government debt is issued on demand 
(Cochrane, 2014) and the state has unlimited power in issuing its debt by 
forming expectations of its real primary surpluses. Cochrane (2014) clearly 
states that "Ultimately, government debt is valued because you need maturing 
government debt to pay taxes, so government debt is backed by the present 
value of the government's ability and willingness to soak up money by taxing its 
citizens in excess of spending". 
The problem is that FTPL argues that the current price level is driven by the 
asymptotic trend in expected primary fiscal balances. But since those expected 
balances are completely unobservable, there is no empirical way of testing the 
theory. Thus, it lacks an ideological interpretation and does not provide an 
understanding of the state money creation process, as it lacks a clear view of 
endogenous money theory or how the monetary production economy works. 
                                                          
11 Modern Money Theory, which states that state money creation power comes from its 
power to tax and only accept its money as tax payments. 
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Another important point is related to private money creation and the role of 
banking. FTPL provides some insight on the endogenous money concept, by 
understanding that banks issue money on demand (ibid). However, following 
neoclassical, FTPL views money as just a version of commodity money, and 
banks’ money creation power comes from their excess reserves (Tcherneva, 
2013). 
Similarly to Post-Keynesians, FTPL believes that the central bank sets 
exogenously12 its key interest rate, meaning the government is able to have 
perfect control over the interest rate it pays on its debt. As the central bank 
intervenes through its open market operations tool in the primary market for the 
treasuries (Lavoie, 2009), Taylor rule is not needed (Cochrane, 2016). Thus, the 
central bank interest rate policy is a key determinant of the level and slope of 
the yield curve on Treasuries, but it is backed by the fiscal stance (Cochrane, 
2014). 
Both theories emphasize the importance of monetary-fiscal policy cooperation, 
as there is an obvious high correlation between policy interest rate and T-bill 
rate. This high correlation makes the financial operations of the Treasury and 
the central bank intertwined (ibid). So, in order to run an effective and smooth 
monetary and fiscal policy to maintain and support the monetary and financial 
systems, regular cooperation is essential in the sense that the central bank gets 
involved in fiscal policy and the Treasury gets involved in monetary policy. Thus, 
in contrast to NCM, central bank independence is a ‘myth' at the operational 
level. It is a political and not an economic constraint, as the central bank cannot 
simply avoid supporting the Treasury in one way or another (ibid). 
In a sense going beyond the view that the central bank and the treasury are 
intertwined, MMT advocates, such as Bell (2000) and Meulendyke (1998), 
argued that one can consolidate two in theory without a loss of generality for a 
monetarily sovereign government and that separating the two adds complexity 
without adding insights (Mosler 1999; Bell 2000; Bell and Nell 2003; Bell and 
                                                          
12 Even though NCM believes that interest rule is applied to control inflation, in practice, 
they set interest rate exogenously on what they believe it should be (Lavoie, 2007). 
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Wray 2003; Wray 2012; Fullwiler 2013; Mitchell and Mosler 2002; Mitchell and 
Muysken 2008). In contrast to MMT, Post-Keynesians economists follow 
Keynes’s (1937) view, in that even though the central bank could be considered 
as a government ‘organ', it is still crucial to see them in an active partnership 
rather than one consolidated public entity (Lavoie, 2011). Problematically, it 
appears that MMT assumes that central bank is publicly owned, which is not the 
case for the Federal Reserve (and for Bank of England prior to 1947) (I have 
discussed this in detail in chapter 1). And if the central bank is operationally 
independent and potentially can take the decision not to provide finance to 
government, then it is analytically useful to treat central bank and government 
separately. 
We can also compare Abba Lerner’s ‘functional finance’ with FTPL. Notably, 
Seccareccia13 (2014) observed some similarity, as both are concerned with the 
outcome of the government deficit. Abba Lerner's (1943) article states that "The 
central idea is that government fiscal policy, its spending and taxing, its 
borrowing and repayment of loans, its issue of new money and its withdrawal 
of money, shall all be undertaken with an eye only to the results of these actions 
on the economy and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is 
sound and what is unsound" (cited in Seccareccia, 2014). Consequently, it does 
not matter whether the government has a large deficit if it is necessary for 
achieving price stability and full employment. 
4.3.3 A Further Criticism 
 
According to Cochrane (2014, 2016), the increasing importance of FTPL and 
fiscal policy comes from, firstly, a ZIRP condition, where the central bank has 
limited power in controlling inflation; second, the payment of interest on excess 
reserves along with a large central bank's having a balance sheet full of junky 
assets; third, the technological change that makes instantaneously transferable 
electronic reserves and T-Bills; fourth, the fact that the narrow spread between 
reserves and T-Bills, and the limited access to reserves from the private sector, 
                                                          




as reserves are only issued to commercial banks, made private sector holding of 
the risk-free-rate T-Bills or government bonds more attractive; and fifth, the fact 
that the high level of debt in many advanced countries, such as the USA and 
some European countries, made the treasury more powerful in impacting the 
economy and more precisely the price level by changing expectations over the 
real primary surplus. 
Thus, FTPL does not provide an economic theory of the monetary-fiscal policy 
behaviour but relies on some practical aspects and events such as technological 
advances or certain conditions such as ZIRP, interest-paying excess reserves, or 
high public debt. Further, FTPL main concern is to differentiate itself from NCM 
paradigm, based on the QTM, where monetary policy can control inflation using 
the interest rate tool, and offering fiscal policy as a key tool to affect inflation. 
Therefore, there is a lack of theory and a deficiency in understanding the 
economic evolution and the role of the public sector and the central bank in a 
capitalist economy. More precisely, the notion of private and state money 
creation and the role of credit money in a monetary production economy is 
completely absent or neglected from FTPL as it follows the NCM ideology of 
money. Positing a technological change and a cashless economy does not make 
any difference in the philosophy of money and its function in monetary 
production economy, and it doesn’t make the economy moneyless either. As 
Seccareccia (2014) (on Moslereconomics blog) states: 
"FTPL seems to suggest that the monetary system has changed because 
of technological change leading to diffusion of interest-paying electronic 
money and now interest on "base" money. All of this is nonsense because 
we could trace some of these same ideas literally to the nineteenth 
century within heterodox circles". 
He continued by arguing that the technological change and the interest-paying-
reserves system does not change monetary policy behaviour in providing 
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‘reserves'14 or more correctly ‘settlement balances'15 , whether the reserves are 
interest paying or not. The change was mainly due to an institutional change in 
the 1990s after the failure to control monetary aggregates. 
Consequently, FTPL framework is still based on assumptions, rules, constraints, 
and the like that have continued to be the hallmarks of NCM as far as fiscal 
policy is concerned (Creel et al., 2014). Further, the NCM criticism of FTPL is 
clearly based on Monetarism ideology, which is based on QTM. Accordingly, 
exogenous money supply and the neutrality of money are noticeable in their 
work. Witness Buiter (2017), who argued that central bank can print money 
exogenously and private agents are willing to hold central bank money even at 
ZIRP. He emphasized that fiscal policy objective should be to balance the budget 
and to maintain its solvency by meeting its contractual obligations. Thus, 
following NCM and neoclassical dogma, fiscal policy is limited, and monetary 
policy has interest rate tool to control inflation. 
4.4 Post-Keynesians’ Theory of Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interrelation 
In this section, the theory of monetary-fiscal policy interrelation within a 
monetary production capitalist economy will be identified, as there is no way to 
understand a financial-capitalist economy without clearly understanding the 
crucial characteristics of money and the state and their vital role in this economy. 
Keynes in 1936 states the way out of the Great Depression: 
“It seems unlikely that the influence of [monetary] policy on the rate of 
interest will be sufficient by itself. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat 
                                                          
14. According to FTPL followers, reserves are necessary for banks to enable them to lend 
and issue ‘inside' money. This is in contrast to the view of endogenous money theory, in 
which money or more precisely ‘credit money' is created as ‘initial finance' to the 
economy on demand by firms, investors, households, and government, and when 
repayments occur, the issued money is destroyed. 
15 The Central Bank of Canada conducts monetary policy with zero reserves system by 
ensuring ‘settlements balances’ on the banking sector at the end of the day, ultimately 




comprehensive socialization of investment will prove the only means of 
securing an approximation to full employment.” 
In his General Theory, Keynes himself was in support of sustained public 
investment in the long-term to stabilize the capitalist economy (Seccareccia 
2011-12). Without the “socialization of investment”, the private market can get 
itself stuck in a state of secular stagnation, due to its inherent instability. 
Following Keynes' work, Post-Keynesians believe in the necessity of the 
government policies to reach economic stability and full employment in 
particular in the time of a deep and great recession. Further, a free market 
stabilizing mechanism is rather weak, given that a laissez-faire economy is 
inherently unstable because of the fundamental uncertainty, irrational behaviour 
of the economic agents (in contrast to the mainstream rationality assumption 
which is based on self-interested behaviour and perfect information) and the 
underlying information asymmetry in the market. Thus, in a capitalist economy, 
appropriate macroeconomic policies are vital to counteract the market’s 
destabilizing tendencies. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, a ‘new fiscalism' era has emerged in most 
of the developed economies such as the USA, where fiscal stimulus packages 
have been implemented (Seccareccia 2012) because the automatic stabilizers 
were rather weak (Costantini, 2015). Furthermore, given the increasing 
complexity and sophistication in a monetary-financial capitalist economy, a 
financial efficient-market hypothesis simply cannot hold up. Thus, an active and 
pervasive state intervention is very essential. Specifically, coordinated monetary-
fiscal policy actions are vital to constrain the instability of the economic system. 
In contrast to NCM, post-Keynesians argued that government is an essential 
part of the mechanism by which societies provide for their continuity and 
survival, especially with the ineradicable uncertainty that an economy faces 
(Lavoie, 2017). Most of the early post-Keynesians, such as Kalecki, have clearly 
criticized the crowding-out idea and the neutrality of money, and they put an 
emphasis on the importance of the state-deficit mechanism in generating profits 
through its impact on aggregate demand (Sawyer, 2003). Further, Arestis and 
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Sawyer (1998) reinstated the important role of fiscal policy as a powerful tool 
for macroeconomic policy. That is in opposition to the New Consensus 
theoretical framework, where fiscal policy is absent or even eliminated because 
of crowding out and the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem (RET) (Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2003). 
Following Keynes’s ideas, Post-Keynesians reject the whole idea of crowding out. 
Crowding out states that government deficits and fiscal policy expansion crowd 
out private investment and raise interest rates16. Post-Keynesians argues against 
crowding out if the economy is operating with spare capacity and unemployment, 
but for crowding out if the economy were operating at full employment. Given 
that interest rate is exogenously set by central bank and profits net of taxes 
equal consumption out of profits plus investment plus budget deficit (per the 
Kalecki equation; see Kalecki, 1971), fiscal deficits do not have any crowding 
out effects, and on the contrary, they enhance profits in the private sector in 
particular when an economy is under-full-employment. This Post-Keynesians 
position contradicts the neo-classical view of exogenous supply of money and 
the IS-LM analysis. Furthermore, the theory of endogenous money presented 
by post-Keynesians, where the interest rate is set by central bank, eliminates 
the crowding out effect (Arestis and Sawyer, 2003). 
For its part, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem (RET) assumes an equivalence 
between debt and taxes as sources of financing, and considers consumers to be 
forward-looking with rational expectations and optimising over their infinite life 
cycle. In this way, an increase in taxes today will be followed by lowering taxes 
tomorrow, and consumers will decrease savings today, knowing they will not 
have to pay more tomorrow, and therefore, the debt will be less. Hence, an 
increase in taxes will not trigger any change in consumer permanent income. 
Consider in contrast a closed-economy model from a Keynesian view, where: 
Equation 9  G-T=S-I . 
                                                          
16, RET based on rational behavior ideology, as private agents will react to fiscal expansion 
by consuming less and saving more as they expect an increase in taxes tomorrow because 
of the government balanced budget objective. 
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G represents government expenditure or deficit, T tax, S savings, and I 
investment. Any increase in government deficit while T and I are constant, will 
lead to an increase in savings, the opposite of RET and crowding out effects 
(Sawyer, 2017). What is more, Hemming, Kelly, and Mahfouz (2002) concluded 
that there is no significant evidence that shows the crowding out effect through 
the interest rate, and they did not notice any significance of the RET. 
Consequently, fiscal policy is effective from a theoretical point of view, and its 
efficiency is also supported by empirical evidence. What is more, fiscal policy’s 
important role in the economy is undeniable, and it should be given its role in 
accordance with monetary policy. 
In contrast to the idea of fiscal deficit ‘crowding-out' private investment, post 
Keynesians argue that the deficit ‘crowds-in' private investment, through the 
process of state-money creation to finance the state’s deficit (Parguez, 2002). 
State money creation is reflected in an increase in reserves on the asset side of 
the commercial banks' balance sheets which exactly matches the net increase 
in the private sector stock of bank liabilities. That leads to an increase in 
aggregate demand, through public and private consumption. Assuming that the 
deficit has generated an equal increase in aggregate demand, the deficit is equal 
to firms’ accumulated retained earnings (ibid). When the profit effect of the 
deficit is strong enough, aggregate profits can be greater than investment 
spending. Firms earn more profits than they have to pay back to banks to 
extinguish the debt incurred to finance investment. It is the existing retained 
profits, which are recycled into future investment expenditures. Retained 
earnings allow firms to substitute internal finance for credit, which lowers future 
interest payments. In a monetary economy, the deficit crowds-in private 
expenditures and "it may be facetiously considered the "goose" that lays the 
golden eggs for firms, workers, and banks as well" (Parguez. 2002). Planning a 
long-run growth of the deficit, the state becomes the cornucopia of the private 
sector, generating enough growth to reach a full-employment state with real 
wages being high enough to sustain household consumption. 
In the following subsection, I discuss in detail Post-Keynesians theory of money 
and debt, which provides a deep conceptual framework on the critical role of 
121 
 
the treasury and the central bank and their interaction in a monetary production 
economy. 
4.5 Post-Keynesian Theory of Money, Debt, and the State 
To better understand the theory of monetary policy-fiscal policy interrelation in 
a monetary production economy, the post-Keynesians’ monetary circuit theory 
explains how the state and creation of money play a crucial role. In a monetary 
production economy, a money creation-destruction process is prerequisite 
(Graziani, 2003). Both the state and firms need initial money injection to finance 
their expenditure. However, their future receipts, which are the outcome of the 
initial injection, account for the ‘destruction' or ‘final finance' of the monetary 
circuit (Parguez, 2002). It is important to emphasise the central role of money 
and to make a distinction between private money and a central bank or state 
money. Essentially, money is a social reality, and it exists as a mere debt 
obligation issued by banks on themselves (Parguez and Seccareccia 2000; 
Rochon, 2000). Also, the trust in this bank money as an accepted means of 
payment exists mainly because all economic agents share the belief in the strong 
creditworthiness of banks and the payment system (Lawson, 2016). That gives 
banks the ability to create private money (money created by banks and it is 
socially accepted). In the same manner, the central bank has the power to 
create state money (money created by the central bank) to provide to the state. 
In modern economies, when the state decides its planned expenditure, the state 
money is created through the central bank (‘the ultimate provider of money') in 
an ‘initial finance' phase. On the other hand, when taxes are collected the 
destruction, or ‘final finance', phase occurs. This clearly explains why both the 
state and private firms cannot depend on their generated future income in order 
to make their investment and expenditure decisions today. Thus, finance is 
crucial today (Sawyer, 2012). Once the state (‘the treasury') decides on its 
spending, they ask for credits from the central bank, who would create money 
(reserves) required by the treasury by issuing debts on itself (see figure 9). The 
central bank would create a claim on the treasury on its asset side of the balance 
sheet; the counterpart would be the deposit by the state on its liability side. This 
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deposit will be then transferred to private agents, which causes an equal 
increase in the reserves of commercial banks. 
Figure 10: Simplified Post-Keynesian treasury-central bank interrelation 
 
 
That brings us to an important element of state money: according to MMT, in 
the creation-destruction process, taxes cannot be a source of funding, as taxes 
destroy money, as proved by the Lerner-Wray proposition (Bell 2001; Wray 
1998). In the same sense, taxes reduce disposable income and reduce 
aggregate demand and are not a source of funding. Bond issues cannot, 
therefore, a source of funding for a deficit, which is already financed (Bell 2001; 
Wray, 1998). Abba Lerner had already tackled this issue long ago when he 
commented that: 
“taxing is never to be undertaken merely because the government needs 
to make money payments. Taxation should, therefore, be imposed only 
when it is desirable that the taxpayers shall have less money to spend, 
for example, when they would otherwise spend enough to bring about 
inflation". (Lerner 1943, 40) 
It is important to note here that Post-Keynesians would argue that money is 
created when the government makes a spending decision and asks to borrow 
from the central bank, granting this loan to the government in the ‘initial finance' 
stage. And when taxes are paid that money is destroyed (‘final finance’ stage). 
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In contrast to MMT, Post-Keynesians view taxes as final finance, and as a major 
source of funding (Sawyer, 2014). 
What is more, an increase in commercial banks’ reserves through state spending 
would make them seek to eliminate their excess reserves by holding treasury 
bills in order to maximize their profits (Parguez, 2002). In this case, the treasury 
will make new issues of bonds to absorb banks’ excess reserves and prevent the 
automatic fall in the long-term rate of interest. Thus, interestingly the state does 
not issue bonds for ‘initial finance’ of its deficit but for targeting the short-term 
rate of interest to offset the impact of the deficit on interest rates (Parguez, 
2002) (Seccarecia, 2012). The central bank’s open market operation of 
buying/selling securities from/to the banks cannot be a final financing operation 
in the same way as private firms would need to do so in financial markets (ibid). 
Therefore, one main reason for government issuing bonds is to help the central 
bank in its interest-rate stabilization operations; and another one is to help 
financial institutions meet their capital requirements, as the treasuries’ risk-free 
rate provides an ultimate proxy to value all other market securities (Tymoigne, 
2014). In a monetarily sovereign economy, taxes and bonds are important as 
reserve-draining devices to maintain price and interest-rate stability. 
It is interesting to note that Joan Robinson made the same point many years 
ago. So, Robinson could be considered as an honorary developer of modern 
monetary theory. She said: "A budget deficit financed by borrowing from the 
Central Bank has effects similar to those of gold-mining…. For the Central Bank, 
in lending to the government, increases the ‘cash' of the banks, just as it does 
by buying securities or by buying gold…. The increase in the quantity of money, 
which takes place cumulatively as long as the deficit is running, will tend to 
produce a fall in the rate of interest" (Robinson 1937, p. 88). 
Further, Godley and Cripps (1983, p. 158) were very much aware of the 
relationship between the government, the central bank, and reserves: "The 
central bank has to fund the government's operations but this in itself presents 
no problems. Government cheques are universally accepted. When deposited 
into commercial banks the cheques become ‘reserve assets' in the first instance; 
banks may immediately get rid of excess reserves by buying bonds" (Godley and 
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Cripps 1983, p. 158). The fact that government default is virtually impossible 17 
explains why interest rates on government securities in the USA and Japan are 
so low, despite their huge public debt (Lavoie, 2011). Obviously, markets are 
confident that Japan has the capacity and the ability to make interest payments 
on whatever amount of public debt its government can accumulate (ibid). 
Therefore, an active partnership between the central bank and the government 
is very crucial in a monetary production economy to achieve greater economic 
goals. Kaldor (1958) stressed the necessity of government policies to achieve 
stability and growth in the economy. That could be achieved by coordinating 
fiscal and monetary policy; where monetary policy is a good tool to deal with 
the fluctuations of the economy, fiscal policy is a good tool to pursue long-term 
objectives of sustained growth in the economy. The long run effects of 
coordinated expansionary fiscal and monetary policy are positive for income, 
capital, and growth, especially when the economy is not close to its productive 
capacity or full employment (Tobin, 1974). 
The early post-World War II “Golden Age” or the “Keynesianism Era” is a great 
example of an appropriate cooperation between government and central bank 
macroeconomic policy actions with a commitment to full employment in a 
peaceful Europe. Further, the recent financial crisis has also proven that the 
cooperation of the government and the central bank, in implementing 
‘unconventional' monetary and fiscal measures, is crucial to save the economy. 
The stakes are of much larger magnitude compared to the 1930s’ great 
depression, especially with a more complex and integrated financialized 
economy (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2017). Further, following Kalecki, Sawyer 
(2017) argued that public deficits are necessary not only during recessions but 
also during expansions. 
A recent study within the FTPL framework on the impact of fiscal stimulus in the 
UK and France via coordinated monetary-fiscal policy rules and an 
accommodative central bank has found expansionary fiscal policy is effective 
                                                          
17 This refers to the central government, which issues bonds in its own currency; lower 
tiers of government can (and do) default, e.g., some local governments in the USA.  
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and has a long-run effect on GDP in both countries (Creel et al., 2014). What is 
more interesting is that a persistent fiscal deficit had a long-run effect on GDP 
in France, and an increase in public investment had a long-run effect on GDP in 
the case of UK (Ibid). 
To sum up, in a modern capitalist financialised economy, coordinated monetary-
fiscal policy actions are vital to and contain the instability of the economic system. 
And there is no way to understand our modern economy without clearly 
understanding the crucial characteristics of money creation and the state’s vital 
role in this economy. 
4.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, NCM ideology has a serious misconception of the role and nature 
of the public sector, the central bank, and money in economic theory and 
practice. Its dominant influence on policymakers and authorities has made 
monetary and fiscal policies not only powerless but inadequate. This is mainly 
due to the belief in a self-adjusting free market, following the ‘invisible hand' of 
Adam Smith, the belief in a limited independent central bank with the self-
imposed rule of one instrument and one objective, and the belief in the neutrality 
and ineffectiveness of fiscal policy because of a self-imposed budget constraint 
as if the state had "limited financial resources". 
Contrary to NCM paradigm, some NK economists have relaxed these 
assumptions at least temporarily and at time of the crisis, and have devised an 
FTPL, which somehow gave fiscal policy the power of limitless debt creation with 
a fully monetized central bank. FTPL emphasised clearly the importance of a 
coordinated monetary-fiscal policy to sustain macroeconomic stability. Even 
though Buiter with his FTS has criticised the FTPL heavily, his FTS is similar to 
FTPL but with central bank dominance rather than treasury dominance. And it 
is consistent with QTM and Friedman’s ‘helicopter money drop’ exogenous-
money ideology. 
Post-Keynesian theory, with its rooted understanding of Macroeconomic theory 
and policy, following Keynes, Kalcki, Kaldor, Robinson, and Minsky among others, 
126 
 
has proved that NCM assumptions regarding monetary policy and fiscal policy 
are self-imposed political constraints rather than economic ones. We have 
noticed some similarity with FTPL; yet, the post-Keynesian approach provides 
an economic theory based on social reality, with a comprehensive understanding 
of the important role of the government and the central bank in stabilizing an 
unstable capitalist economy. It also stresses that there is nothing written in stone 
in terms of monetary-fiscal operations given the impossibility of separation 
between the treasury and the central bank in a monetary production economy, 
where monetary and fiscal policies are very interrelated by nature, both in theory 
and practice. Providing a theory of money and debt in a modern capitalist 
monetary circuit and understanding the central bank’s ultimate power of money 
creation and its interrelation with the treasury is essential because it effectively 
liberates the government from being subject to an artificial, self-imposed budget 
constraint. Therefore, the theory allows the central bank to actively intervene 
and fill the gap of the underutilized capacity of our society as a whole – that is, 
strive to achieve full employment and economic stability. In the following 
chapter, I explore and critically compare the existing Macro models, which are 
DSGE NCM model vs. SFC Post-Keynesians macro model.  
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Chapter 5:  Macroeconomic Modelling 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a formal model that encompasses the 
interaction and behaviour of all macroeconomic agents, which in turn feeds back 
to the aggregate macroeconomic dynamics. Although it can be argued t h a t  
econometric tools are not attached to a specific viewpoint of the world, this 
v i e w  does not always hold for macroeconomic modelling (see, e.g., 
Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004 for critical reflections on the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) methodology). Further, there is always the question of 
how econometrics copes with a world of fundamental uncertainty when it is 
based on a probabilistic-risk view of the world with random error terms coming 
from a statistical distribution. In general, the macroeconomic modelling 
framework that is used by researchers often reflects to a certain extent their 
assumptions and understanding of the way the economy functions.  That is why 
it is important to discuss and compare the merits and limitations of the different 
macroeconomic modelling methods that exist. 
It could be argued that we have two classes of theoretical Macro models. DSGE 
models are one class models whose popularity has increased during the 1980s-
2000s. The other class of “theoretical” models mainly used by economists and 
practitioners is structural macroeconometric models. SFC models can be 
regarded as a subgroup of the latter. In addition, agent-based (AB) 
macroeconomic models (and AB-SFC models) have been developed in the last 
two decades as an alternative modelling tool. VAR and SVAR models are also 
very popular. A VAR model is regarded as having “empirical” nature while a 
SVAR model is a middle ground between “theoretical” and “empirical” models, 
that’s in addition to the input-output (meso) analysis models. However, in this 
chapter, I discuss and compare two macroeconomic modelling methods used 
by economic researchers, which are the Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) and the Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) approaches. The 




Firstly, DSGE has been developed and consistently based on the neoclassical 
macroeconomic theory, and it reflects that theory’s assumptions and limitations. 
For instance, it reflects the neoclassical assumption of general equilibrium as the 
normal state of the market economy. DSGE’s main contribution is to provide 
microfoundations to macro-modelling. However, this contribution is questionable 
as the approach views society as a simple aggregation of separate individuals 
who are homogeneous and do not interact. More specifically, DSGE adopts an 
atomic (individualistic) view of the world, with one representative agent 
(motivated by self-interest) who optimises and has rational expectations and 
an infinite time horizon (I have discussed this point in detail in chapter 1). 
That not only reflects a false social ontology, it also creates space for fallacies 
of composition. Furthermore, the intrinsic assumption of stability across DSGE 
models creates a pre-determined understanding as to what causes certain 
economic phenomena, such as inflation and unemployment. To be sure, the 
models are open to non-neoclassical features, such as the New Keynesian price 
and wage rigidities, and they have been recently updated b y  adding financial 
‘frictions’18  to include banks and credit. However, those additions do not 
eliminate the fundamental faults of those models, such as disregarding the 
endogeneity of money. 
In contrast to the DSGE methodology, the alternative of SFC macroeconomic 
modelling offers a more conceptual and broader framework which allows 
researchers to use and apply their different theoretical backgrounds. The clear 
separation between stocks and flows in SFC modelling gives the model an 
important element of dynamic interaction, whereby the realization of flows and 
the change of stocks link different short-term periods with each other. More 
importantly, it provides a solid basis for coherent social accounting and also 
creates the appropriate space for a comprehensive consideration of financial 
dynamics. SFC also allows different perspectives on human behaviour and is not 
locked into utility maximisation. 
                                                          
18 Notice here that in the DGSE model, the word ‘frictions’ usually corresponds to 
factors that slow down the price mechanism from equilibrating the market 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: I first outline the most important 
developments within the DSGE tradition throughout recent years. I then move 
on to critiques of the approach. Next, I discuss the alternative of SFC modelling, 
identifying both its merits and its limitations. The last section concludes. 
5.2 DSGE Models 
DSGE models enjoyed a golden era before 2007. Most central banks and 
mainstream researchers utilised it, in addition to other Macro forcasting models, 
as an effective way of macroeconomic modelling, despite its shortcomings. Such 
as the absence in the models of banks, credit, and money, and implicitly money 
is exogenous (e.g., the Smets and Wouters (2002) model used by ECB), and 
other important economic aspects such as income inequality. One of the main 
arguments of DSGE models’ ‘success story’ is their ability to fit the data 
(Christiano et al., 2010), at least up to the 2007 crisis.  
The crisis revealed flaws with DSGE models. However, following the crisis, DSGE 
modelling has made some progress b y  incorporating a number of real-world 
features such as a banking sector and by attempting to explain the existence of 
multiple interest rates by introducing financial frictions into the models (Fontana 
and Passarella, 2018; Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007).  Further, Gerali et al. 
(2010) introduce a banking sector with monopolistic power and study the 
importance of credit-supply factors in explaining fluctuations in investment and 
GDP. The banks in their model provide loans to both households and firms, 
and draw funds not only from savings but also from retained earnings, thereby 
creating an important link between the real and financial sides of the economy. 
Furthermore, interest rates are sticky, while households demand either 
deposits or loans depending on their level of ‘patience’ (patience relates here 
to the discount factors that households apply to their future utility). 
In another study, Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) introduce inequality as a 
factor increasing the financial leverage of households and increasing the 
probability of a financial crisis. In a similar vein, Charpe and Kuhn (2012) 
highlight the importance of inequality in dampening consumption and aggregate 
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demand. Their model includes a wage- bargaining mechanism and an 
endogenous labour share of income. 
Additionally, newer DSGE models set a low elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour, which limits the increase of labour demand that follows a fall 
in wages. In contrast to most of the existing DSGE literature, their results show 
how wage rigidities such as minimum wage help to stabilize the economy by 
containing the falls of output and employment. Christiano et al. (2013) 
endogenise wage inertia and examine the response of labour market variables 
to monetary, technological, and investment shocks. 
As for the financial sector, Benes, Kumhof, and Laxton (2014a; 2014b) construct 
a DSGE model with banks and household credit, following a balance sheet 
approach for their banks. Adopting the key insights of the endogenous money 
theory, the authors suggest that it is not savings but rather demand for financing, 
banks’ expectations of future profitability, and the risk- absorption capacity 
of their capital that govern banks’ decisions to provide credit. They use their 
model to show that banks have the capacity to create purchasing power ex 
nihilo, while at the same time they show how large and risky loans create the 
seeds of a financial crisis. Christiano et al. (2014) also include financial frictions 
into their model, without however considering an explicit banking sector. What 
is interesting in their paper is that they adopt a two-stage decision mechanism 
for households, with a monetary shock in- between. With households deciding 
the size of their portfolio in the first stage, and the allocation of their wealth in 
the second one, this model permits the authors to depict a “flight to safety” 
situation. 
5.2.1 DSGE Critiques 
5.2.1.1 Microfoundations of Macroeconomics 
 
The key point of the Lucas Critique (Lucas, 1976) was that expectations play 
an important role in explaining observed regularities at the aggregate level. In 
that regard, once there is a policy change, expectations change, and as a result, 
the observed aggregate relationships will change. To tackle this problem, 
macroeconomic models should start from the level of the individual, since 
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structural parameters such as consumption preferences and production 
functions are immune to policy changes. The above critique shaped DGSE 
models from their genesis so that the microfoundations approach provided 
DSGE models a strong raison d'être. 
To evaluate the validity of the Lucas argument, one should first consider the 
purpose of mathematical modelling.   If the aim is to conduct accurate prediction, 
as advocated by neoclassical economists (e.g., Friedman, 1953), the Lucas 
Critique is right in pointing out the possible instability in observed aggregate 
relationships. But then the disappointing performance of DSGE models in 
forecasting the crisis and post-crisis economic dynamics (for evidence see Edge 
and Gurkaynak, 2010) could be taken as a sign that not even the individual-
based parameters are permanently fixed as assumed by the microfoundations 
approach. In that case, there is either a need to think of abolishing mathematical 
modelling altogether or to acknowledge the artificiality of the closures we 
construct when building such models. A mathematical model is, in essence, an 
analytical tool for exposing and communicating an argument. As such, it requires 
a vast number of simplifications. Although such communication might include 
projections of future scenarios, there is no obvious reason why we need to 
attach certain probabilities to possible scenarios, especially when our knowledge 
of such likelihoods appears to be so shaky. Neither is there any reason to 
pretend that the parameters utilized are going to stay constant when it is 
known that the parameters vary over t ime. Any projections will, of 
course, be sensitive to the stability of the parameters employed, but this not an 
error itself. In either a micro- or a macro-founded model, it is an error to forget 
the artificiality that surrounds the constructs. Even if the microfoundations 
approach provides a solution to a problem, it only does so by creating a few 
new ones.  In particular, it introduces a false social ontology, which as such 
creates the hazard of false policy conclusions, while it also opens the space for 
fallacies of composition. 
To start with the problem of social ontology, microfounded models such as the 
DSGEs are based on the dubious idea that society is an aggregation of individual 
households and firms so that we can conduct a valid macro analysis by focusing 
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at the level of the representative agent without losing scope. However, as 
argued by Kirman (1989, 1992), it is far from obvious that the aggregate of 
individuals acts in the same way as the representative agent, even if everyone 
is assumed to behave rationally.  Put simply; there is no direct relation between 
individual and collective rationality.  Furthermore, Kirman points out that even 
if we could somehow construct an accurate representative agent at a given 
point in time, such representation would be itself sensitive to policy changes. 
In Kirman’s words, ‘the representative constructed before the change may no 
longer represent the economy after the change’ (1992: 123; emphasis in the 
original). That means that the Lucas Critique applies to DSGE models just as 
well as other models (also see Sawyer, 2017; Skott, 2014). 
Despite the recent developments in DSGE modelling in incorporating insights 
from Game Theory, the basic microfounded ontology of the model leaves aside 
any element of social conflict, class divisions, or exploitation (Skott, 2014). For 
instance, under the basic routine of those models, households provide capital to 
firms, while in their role as workers they freely choose how much to work and 
how much to go on holidays based on the disutility they derive from their 
labour. To the extent that those elements are important in capturing real social 
dynamics, DSGE models act in a way that constrains rather than liberates the 
mind of the researcher. 
Coming to the second problem, when microfounding of a macro world, it is 
easy to neglect the fact that some variables might have different and often 
opposing effects at the two levels. To neglect such a fact is to succumb to the 
fallacy of composition (Sawyer, 2017). For example, a key point raised by 
Keynes (Keynes, 1936) in his critique against the classical economics of his time 
is the ‘paradox of thrift’, a phenomenon that relates to the implications of 
increased savings. 
As argued by Keynes, although increased savings can secure some increased 
future consumption if applied solely by the individual, the reverse occurs when 
such behaviour is adopted on a collective scale by the population. In that case, 
rather than securing an augmented volume of future consumption, increased 
savings will reduce consumption demand and therefore investment (Sawyer, 
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2017). As a result, not only wil l  the economy experience a slump, but the 
savings will also end up being lower than before due to the fall in people’s 
incomes. 
5.2.1.2 Equilibrium  
 
By virtue of their neoclassical underpinnings, DSGE models assume that 
equilibrium is something that exists in the real world. In that regard, DSGE 
models work with the deeply-rooted assumption that the market mechanism is 
capable of providing stability and full employment if left to operate freely. Of 
course, they employ all different sorts of frictions so as to mimic the data of 
the real world. However, the usage of those frictions does not change the main 
idea behind DSGEs, and this is of the utmost importance for policy conclusions. 
For example, one of the most common kinds of rigidities that can be found 
in DSGE is wage rigidities. The conventional (but not universal) wisdom across 
the DGSE community is that wage stickiness explains unemployment since it 
keeps the market away from the equilibrium wage that would deliver full (or 
non-accelerating-inflation) employment. Put simply, if there are legal barriers, 
such as the minimum wage, firms might not hire as many workers as they would 
do otherwise, and therefore the labour market does not clear. What is more, 
when, in a recession, workers refuse to accept a cut in their wages, firms will 
have to fire part of their staff in order to reduce their costs. 
Other than the fact that as with before there is a fundamental fallacy of 
composition when taking wages solely as a cost factor and omitting their role 
as a source of aggregate demand, there is also an important issue in that 
DSGE modellers would usually assume that there really exists at all times an 
equilibrium wage consistent with full or non-inflation-accelerating employment.  
They ignore the fact that firms’ decisions to hire do not relate solely to the wages 
they have to pay, but also to their expectations about the future so that 
especially in a recession we might very well have falling wages and increasing 
unemployment going hand in hand. Or, to state another example, even in the 
most advanced DSGE formulations, where banks are explicitly incorporated 
into the model, there is the implicit assumption that if we were to remove the 
specific element that creates financial crises, we could think of a stable financial 
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system. For instance, in Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) the problem of high 
leverage of financial firms is caused by income inequality, while in Benes et al. 
(2014a) it has to do with risky loans given out to households. 
In none of the papers outlined above is there any thought that financial 
instability might be inherent to the functioning of the capitalist economy, rather 
than a symptom of specific regularities. That, of course, is not a coincidence, 
but a reflection of the fact that in DSGE models finance is at best considered 
as an afterthought, rather than an intrinsic feature of the process of capital 
accumulation. All those models outlined earlier can equally well explain 
investment with or without finance. Needless to say, my critique does not imply 
that observed regularities such as income inequality or risky loans are not 
important, but that there can be deeper causes behind financial crises not 
picked up by DSGEs. For instance, Minsky (1986) with his celebrated Financial 
Instability Hypothesis shows how financial fragility and speculation can be seen 
as intrinsic outcomes of the capitalist economy, given the way overoptimistic 
expectations are formed and reinforced in the expansionary phase of the 
business cycle. The precise schema that intrinsically creates financial 
instability goes beyond the current discussion. For my purpose, it suffices to 
point out that as long as there exist coherent explanations as to how 
unemployment, financial instability, and crises can arise as endogenous 
outcomes of the market economy. DSGE models act in a way that impoverishes 
the researcher by binding him or her to a very specific understanding of the 
economic system that assumes stability as its ultimate normality. 
Furthermore, as Yilmaz (2015) argues, there is a very important distinction at 
the level of policymaking: rather than focusing on policy recommendations that 
would allow us to prevent unsustainable and destabilizing processes from 
building up, DSGE models tend to provide recommendations on how to improve 
the shock-absorbing mechanisms of the economy. Even more, as can be seen 
in the abovementioned literature, those recommendations are usually delivered 
in the aftermath of the occurrence of actual shocks, so that the usefulness of 
this kind of modelling can be directly questioned. 
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5.3 The SFC Alternative 
SFC modelling has recently emerged as a way to move away from the 
problematic nature of DGSEs, while also opening up the space for a richer 
comprehension of economic phenomena.  Despite the fact that the SFC 
approach has mainly been adopted by scholars broadly belonging to the Post 
Keynesian tradition, it devises a framework that can also be adopted by 
economists who do not necessarily share the assumptions and insights of the 
Post Keynesian theory. While the SFC approach has its roots in the works of 
James Tobin and Wynne Godley (indicatively see Brainard and Tobin, 1968; 
Tobin, 1982; Godley, 1999), it was the seminal book of Godley and Lavoie 
(2007b) that provided the main unified framework for the development of those 
models.   It is this book, along with the recent review of SFC models provided 
by Caverzasi and Godin (Caverzasi and Godin, 2015), that mainly influences the 
outline provided here. First, as the name suggests, SFC models pay attention to 
clearly distinguishing between stocks and flows. As pointed out by Godley and 
Lavoie (2007b), such distinction gives an element of dynamic interaction in the 
model whereby different short-run periods are interrelated through the 
realization of flows and the corresponding change of stocks in the economy. 
Furthermore, by focusing on the interaction of the balance sheets of all the 
agents that are included in the model, the SFC approach gives a strong emphasis 
to watertight social accounting. Namely, every flow needs to come from 
somewhere and go somewhere else, while every asset in the economy is always 
somebody else’s liability. Although conceptually simple, this rule is powerful in 
making sure that we do not commit any fallacies of composition. In addition, it 
forces the researcher to comprehend the multifaceted role of assets/liabilities in 
economic dynamics. For instance, under proper SFC accounting, public debt 
always has a mirror reflection as wealth in the hands of the private sector. 
The above rule also holds in the case of open-economy stock-flow modelling. In 
contrast with non-SFC models, the stock-flow approach requires the explicit 
modelling of the external sector. As with before, the logic of SFC models forces 
us to take into account the fact that every trade imbalance has two distinct 
points of view: the deficit of one country is always the surplus of another. 
136 
 
Similarly, the wealth that flies out of a country does not go into a black hole but 
ends up in the hands of an agent or fund in a foreign sector. Furthermore, 
unless special assumptions are employed, there is nothing in the system that 
guarantees balanced trade across countries in either the short or the long 
run. 
In neither the closed nor the open economy set-up is there any default 
assumption of gravitating tendencies towards a market-clearing equilibrium 
point. Of course, the model still solves for a steady state in most (but not all) of 
the SFC applications (for a discussion of explosive trajectories in SFC models, 
see Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos, 2011). However, this does not imply that 
equilibrium is understood here as a feature of the real world.  Rather, the steady 
state is merely employed as a reference point for the researcher to be able to 
draw inferences and conclusions. Similarly, it can be seen as a useful device for 
comparing alternative policies. 
Although there is a growing stream of agent-based stock-flow applications (see 
for instance Carvalho and Di Guilmi, 2013), microfounding an SFC model is not 
required. In fact, most of the SFC models, including the ones outlined in 
Godley and Lavoie (2007b), have been so far based on macrofoundations. 
Note here that the macrofounding of a macro model does not imply a return to 
the old-school IS/LM framework. In most, if not all, SFC models there is a far 
richer interaction between the developments going on in the financial market 
and the real economy than what the IS/LM approach could allow for (Sawyer, 
2017). 
With regard to the behaviour of the model’s agents, there is no specific 
requirement for assuming rational expectations. Decisions depend on 
expectations which turn out to be incorrect, and in that sense, mistakes made. 
Also of course decisions cannot all be implemented – a person may decide to 
buy but can only actually do so if there is someone ready to sell. Instead of 
rational expectations, a variety of expectation mechanisms can be employed.  
Most importantly, given that some key decisions of the agents are made at the 
beginning of the period before the economy engages in any sort of interactions, 
mistakes can also be made. For instance, households can err when calculating 
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their expected wealth, firms may face a discrepancy between the expected and 
actual sales of their products, and banks may face a gap between the asset and 
liability sides of their balance sheet. In all cases, a buffer element is assumed 
for every sector to ensure the ex-post coherency of the accounting. 
One of the most interesting aspects of an SFC model is the way the financial 
market is depicted.  As modelled, it is essentially based on the financial decisions 
of households, which, after deciding at the beginning of the period how much 
to consume. They then go on to estimate their end-of-period wealth and decide 
how to allocate it across the available financial assets (e.g., government bills 
and bonds, corporate equities) (Lavoie, 2014). The demand for every asset 
(which is proportional to expected wealth) is not only a function of its own 
rate of return but also relates with the rates of return of all the other financial 
assets, including cash. 
The demand for money is generally either for liquidity or transactions purposes. 
In that way we end up with a system of equations that needs to satisfy the 
following Tobinesque principles: (i) the column of the coefficients that relate 
with liquidity preference (the constants of the equations) needs to sum up to 
one. (ii) the coefficients of all other columns need to sum up to zero; (iii) the 
sum of all the coefficients on rates of return, reading horizontally, need to 
sum up to zero as well.   The logic behind those rules is that what matters for 
the decision making of households is not the rate of return of every asset per 
se, but its yield relative to all other assets. For the same reason, whether the 
rates of return are included in a nominal or in a real form does not make any 
difference (Godley and Lavoie, 2007: 326- 7). Furthermore, money holdings 
usually play the role of the buffer so as to correct the realized mistakes in 
expectations.  In that regard, the ex-ante demand for cash usually differs from 
the actual ex-post cash holdings. 
There is a three-stage process that needs to be followed when setting up 
and solving an SFC.  First, in accordance with the requirement of watertight 
accounting, a balance sheet matrix must be designed for the model.  That is 
meant to include all the stocks of assets and liabilities that every sector has at 
the beginning of the period, as well as the sectors’ net worth. Second, a 
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transaction matrix is required to map every transaction that takes place 
throughout the period across the different sides of the economy.   Any capital 
gains are also included here.  As a reflection of proper accounting, in both the 
balance and the transaction matrices all columns and rows should sum up to 
zero.  Third, the accounting identities and behavioural equations of each sector 
need to be established in order to illustrate the causalities that are assumed to 
run across the model. Then, the parameters and initial values of stocks and 
flows need to be obtained so as to simulate the model (alternatively one can 
solve the system analytically and stop there, or just stop at the specification of 
the identities and equations). As discussed in Caverzasi and Godin (2015), 
numerical values can either be theoretical or empirical; in the second case the 
researcher can either calibrate them or estimate them econometrically. Notice 
here that up to stage two, the model does not have a ‘character’ yet. Rather, it 
is only by means of the equations of stage three that the model incorporates 
insights from theory (also see Toporowski and Michell, 2011). For instance, the 
model could be either led by demand or supply and up to stage two, the choice 
would make no difference. 
All in all, there are no specific constraints on the issues to be studied. Rather, 
SFC models can allow for a plethora of phenomena to be investigated such as 
income inequality, innovation, and financialization (see literature outline below). 
Moreover, there are no boundaries to the theoretical narratives that one might 
want to reflect on a model, so that the SFC approach does not advocate any 
kind of economic orthodoxy, either new or old. 
5.3.1 SFC Literature Review 
 
SFC modelling began with Morris Copeland's approach to modelling economic 
flows in the late 1940s (Copeland, 1949). Based upon the double-entry-
bookkeeping principle, Copeland augmented this approach to recording flows 
from a social perspective, creating the quadruple-entry-bookkeeping principle 
(Caverzasi & Godin, 2015). An example of the quadruple-entry approach is the 
sale of a house. To purchase houses, the buyers must have either sufficient cash 
on hand or get a mortgage from a bank. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume 
the former, with the buyers using the money in their deposit accounts. Upon the 
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sale of the house, the buyers transfer the money to the account of the sellers, 
and in exchange, they receive the title to the house. In the end, four transactions 
between the buyers and the sellers take place. The buyers receive the houses, 
and thus their tangible capital increases, but their deposits decrease by the same 
amount to pay for the houses. The sellers lose the tangible capital, and their 
deposits increase by the amount of money received from the sale of the houses. 
After Copeland, there were two other early major contributors to SFC modelling, 
James Tobin at Yale and Wynne Godley at Cambridge in the United Kingdom. 
The first major empirical SFC model focused on the U.S. economy, and was 
published in a paper by Tobin along with David Backus, William Brainard, and 
Gary Smith (Backus et al., 1980) (Caverzasi & Godin, 2015). Another significant 
contribution by Tobin was the development of a system of equations for portfolio 
allocation of wealth into various assets depending on their respective rates of 
return (Tobin, 1969) (Caverzasi & Godin, 2014). With respect to SFC modelling 
used by post-Keynesian economists, Godley made the significant early 
contributions on both theoretical and empirical sides. Perhaps the most 
important contribution to SFC modelling was the book Godley coauthored with 
Marc Lavoie: Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, 
Income, Production and Wealth, published in 2007, with a second edition 
published in 2012. Monetary Economics introduces the fundamentals of SFC 
modelling and explores various facets of macroeconomics, such as open-
economy models, realistic financial systems, and growth. It is the textbook for 
SFC modelling. A more in-depth discussion of SFC modelling can be found in 
Post-Keynesian Stock-Flow-Consistent Modelling: A Survey, by Eugenio 
Caverzasi and Antoine Godin (2015). In what follows I outline some of the most 
recent papers, with a special focus given to open-economy case studies. 
To start with, van Treeck (2009) introduces some aspects of financialization into 
the SFC framework, running a number of experiments related to share buybacks 
and higher dividend pay-outs. Moreover, Arestis and Sawyer (2012) study the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy, and Ryoo and Skott (2013) investigate the fiscal 
requirements for continuous full employment. Dafermos (2012) designs a model 
that incorporates liquidity preference in all three sectors (households, firms,  
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and banks) at the same time. His analysis is facilitated by the construction of 
an uncertainty index that links to the economic agents’ precautionary motive 
and asset selection, as well as their willingness to take up more debt.  Passarella 
(2012) introduces the Minskyian dynamics of financial instability while modifying 
Minsky’s theory by allowing equity price inflation and households’ autonomous 
consumption (as related to capital gains and credit) to enter the model. 
Furthermore, Dafermos (2014) attempts to put together some of the key 
insights of Godley and Minsky, by taking on board Godley’s ‘financial balances 
approach’ and merging it with an endogenous target of the private sector’s net 
debt-to-income ratio a la Minsky. Nikolaidi (2014) studies the joint role of wage 
stagnation and securitization in amplifying macroeconomic instability. Her model 
consists of nine distinct sectors, including two types of households, commercial 
banks, Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) underwriters, and institutional investors. 
Bhaduri et al. (2015) investigate the links between asset price fluctuations and 
the real economy. Interestingly, Bhaduri and his colleagues show how the 
inflation of asset prices can drive funds from real to financial investment, and 
thus contribute to systemic financial fragility. From their side, Caiani et al. (2014) 
study Schumpeterian innovation and its interplay with financial dynamics. 
5.3.2 Limitations 
 
Although the SFC framework is a promising alternative to conventional 
macroeconomic modelling, it has its limitations. First, most SFC models (but not 
all) still come down to a system of linear equations, as in the case of DSGE 
models. Similarly, despite its usefulness as a methodological tool, the steady-
state assumption also creates some distance between the model and reality. 
However, it is worthy to notice that the steady state assumption is not necessary 
to empirical SFC models. Moreover, as discussed by Godley and Lavoie (2001/2) 
and Caverzasi and Godin (2015), the numerical solution of the model focuses on 
local stability, so that the researcher cannot know whether there are any other 
equilibria in the model and whether these are stable. 
Aggregate SFC models usually employ a vast amount of equations (probably 
around a hundred equations on average). In addition, as pointed out by 
Toporowski and Michell (2011), the analysis of some phenomena such as stock 
141 
 
market inflation can require the splitting of one or more of the aggregate sectors 
and hence further augment the mathematical complexity of the model. In 
either case, such complexity can obscure economic interpretation, while the 
results can prove to be quite sensitive to parameter values. As discussed by 
Caverzasi and Godin, the parameterization of the model always involves some 
arbitrariness, irrespective of the strength of the underlying empirical analysis, 
while sometimes non-realistic values need to be assumed for the sake of 
obtaining a realistic, steady-state solution. 
Taking all these considerations into account, it is important to remember that 
the SFC approach is a method of mathematical modelling. As pointed out earlier, 
while modelling techniques can allow us to understand and illustrate analytically 
some otherwise complex phenomena and interactions, there are always 
simplifications and sacrifices that need to be made. But even the most advanced 
and extended model one could ever imagine would not be in a position to 
capture the richness of theory. For example, although there are many bright 
mechanics that can be employed to illustrate aspects that arise out of 
Keynesian uncertainty, uncertainty itself remains a non-quantifiable concept. 
The way out of the conundrum is not to downgrade the importance of such non-
quantifiable phenomena and constraints and treat them as disturbances to an 
otherwise smooth process, but to fully acknowledge them and in that sense 
also acknowledge the limitations of the modelling we are doing. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Paving the ground for the model developed in the following chapter, chapter 
5 has discussed some of the main alternatives in macroeconomic modelling. In 
contrasting the DSGE with the SFC approach, the chapter points out the 
advantages of the second. As shown, the DSGE methodology offers the 
researcher a narrow modelling framework which intrinsically assumes stability 
as the normal state of the economy and which operates on the basis of 
microfoundations. On the other hand, the SFC approach provides a broader 
framework that can be employed by researchers coming from a variety of 
theoretical traditions. Some of the main merits of the approach include the 
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clear distinction between stocks and flows, the emphasis on watertight social 
accounting, and the creation of the space required for the thorough examination 
of the various financial relationships among the agents of the economy. In the 
following chapter, I investigate the interaction between monetary policy and 
fiscal policy in an SFC model, in a sense incorporating chapters 4 & 5.  
143 
 
Chapter 6:  The impact of monetary-fiscal policies coordination on 
financial stability in a post-Keynesian stock-flow model 
6.1 Introduction 
I have discussed in chapter 4 the importance of a monetary-fiscal policies 
coordination from both the fiscal theory of price level and the post-Keynesian 
theory of monetary-fiscal policies interrelation. In addition, I have discussed the 
SFC modelling in chapter 5. Consequently, in this chapter, I use a post-
Keynesian stock-flow model to investigate the role of a coordinated monetary-
fiscal policy to achieve economic stability in particular financial stability. My 
concern here to emphasise the central bank’s unique role as the as a fiscal agent 
(government’s bank), which is very crucial to achieve macroeconomic stability. 
The latter is acheived when acting as the ultimate provider of liquidity to the 
economy and as a lender of last resort to both government and banks. Thus, an 
accommodating monetary policy which is based on the post-Keynesian 
‘horizintalists’ view is not only essential, but it is vital to achieving economic 
stability (Fontana, 2004). 
The main contribution for this chapter that it goes beyond existing literature, by 
incorporating a coordinated monetary and fiscal policy to achieve financial 
stability. Banking on Minsky’s concept of Borrower’s and Lender’s risk of firms 
and banks, which is based on expectations and level of confidence. Post-
Keynesian fundamental uncertainty is incorporated implicitly here in the sense 
to signify low confidence in expectations, regardless of probability, which is 
represented in the changing of firms desired investment and expected demand, 
and it is also reflected on Borrower’s and Lender’s risk of firms. More importantly, 
a monetary rule based on the solvency and liquidity risk of banks rather than 
the usual Tylor rule.  
In the first section I discuss some literature on the importance of monetary-
fiscal policies coordination. Then I build a SFC model in a closed financialised 
economy which consists of five economic sectors: households sector, firms 
sector, banks sector, a central bank and a government. That is done to 
investigate a coordinated expansionary monetary-fiscal policy on financial 
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stability when a solvency rule is applied in contrast to contractionary fiscal policy 
(austerity). I discuss the results of simulations and scenarios. Finally, a 
conclusion will be drawn. 
6.2 Monetary-fiscal policies coordination 
I have shown in chapter 4 that the interrelation of monetary and fiscal policy is 
essential to achieve overall economic stability. This is in contrast to NCM, where 
fiscal policy is impotent, and to FTPL, in which fiscal policy is only crucial for 
price stability. The post-Keynesian notion of monetary-fiscal policy interrelation 
is vital to achieving financial stability that would lead to economic stability. 
Fontana et al. (2015) argued that coordinated monetary policy and fiscal policy 
can achieve financial stability. That is to say, both policies can affect the Minsky’s 
notion of ‘lender risk’ and ‘borrower risk’ reducing the risk and restore confidence 
in the economy, by changing firms’ and banks’ expectations, which restores 
economic activity and promote financial stability. More precisely, monetary 
policy transmission mechanism uses its policy rate affecting the lending and 
borrowing behaviour of banks and firms, by impacting lenders’ and borrowers’ 
risk a la Minsky (Nikolaidi, 2017). This is so given that banks set their interest 
rate on loans based on mark-up over the central bank policy rate and on their 
credit risk which comprises liquidity and insolvency risks. Liquidity risk is the 
composition of their portfolio and by taking into account the ratio of illiquid and 
liquid assets. The liquidity risk increases when the ratio of illiquid/liquid assets 
of banks increases. Since loans to firms and households are normally identified 
as illiquid assets, banks will be less willing to accommodate the demand for 
credit if their portfolio is highly illiquid. However, the central bank can reduce 
the liquidity risk of banks by exchanging government bonds for private debts. 
Moreover, banks assess the insolvency risk according to the ability of firms and 
households to reimburse their debt. The ability of firms to repay debts, in turn, 
depends on their leverage ratio and Tobin’s q (Le Heron, 2009). 
Further, following Graziani’s ‘monetary theory of production’, Fontana et al 
(2015) added fiscal policy dimension to financial stability. Given the direct 
relationship between income (Y) and government expenditure (G), then an 
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increase in (G) increases income level, which in turn affects the aggregate 
demand that leads to an increase in households’ consumption. That will increase 
firms’ production and profitability, which reduces their borrower’ risk, which also 
reduces the solvency risk of the banks, given the increasing ability of firms to 
pay-back their debts. An increase in production will increase the demand for 
loans, and banks will be willing to increase the supply for loans due to a 
reduction in the borrower’s risk given the increase of firms’ profitability, liquidity, 
cash flow and expected sales revenue. Moreover, an increase in government 
expenditure is financed by a loans issued by the central bank in exchange of 
government bills and bonds. That also increases banks’ liquidity, as central bank 
will provide these bills and bonds, which are very liquid assets for banks’ balance 
sheets, in exchange of private debts, increasing banks’ liquidity and ability to 
meets the increasing demand of loans by households and firms. 
Thus, we have coordinated monetary-fiscal policy with an increase of 
government expenditure that increases aggregate demand, expected aggregate 
demand and income, and a decrease of central bank policy rate. All is 
accompanied by central bank financing of government spending, which will lead 
to change market exepctation, which in turns improve the state of confidence 
of households, firms and banks by reducing the solvency and the liquidity risk 
in the economy, which helps, first in achieving financial stability, second 
increasing economic activity and ensuring stability. 
6.3 The SFC Model 
Following (Lavoie-Godley, 2001, 2007, Dos Santos-Zezza, 2004, Mouakil, 2006, 
Le Heron-Mouakil, 2008, Le Heron, 2009)work, I build a post-Keynesian stock 
flow consistent closed economy model, consist of five economic sectors: 
households, firms, banks, government and central bank. Firms take their 
investment and production decision based on desired growth of capital, which 
depends on their state of confidence in the economy, following Keynes ‘animal 
spirit’ behaviour. They demand banks’ loans based on the availability of internal 
funds and their borrowing risk. Banks create money and grant loans based on 
their state of confidence and the creditworthiness and the financial structure of 
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the firms. Households supply work and earn wages, and they take their 
consumption decision based on their disposable income and accumulated wealth. 
To present a financialised household, they have access to loans, and they hold 
financial assets. Banks create money by issuing loans on demand which creates 
deposits, and they also have a portfolio of financial assets. The central bank sets 
the monetary policy rate, acts as a lender of last resort to government and banks, 
and provide currency and advances to banks on demand. It acts as a public 
agent as it does not hold any net wealth and it transfers its profit to the 
government. Government finances the public expenditure by issuing bills and 
bonds, and its expenditure grows constantly. The government collects taxes and 
receives profit from the central bank. In our model, a coordinated monetary-
fiscal policy is crucial to achieve financial stability by its impact on the lenders 
and borrowers risk. 
I illustrate the SFC model mechanism with an emphasis on an expansionary 
fiscal policy and an accommodating monetary policy that use a solvency and 
liquidity rule that is necessary to reach financial and economic stability. It is 
based on banks’ lender’s risk and borrower’s risk, which is based on firm’s risk 
in the first place. However, following Keynes’s ‘animal spirit’, firms make an 
investment decision based on future profitability and expected demand. As 
discussed on chapter five, SFC modelling is based on two tables: a balance 
sheet matrix (stocks) and a transactions matrix (flows). Table 8 gives the 
transactions matrix that describes monetary flows between the five sectors of 
the economy. Every row represents a monetary transaction, and every column 
corresponds to a sector, which is fragmented in a current and a capital account, 
except in basic cases such as the government and that of households. Sources 
of funds appear with plus signs and uses of funds with negative signs, so every 
row must sum to zero seeing that each transaction always corresponds 
simultaneously to a source and a use of funds. The sum of each column must 
also be zero since each account (or sub-account) is balanced. Table 9 gives the 
balance sheet matrix of our economy. Symbols with plus describe assets and 
negative signs indicate liabilities. The sum of every row is again zero except in 
the case of accumulated capital in the industrial sector. The last row presents 
the net wealth of each sector.
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Table 8: The transactions matrix 
Sector Households Firms Private Banks Central Bank Govt. Σ 
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Govt. Expenditure  + G      - 
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0 
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   - rb -
1.Bs-1 
0 
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- rl –1 .Lh,–1 + rl –1 .Ls,–1 
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6.3.1 Firms Equations 
Following the theory of monetary production economy, firms need credit ‘initial 
finance’ in order to production takes place. In our model firms play a crucial 
role in terms of production, providing goods and services to households (C) 
and the government (G) for consumption. However, in our growth model the 
demand of investment (Id) function, equation (11) grows by the desired rate 
of accumulation (grk) out of a capital target stock (Kt) plus depreciation (Da). 
The desired rate of accumulation (grk), equation (12), is a function of an 
exogenous state of confidence (γ0), the capacity utilization rate (Uk), the 
borrower’s risk, which is measured by the rate of cash flow (CF) that is the 
ratio of retained earnings (Fu) to capital (K-1). Equation (10) represents the 
capital accumulation function, and a financial condition (FCI) which is 
measured by firms’ loans defaults out of their investment. Equation (16) is the 
firms’ profits (Ff) which is determined by the output (Y) out of wages paid (Ws) 
to workers, which consist of a number of workers (Nd) times wage (w), and 
interest payments for loans (rl* Lfd). Then they retained (Fu) a proportion (sf) 
of (F) and the rest is distributed (Fd). 
The desired investment financing decision is determined by internal finance, 
consist of undistributed profits (Fu)‘retained earnings’, and external finance, 
consist of loans (Lfd) granted by banks. The difference between the desired 
investment (Id) and the retained earnings (Fu) will determine the desired 
demand for loans (Lfd), equation (20). The latter, equation (21) depends on 
the bank's willingness to finance totally or in part according to their lender’s 
risk (lrf). For instance, if (lrf = 1) then banks will refuse to finance investment 
demand for loans, and if (lrf <1) then they will accept to finance the firms 
demand for loans. Equation (22), the lender’s risk depends on the firm leverage 
(levf ) and some constant leverage ratio (levc), and it also depends on topin’s (q) 
ratio. The lender’s risk and the borrower’s risk come from the analysis of H. 
Minsky. 
Equation 9: Capital Accumulation  
K = K-1 + Id – Da  where Da = δ * K-1  δ is a constant 
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Equation 10: Desired Investment 
Id = grk * Kt + Da  where Kt = κ * Y-1  κ is a constant 
Equation 11: Desired growth of investment 
grk = γ0 + γ1 * CF-1 + γ2 * Uk,-1  – γ3 * FCI-1    γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3 are constant 
Equation 12: Cash flow 
CF = Fu / K-1 
Equation 13: Financial condition 
FCI = Nplk * Lf / Id,-1    where Nplk is constant 
Equation 14: Rate of Capacity utilization 
Uk = Y/ K-1 
Equation 15: Firms’ profit 
Ff = Y - Ws – rl-1* Lfd,-1 
Equation 16: Wages paid to workers 
Ws = w * Nd     where w is constant 
Equation 17: Distributed profits 
Fd = (1-sf) * Ff    where sf is constant 
Equation 18: Undistributed profits 
Fu = Ff - Fd 
Equation 19: Firms desired demand for loans 
Lfd = Id - Fu 
Equation 20: Actual loans granted by banks 
Lfdd = Lfd * (1 – lrf) 
Equation 21: Lender’s risk 
lrf = γlr + γlev * (levf,-1 – levc) – γq * q where γlr, γlev, γq , levc are constants 
Equation 22: Firms’ leverage 
(15) levf =  Lfd/ Fu 
What is important in the model is that firms issue equities, equation (24), that 
grow depending on firms’ decisions among making desired investments, 
distributing profits, and retaining earnings, which is also a way to raise capital 
in the market instead of demanding loans from banks. 
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Equation 23: Equities issues by firms 
Eks = Eks,-1 + (1-sf) * Id,-1/ pe where sf is a constant 
Equation 24: Price to earnings ratio 
PE = pe / (Ff/ Eks,-1) 
Equation 25: Equilibrium condition, equities demand equals equities supply 
Ekd = Eks 
Equation 26: Topin’s q 
q= pe* Eks,-1 / (Lfd+K) 
Equation 27: Equities demand by Households 
Ekh = Ekd - Ekb 
Equation 28: The rate of return on equities 
rk = Fd / (pe,-1* Eks,-1) 
Equation 29: Distributed profits to Banks 
Fdb = Fd * Ekb/ Eks 
Equation 30: Distributed profits to Households 
Fdh = Fd - Fdb 
6.3.2 Households Equations 
The households in the model are financialised. In equation (32) households earn 
income (Yh) which is based on paid wages by firms (Ws) in return to their supply 
of labour, dividends paid by firms (Fdh), interest paid on deposits (rm,-1* Md,-1) by 
banks, interest paid on treasury bills (rb,-1* Bhd,-1 ) , interest paid on government 
bonds (rbl,-1*pbl,-1 * BLhd,-1) minus interest paid for loans (rl-1* Lhd,-1) to banks. 
Equation (33) shows households disposable income (Yd) is earned income (Yh) 
net of taxes (T). However I added the changes of loans’ demand minus 
repayments of loans (ΔLhd – Reph) as it is available for consumption and financial 
decision as well. Then, households make their consumption decision (C), 
equation (34) depending on their propensity to consume (α1) out of their 
expected disposable income (Yde), based on adaptive expectation equation (35), 
and (α2) out of their previous wealth (V-1). Household’s wealth accumulation 
function (V) depends on his previous wealth (V-1) and their savings out of their 
disposable income after consumption, a capital gain on equities will be added 
(cgh) to their wealth accumulation as well, equation (37). 
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Equation 31: Households’ income 
Yh = Ws + Fdh + rm,-1* Md,-1 + rb,-1* Bhd,-1 + rbl,-1*pbl,-1 * BLhd,-1 - rl-1* Lhd,-1 
Equation 32: Households’ disposable income 
Yd = yh – T + ΔLhd – Reph 
Equation 33: Households’ consumption function 
C = α1 * Yde + α2* V-1 where α1, α2 are coefficients parameters 
Equation 34: Households’ wealth accumulation 
V= V-1 +( Yd – C) + cgh 
Equation 35: Expected disposable income 
Yde= Yd,-1  
Equation 36: Capital gain out of equities 
cgh = Δpe * Ekh 
In a financialised world, households have access to finance their consumption 
and financial investment. Thus they are granted loans by banks based on their 
demand for loans. For simplicity, equation (38), the demand for loans (Lhd) is 
based on previous loans and a parameter (β) out of their consumption decision. 
The idea here is to present a consumption-debt-led behaviour, so households 
demand for loans is determined by their consumption level. 
Equation 37: Households demand for loans 
Lhd = Lhd,-1 + β*C   where  β is a constant 
Equation 38: Households’ loans repayments 
Reph = βh* Lhd,-1   where βh is a constant 
Households portfolio choice is fundamental in our model, as it is crucial to the 
dynamics of the demand for financial assets in a financial economy. They hold 
cash (Hh), and allocate their financial wealth (Vfah) between treasury bills (Bhd), 
government bonds (BLhd), equities (Ekh) and deposits (Md). This allocation is 
based on some preference parameter (λ) and the rate of return to each financial 
asset. 
Equation 39: Households’ demand for cash 
Hh = V - Bhd - pbl * BLhd - pe * Ekh 
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Equation 40: Households’ financial wealth 
Vfah = Md + Bhd + pbl * BLhd + pe * Ekh  
Equation 41: Households’ demand for treasury bills 
Bhd = Vfah,-1 * ( λ20 + λ22* rb,-1 - λ21* rm,-1 - λ24*rk,-1 - λ23* rbl,-1 - λ25* Yd,-1/V)
 Where λ20, λ21, λ22, λ23, λ24, λ25 are constant parameters 
Equation 42: Households’ demand for government bonds 
BLhd * pbl = Vfah,-1 * ( λ30 - λ32* rb,-1 - λ31* rm,-1 - λ34*rk,-1 + λ33* rbl,-1 - λ35* Yd,-
1/V)  Where λ30, λ31, λ32, λ33, λ34, λ35 are constant parameters  
Equation 43: Households’ demand for equities 
pe * Ekh = Vfah,-1 * ( λ40 - λ42* rb,-1 - λ41* rm,-1 + λ44*rk,-1 - λ43* rbl,-1 - λ45* Yd,-1/V) 
 Where λ40, λ41, λ42, λ43, λ44, λ45 are constant parameters  
Equation 44: Households’ demand for deposits 
Md = Vfah,-1 - Bhd - pbl * BLhd - pe * Ekh + Lhd - Reph 
6.3.3 Banks’ Equations 
 
Banks are the main actors in the credit market, following post-Keynesian 
endogenous money theory banks issue loans to firms and households on 
demand. By issuing loans they also create deposits, and they accept deposits 
from households, equations (47, 48, 49). Equation (46) represents banks’ profit 
(Fb) which is be made up of dividends received by firms (Fdb), interest received 
on treasury bills (rb,-1* Bbd,-1), interest received on government bonds  (rbl,-
1*pbl,-1*BLbd,-1), interest received on loans issued to firms (rl-1* Lfd,-1) and to 
households (rl-1* Lhd,-1), in addition to capital gains on holding equities (cgb), 
subtracting interest paid on deposits to households (rm,-1* Ms,-1). 
Equation 45: Banks’ profit 
Fb = Fdb + rb,-1* Bbd,-1 + rbl,-1*pbl,-1 * BLbd,-1 + rl-1* Lfd,-1 + rl-1* Lhd,-1 - rm,-1* Ms,-1 + 
cgb 
Equation 46: deposits to households 
Ms = Md 
Equation 47: Loans supply based on Loans demand by firms 
Lsf = Lfd 
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Equation 48: Loans supply based on Loans demand by households 
Lsh = Lhd 
In a monetary production economy banks play an essential role in order to 
investment and production take place. However, they issue loans after analysis 
of the credit worthiness of the firms, by analysing expected production plans, 
expected cash flow, and the borrower’s financial structure ability in making 
repayments. So, as mentioned in the firms section, in my model banks issue 
loans based the borrower’s risk (lrf), and if (lrf = 0). Then firms finance the total 
amount of firms desired demand of loans as in the case of the ‘horizontalists’ 
view, when banks foresees firms’ future profits then they will be willing to 
finance all the loans demanded , and if (lrf = 1) then banks refuse to finance 
firms demand of loans. This investigation is made according to their confidence 
in the state of long-term expectations of yields on capital assets, influencing 
what Keynes referred to as ‘animal spirits’. The state of confidence of banks is 
notably taking into account by an exogenous variable (γ4). 
Banks charge interest on loans issued to firms and households (rl) Equation (50), 
with a mark-up over central bank’s policy rate (rcb), and taking into consideration 
the lender’s risk on firms leverage (lrb), equation (51) in addition to some fixed 
mark-up (add1). Further, banks also pay interest on deposits to households (rm), 
equation (52), based on central bank’s policy rate (rcb) subtracting a fixed 
parameter (sub1). In addition, banks receive capital gains from holding equities 
(cgb) equation (53). 
Equation 49: interest rate charged on loans issued 
rl = rcb + lrb + add1 
Equation 50: lender’s risk 
lrb = γlrb + γlevb * (levf,-1 – levc) where γlrb, γlevb parameters, levc leverage 
target 
Equation 51: interest paid on deposits 
rm = rcb - sub1 where sub1 exogenously determined 
Equation 52: Banks’ capital gain on equities 
cgb = Δpe * Ekb 
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Banks’ portfolio choice is also important in our model, as it is vital to the 
dynamics of the demand for financial assets in a financial economy. They 
allocate their profit (Fb) between treasury bills (Bbd), government bonds (BLbd), 
equities (Ekb) equations (54, 45). This allocation is based on some preference 
parameter (λ) and the rate of return to each financial asset. However, equation 
(56), the demand for treasury bills is also based on balance sheet equilibrium 
where assets should equate liabilities. Where loans, bonds and equities are in 
the banks’ asset side, deposits and advances demanded by the central bank 
(equation 57) in addition to banks’ net profit. Further demand for advances 
depends on banks liquidity ratio ((Lsf + Lsh) / Bbd). 
Equation 53: Banks’ demand for government bonds 
BLhd * pbl  = Fb,-1 * ( λ60 – λ61* rb,-1 – λ62*rk,-1 + λ63* rbl,-1)  Where λ60, λ61, 
λ62, λ63, λ64, λ65 are constant parameters 
Equation 54: Banks’ demand for equities 
Ekb * pe = Fb,-1 * ( λ70 – λ71* rb,-1  + λ72*rk,-1 – λ73* rbl,-1 )   Where λ70, λ71, 
λ72, λ73, λ74, λ75 are constant parameters 
Equation 55: Banks’ demand for treasury bills, a balance sheet equilibrium condition 
Bbd = Fb,-1 + Ms + Ad – Lsf - Lsh - pbl * BLbd - pe * Ekb 
Equation 56: Banks demand advances by the central bank 
Ad = Ad,-1 + z1 * (Lsf + Lsh) / Bbd where z1 a constant 
6.3.4 Central Bank Equations 
Central banks set monetary policy rate, in contrast to the NCM inflation targeting 
rule our model emphasizes the role of the central bank in financial stability. The 
central bank will consider banks’ risk. The credit risk faced by banks is the sum 
of insolvency risk, which corresponds to the bank’s perception regarding the 
borrower’s likelihood of failure to repay the claim, and Liquidity risk, which 
entails the ability to liquidate assets when necessary. Thus, the monetary policy 
interest rate (rcb) function, equation (58) depends on a natural rate of interest 
(rn) (that makes savings=investment, it is assumed that is known and given). 
and taking into consideration banks’ liquidity risk (Liqb) compared to liquidity 
target (Liqc), equation (59), And banks’ solvency risk (insolvb) compared to 
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solvency target (insolvc), equation (60), both set by the central bank depending 
on weight parameters (β1, β2). 
Equation 57 
rcb = rn + β1 * (Liqb – Liqc) - β2 * (insolvb – insolvc ) 
Equation 58 
Liqb = (BLhd+ Bbd)/ Ms 
Equation 59 
insolvb = (BLbd+ Bbd)/( Lsf + Lsh + Ekb) 
Central bank performs its lender of last resort function for both the government 
and the financial sector to ensure financial stability by accommodating 
government demand for spending purpose and banks demand on advances, 
equations (61, 62, 63). The central bank will also hold treasury bills and 
government bonds which are not hold by banks and households to ensure 
financial stability and its full control over its policy rate. And as the ultimate 
provider of currency, central bank issues currency on demand equation (64). 
Equation 60: Central bank’s holding of treasury bills 
Bcb = Bs - Bbd – Bhd 
Equation 61: Central bank’s holding of government bonds 
BLcb = BLs - BLbd – BLhd 
Equation 62: Central bank’s supply advances to banks on demand 
As = Ad 
Equation 63: Central bank’s supply currency on demand (the hidden equation) 
Hs = Hh 
Equation (65) central bank’s profit on holding treasury bills, government bonds 
and providing advances, will be transferred to the government. 
Equation 64: central bank’s profit 
Fcb = rb,-1* Bcb,-1 + rbl,-1 * pbl,-1 * BLcb,-1+ ra,-1 * As,-1 
Equation 65: interest rate of treasury bills 
rb = rcb + add2  where add2 is mark-up 
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Equation 66: interest rate of advances 
ra = rcb + add3  where add2 is mark-up 
Equation 67: Interest rate of government bonds 
rbl =  1/pbl 
Equation 68  
pbl = pblpar  for simplicity I assume government bonds price is fixed 
6.3.5 Government Equations  
The national income (Y) adds the household consumption (C), investment of 
the firms (Id) and the public expenditure (G). 
Equation 69 
Y = C + Id + G 
The government finances any deficit issuing bills and government bonds so that 
the supply of treasury bills (B) and government bonds in the economy is 
identical to the stock of government debt. In other words, government’s new 
issue of bills is the sum of the previous period stock of debt plus its current 
deficit (DG) subtracting the change on government bonds equation (71). The 
current deficit of the Government includes the redemption of the National debt. 
It is assumed that private banks give limitless credit to the government at the 
long-term rate of interest: 
Equation 70: Government’s new issues of bills 
Bs = Bs,-1 + DG - Δ BLs 
In this model, I assume that government expenditure (G) is always growing at 
a constant rate (grg), equation (72). Our model key element is the necessary 
coordination between the monetary and the fiscal policies, where the economy 
has a self-stabilizing tendency due to the coordination policy, through its impact 
on financial stability which leads to economic stability. 
Equation 71: Government expenditure 
G = G-1*(1 + grg) 




Equation 72: Taxes 
T = θ * Yh 
Equation (74), government deficit is the difference of government expenditure 
(G), interest paid on bills, repayment of matured bonds and the tax revenue (T) 
plus central bank’s profit (Fcb). 
Equation 73: Government deficit 
DG = G + rb,-1 * Bs,-1 + BLs,-1  - T - Fcb 
Equation 74: Government debt 
GD = Bs + BLs  
Yfc = σ * K-1 (Output full capacity) 
OG = Yfc - Y / Yfc (Output Gap) 
6.4 Model Simulation and shock 
This section explores two scenarios for the mix policy by a shock of 1) an 
expansionary fiscal-monetary policy by a decrease in interest rate and an 
increase in government expenditure, 2) an expansionary monetary policy by a 
reduction of interest rate and contractionary fiscal policy (austerity) with a 
decrease in government expenditure. This representation is based on the real 
current world scenario, where policy interest rate is very low (near zero) and 
fiscal austerity measures in most countries that lead to poor macroeconomic 
outcomes (Sawyer, 2017). Then I look at both scenarios impact on output, 
disposable income, consumption, demand, and supply of loans, the borrower’s 
and lender’s risk. I use a plausible set of parameters values (see Appendix II) 
that is used in chapter 10 & 11 Godley & Lavoie (2007). 
6.4.1 First Scenario: an expansionary monetary-fiscal policy  
 
Starting with an initial state of crisis and loss of confidence, an increase in 
government expenditure by 1% combines with accommodative monetary policy, 
which entails a decrease in the policy rate and acting as a lender of last resort 
for the government. Given that there is a policy interest rate tool based on 
solvency and liquidity risks of banks, then the policy rate will accommodate this 
increase in public expenditure by a decrease in interest rate policy.  
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Figure 10 illustrates that the impact of an expansionary monetary-fiscal policy 
improves all the concerned variables output, disposable income, consumption, 
investment targets, desired investment, firms’ demand for loans, undistributed 
profits (internal funds), the borrower’s and lender’s risk, insolvency, banks 
demand for T-Bills, the interest rate on loans – Not only in the short-run but also 
in the long-run. 
6.4.2 Second Scenario: an expansionary monetary policy by a decrease in 
interest rate and contractionary fiscal policy (austerity) decrease in government 
expenditure. 
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In contrast to the first scenario, an expansionary monetary policy by a decrease 
in interest rate and a contractionary fiscal policy (austerity) by a decrease in 
government expenditure will worsen all the concerned variables: output, as 
shown  in figure 11, disposable income, consumption, investment targets, 
desired investment, firms’ demand for loans, undistributed profits (internal 
funds), the borrower’s and lender’s risk, insolvency, banks demand for T-Bills, 
interest rate on loans at least on the short-run. Notably, desired investment is 
worst in the short and the long run, due to the deterioration in the level of 
confidence, leverage risk and increasing demand for loans while weakening 
internal funds. Furthermore, banks become more prudent as their liquidity and 
solvency ratio increase as the economic situation is falling. 
6.5 Results and Discussion 
The consequences of the financial crisis are examined for two kinds of policy 
mix: For scenario (1), monetary policy is concerned with financial stability 
matters, with a policy rate that follows solvency and liquidity anchor. There is 
coordination between the monetary and the fiscal policies. That gives rise to a 
favourable outcome for the whole economy not only in the short-run but also in 
the long-run through restoring the state of confidence and reducing the 
borrower’s and lender’s risk for all economic sectors. 
For scenario (2), monetary policy is based on Taylor type of rule with inflation 
targeting. That corresponds to a unique mandate of the independent central 
bank: inflation gap only. Here fiscal policy is impotent and neutralized because 
we assume the fiscal rule that the ratio of the current deficit of the Government 
on the GDP is constant and equal to zero, as imposed by the Maastricht treaty 
for the European Union. 
In our financialised economy, the steady state is not the full-employment 
equilibrium. The output gap is positive, with a significant rate of unemployment. 
Potential output corresponds to the full capacity output. Following Minsky and 
Keynes approaches, confidence and financial features explain the crisis. Scenario 
(1) produces much better outcome than scenario (2) in response to a fall in the 
state of confidence. With neutralising the fiscal policy by imposing austerity 
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measures to achieve a balanced budget, the economic situation deteriorates 
deeply and becomes more strongly cyclical. 
Initially, after the crisis occurs, the decline in the state of confidence of firms is 
the first explanation to the depressed effective (expected) demand, i.e., the 
desired growth rate of accumulation of capital. But, particularly with the policy 
mix, banks also have an important responsibility, because financing conditions 
deteriorate. The rate of utilization of productive capacity falls more in the second 
scenario than in the first. The financial behaviour of firms explains these 
developments widely. With the depressed financial condition and the lower cash 
flow ratio, the borrower’s risk increases seriously. 
The effects on the self-financing of firms are very interesting. With the higher 
borrower’s and lender’s risks, firms and banks reduce external financing: self-
financing of firms increases. It corresponds to a supply shock and a credit crunch. 
On the contrary, the lost confidence of households involves a shock of demand 
and self-financing of firms decreases. With the policy mix scenario (1) the higher 
government deficit allows an increase in the cash flow of firms. Their self- 
financing increases. Government indebtedness substitutes for that of firms. With 
the scenario (2), the weight of banks and households’ behaviours is stronger 
and durably lowers self-financing of firms. We understand why the redoing of 
the ratio of self-financing is difficult and why it does not show the good state of 
the economy. The financing rationing of firms explains in part an increasing rate 
of unemployment. It exists sharp volatility in the financial markets (stocks and 
bonds) and a significant fall in the profit of banks. During the crisis, private 
banks try reaching a new equilibrium in their asset allocation. The structure of 
their balance sheet changes clearly. It is sure that our model over-estimates the 
size of equities. In the financialised economy, the firms finance the financial 
market more than the financial market finances the firms. Of course, the credit 
crunch will be deeper without the equities. These elements could explain the 
crossing of the financial crises to the real world. 
The financing rationing of firms explains in part an increasing rate of 
unemployment. It exists a sharp volatility in the financial markets (stocks and 
bonds) and a significant fall in the profit of banks. During the crisis, private 
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banks try reaching a new equilibrium in their asset allocation. The structure of 
their balance sheet changes clearly. It is sure that our model over-estimates the 
size of equities. We can consider that one feature of our present economy is the 
‘financialised’ accumulation of the profits. We can experiment our model with a 
higher part of the profits distributed to the shareholders. With an increase in the 
distributed profits, the rate of growth decreases and the borrower’s and the 
lender’s risks increases. The inflation decreases with the lower rate of growth 
and then the key interest rate of the central bank. With the higher leverage ratio 
and the lower self-financing for the firms, the gap between the short-term 
interest rate and the long-term interest rate increases. 
These results support post-Keynesians view which provides a ground for a better 
understanding the mechanism of the unavoidable interrelationship between the 
treasury and the central bank to achieve financial stability, Impacting the state 
of confidence of the economy and affecting households, firms, and banks 
borrowing and lending behaviour and risk. Thus, when central bank follows her 
main function as a government’s bank and her primary function as a banker’s 
bank, with an accommodating policy, it leads to a better economic outcome, 
especially towards achieving financial stability objective. 
6.6 Conclusion 
A policy mix or a coordinated monetary-fiscal policy has given rise to a crucial 
debate between different economic paradigms. In this chapter, I analyse and 
investigate a coordinated monetary-fiscal policy from a Post-Keynesian 
perspective using Post-Keynesian SFC model of a closed economy with five 
agents: households, firms, banks, government and central bank. Our simulation 
provides proof of the Post-Keynesian theory of monetary-fiscal interrelation in 
stabilizing the economy, through changing the behaviour of firms and banks 
affecting demand and supply loans by reducing solvency and liquidity risk which 
impacts borrower’s and lender’s risk behaviour. An expansionary fiscal policy 
with an accommodating monetary policy and policy rate targeting banks’ 
solvency and liquidity risk, will ensure achieving financial stability that improves 
the economic activity. Nevertheless, given the model complexity, the theoretical 
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plausible values (parameters and initial values) and the state of a closed 
economy, the model has its own limitations to provide an exact outcome for 
each economic variable in our economy. However, it produces a comprehensive 
understanding of a financialised economy. In the following chapter, I discuss 
the impact of monetary policy on inequality, using an expanded SFC model that 
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Chapter 7:  The impact of monetary policy on income distribution in a 
post-Keynesian stock-flow model 
7.1 Introduction 
Since the 2007-2008 great financial crisis, income inequality and income 
distribution matters have gained increasing attention not only in academia but 
also from professionals such as large financial institutions. Mainstream 
economists also joined also this concert, with the famous work of Piketty’s 
Capital in the 21st Century (2014). This income inequality has been rising since 
the early 1980s. Since 2010, median family incomes fell, while the mean rose. 
Inequality keeps rising. A Morgan Stanley study (2014) has also identified the 
rise in inequality, due to the growing proportion of poorly paid and insecure low-
skilled jobs; the rising wage premium for educated people; and the fact that 
government (tax and spending) policies are less redistributive than they used to 
be a few decades ago. A report was written by the chief US economist of 
Standard & Poor’s (2014), and another from Morgan Stanley, agree that 
inequality is not only rising but having damaging effects on the US economy. 
Janet Yellen, the chairman of the FED, recognised in her speech (2014) the 
growing gap between the rich and the poor, and she highlighted the risk of 
increasing income inequality to the American economy. 
The key argument of this chapter is that central banks should take responsibility 
for the fight against the increasing inequality. Because of their central position 
between the government, the banking sector, and the society. Instead of only 
focusing on nominal anchor such as inflation targeting. My main contribution in 
this chapter that I developed a SFC model where I have tested the Pasinetti’s 
‘fair rate interest’ based on productivity growth against ‘Inflation targeting’. The 
importance of the fair interest rate, compared to other alternative interest rates, 
is that the one which maintains purchasing power in relation to labour hours and 
money borrowed or lent and maintains the distribution of income between 
borrowers and lenders over time. From the fair rate perspective, central bank 
inflation targeting as currently practiced are not distributionally neutral in that 
they enable the capitalist class to take favourable financial positions. 
171 
 
I have found if the central bank incorporated a ‘fair rate of interest rule’ it would 
reduce inequality by distributing income from the rentiers class to other 
productive classes. That is consistent with Keynes argument against the 
unproductive rentier class. 
This chapter will discuss inequality from a central banking perspective. Firstly, 
inequality will be defined, as inequality could take different forms. Section 2 will 
discuss how central bankers view inequality, causes, and consequences. That is 
mainly drawn from a mainstream perspective. Section 3 will provide a post-
Keynesian approach, following Keynes, to inequality causes and consequences 
in a modern financialised economy. Then in section 4, I will build a SFC model 
to apply a post-Keynesian approach to interest rate and monetary policy. The 
fair rate of interest will be the policy rate; then simulation results will be 
discussed. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn. 
7.2 Definition of inequality 
Rising inequality has recently become a major concern in advanced economies, 
as it does not only affect economic activity but also it also affects social justice 
and fairness. Inequality could take different forms in a modern capitalist 
economy, inequality of wealth, income, financial exclusion, race, gender, 
globalization, technological progress, education and more importantly 
institutional set-up of our society. Inequality matters as it does not only impact 
our society today, but it has long run impact on the next generation. 
Usually, mainstream studies focus on quantifying and simplifying inequality to 
limited and straightforward scope, such as wealth inequality, income inequality, 
opportunity inequality. However, the social justice, wholistic well-being, and the 
morally problematic issues are ignored. For instance, should we care about 
inequality in well-being, in social primary goods (Rawls, 1999), capabilities (Sen, 
1992), opportunities, or some other relevant domain?  For instance, Piketty’s 




According to Fontan et al. (2016), some recent theorists of justice what is 
relevant for justice is some measure of the means, resources, or capacities of 
the individual to pursue her life plans rather than the actual welfare level she 
attains (see, for example, Dworkin, 1981a). For example, inequalities in income 
or wealth are more straightforward to ascertain than inequalities in opportunities 
or capabilities. Further, Egalitarian theories of justice, in particular, have become 
more sophisticated than a simple call for equality in outcome. As a result, general 
claims about justice tend to focus on the inadmissibility of certain kinds of 
inequalities rather than call for outright equality (Fontan et al. 2016). For 
instance, the notion of equality of opportunity implies that people of equal talent 
should have equal opportunities or, put differently, that one’s social background 
should not have any differential impact on one’s life prospects. Second, we might 
employ Rawls’s difference principle, which, as standardly understood, requires 
that institutions ensure inequalities in income and wealth maximize the 
expectations of the least advantaged (Rawls, 1999). Third, prioritarian views 
argue that we should be sensitive to both the size of the cake and the interests 
of those who receive the smallest slice, but without imposing a strict constraint 
as a maximum threshold (Parfit, 1997). Given its structure, prioritarianism 
promises to be particularly useful when it comes to trade-offs between 
containing inequalities and promoting economic growth. Other theories such as 
sufficientarian approaches view that what counts is not what people have 
relative to others, but that they have enough. The advocates of the 
sufficientarian approach aim to establish a minimum threshold of the currency 
of justice in question that everyone should attain (for example, Casal, 2007; 
Frankfurt, 1987). 
7.3 Trends and facts of inequality 
In almost all OECD countries income inequality increased, but the timing and 
the trends differ considerably (WIR, 2018; OECD 2011). Anglo-Saxon countries 
already began to experience rising trends in inequality in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, the phenomenon of rising inequality 
became more widespread, and by the 2000s, countries that were previously 
considered (more) egalitarian also became affected. High-income concentration 
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is also indicated by the development of top income shares (Piketty and Saez 
2003, 2006). Since the 1980s, top income shares increased tremendously in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, and much of this increase was driven by a rapid rise in 
wage income and entrepreneurial income, whereas top shares in Continental 
European countries developed rather moderately (Alvaredo and Piketty 2009, 
Atkinson et al. 2011). 
In recent decades, income inequality has increased in nearly all countries, but 
at different speeds, suggesting that institutions and policies matter in shaping 
inequality. Since 1980, income inequality has risen rapidly in North America, 
China, India, and Russia. Inequality has grown moderately in Europe (Figure 12 
below). From a broad historical perspective, this increase in inequality marks the 
end of a post-war egalitarian regime which took different forms in these regions. 
 
Figure 13: Top 10% income shares across the world, 1980 – 2016. 
 
Source: WID world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series notes. In 2016, 47% 
of national income was received by the top 10% in US-Canada, compared to 34% in 
1980 
The divergence in inequality levels has been particularly extreme between 
Western Europe and the united states, which had similar levels of inequality in 
1980 but today are in radically different situations. While the top 1% income 
share was close to 10% in both regions in 1980, it rose only slightly to 12% in 
2016 in Western Europe while it shot up to 20% in the united states. Meanwhile, 
in the united states, the bottom 50% income share decreased from more than 
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Figure 14: Top 1% vs. bottom 50% national income shares in the US and Western 
Europe, 1980–2016: diverging income inequality trajectories. 
Source: WID.world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes. 
In 2016, 12% of national income was received by the top 1% in Western Europe, 
compared to 20% in the United States. In 1980, 10% of national income was 
received by the top 1% in Western Europe, compared to 11% in the United States. 
 
Figure 15: Top 1% vs. bottom 50% national income shares in the US and Western 
Europe, 1980–2016: diverging income inequality trajectories 
 
Source:  WID.world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes., 
In 2016, 22% of national income was received by the Bottom 50% in Western 
Europe 
The global top 1% earners have captured twice as much of that growth as the 
50% poorest individuals. The bottom 50% has nevertheless enjoyed important 
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growth rates. The global middle class (which contains all of the poorest 90% 
income groups in the EU and the United States) has been squeezed (see figure 
15 below). 
Figure 16: The rise of the global top 1% versus the stagnation of the global bottom 
50%, 1980–2016. 
 
Source: WID.world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes., In 2016, 
22% of global income was received by the Top 1% against 10% for the Bottom 50%. In 
1980, 16% of global income was received by the Top 1% against 8% for the Bottom 50%. 
In term of inequality measurement, the most commonly discussed measures of 
income and wealth inequality is the Gini coefficient. It compares the income or 
(wealth) distribution of a population to a perfectly equal distribution—in which 
every citizen of a city or country has equal income or wealth. Gini coefficient is 
a summary statistic that measures the dispersion of incomes on a scale of zero 



































































Figure 17: Gini Coefficient USA, UK, Germany 1944-2015 
 
Source: OECD Database 
The figure 16 above, shows the increase of Gini Coefficient in USA, UK, and 
Germany, particularly starting from the 1980s. And it shows inequality in the UK 
increasing from the 1980s to 1990s and then ‘flat’ since around 1990, with the 
decline since the global financial crisis. That is a reflection of the above graphs, 
where the Anglo-Saxons countries have experienced increase in income 
inequality starting the 1980s. That is after the rise of neoliberalism based on 
globalisation and financialisation, while Germany experienced a flat from 1960s 
to around 2000, with an increase from the introduction of the euro 2000 to 2006, 
and then flat afterwards. 
However, the Gini coefficient has been criticised on the grounds that it is simple 
and unintuitive and relatively insensitive to the tails of the distribution, which 
are the most dynamic parts of the distribution Palma (2011). Palma noticed that 
in most countries, the middle class – defined as those in the fifth to ninth income 
deciles, or the 40%-90% – take in around half of the total income. "The (relative) 
stability of the income share of the middle is a strikingly consistent finding, for 
different data sets, countries and time periods.," (Cobham and Sumner, 2013). 
Given that insight, there seems to be less reason in using the Gini ratio, which 
is sensitive to changes in the middle of the income spectrum but relatively blind 
to shifts at the extremes. The Palma ratio divides the income share of the top 
















































































































of top 10 per cent to bottom 10 percent. The result is a metric that is, in Cobham 
and Sumner's words, "'over'-sensitive to changes in the distribution at the 
extremes, rather than in the relatively inert middle." The Palma ratio has another 
advantage: its real-world meaning is easy to grasp. It is not the product of 
statistical wizardry, but simple division: the highest-earning 10% of the 
population make X times more than the lowest-earning 40%. The Gini ratio, 
Cobham and Sumner write, "yields no intuitive statement for a non-technical 
audience." The best we can do is something like: on a scale of 0 to 1, this 
country is 0.X unequal. This debate needs much further research which is out 
of the scope of this chapter. 
To sum up, understanding the economics of inequality from different 
perspectives is an important matter in order to find the right policy levers that 
promote social justice and fairness not only for current generation but to the 
next one as well. In contrast, income inequality does not play a prominent role 
in mainstream discussions of crises. 
7.4 Mainstream, Central Banker’s and inequality 
Central bankers, following neoclassical economics, view inequality as an 
outcome of the capitalist economy rather than an inherent component of it. That 
because neoclassical economics in its canonical form views income in terms of 
the returns to factors of production. Abstracting from questions of power, 
inequality thus arises from differing marginal productivities of labour and capital.  
Given different endowments of skills, talents, and scarce factors of production 
inequality, therefore, reflect one’s ability to earn in the marketplace. In contrast, 
as I discuss in the following section, heterodox approaches view differences in 
power as an essential component of one’s ability to earn income. Thus, it is not 
shocking the late and weak recognition of mainstream economics to this crucial 
phenomenon. That is so because of their beliefs on in free and self-adjusting 
market mechanisms, labour market flexibility and the major assumption of 
general equilibrium, and their ignorance of the nature and crucial role of money 
in a monetary production economy, and its impact on the real economy in the 
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short and long-run. Academic contributions such as Stigilitz (2012) and Piketty 
(2014) have fuelled debate on issues of inequality. 
Furthermore, the role of macroeconomic policies in inequality, such as central 
banking policy, has been understated or even ignored by mainstream 
economists. The conventional monetary policy focus on inflation targeting 
ignores any link whatsoever with inequality. The increasing power of central 
banks and the use of unconventional monetary policy in the post-crisis period, 
have invigorated mainstream economists to question the impact of such policy 
on causing or worsening inequality. As a result of these unconventional policies, 
such as quantitative easing, the distributive consequences have become more 
prominent (Ertu¨rk, 2014). Arguably, the increasing concern of inequality as a 
socioeconomic matter has remained very limited in the mainstream central 
banks’ bank’s intellectual apparatus. Usually, mainstream economics studies 
inequality at best within the scope of causes and impact on economic activities, 
for example, its role in declining economic growth, or negatively impacting 
consumption and spending, or the impact on price (Goda, 2013). The fact that 
inequality is not prominent in mainstream research can also be seen from the 
fact that the vast majority of DSGE models were based on one rational 
representative agent (with some exception such as the work from Kumhof and 
Ranciere (2010), and Kumhof et al. (2012). That means that “there are no 
distributive issues [and] no scope for exploitation [because] what the worker 
loses through lower wages, he/she gets back in his/her role as ‘owner’ through 
higher profits” (Stiglitz, 2011, p.598). Furthermore, DSGE models normally 
disregarded the possibility of excess indebtedness, as no financial market was 
included in most models. In other words, according to the vast majority of 
mainstream theories and models, inequality will have neither a negative impact 
on aggregate demand nor will it lead to over-indebtedness. Even if capital 
markets are taken into account mainstream theories of consumption “…see no 
link between the inequality of (permanent) income and aggregate personal 
consumption, and hence no need for government action…” (van Treeck and 
Sturn, 2012, p.1). The reason for this view is that households are expected to 
be able to smooth fluctuations in income with the help of financial markets. And 
that inequality is seen to be rather influenced by transitory changes (e.g., 
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depending on the age of the individual) and not by permanent changes in 
lifetime income (Krueger and Perri, 2006). 
More importantly, some mainstream economists have recently gone a step 
further by realising the impact of monetary policy in income distribution 
(Nakajima, 2015). These studies focused on the impact of interest rate policy 
and quantitative easing policy on the income distribution gap between the rich 
and the poor. However, their main argument was raised due to the low interest 
rate after the crisis that could deteriorate safe assets investments. For instance, 
these economists criticised quantitative easing policies (liquidity facilities) that 
went mainly to banks in replacement of their risky assets in order to restore 
their balance sheets and liquidity and restore their willingness to lending. But 
instead, they refused to do so because of the uncertainty and low confidence in 
the state of the economy, which deteriorate the economy further, increasing the 
income distribution gap. According to Nakajima (2015), monetary policy affects 
income distribution by two channels: first the inflation channel, where labour 
and low-income households hold mainly cash assets compared to high-income 
households (that hold financial assets?). Secondly, the income channel, through 
the impact of policy rate on employment (labour income) and the income of 
financial assets. However, he argued that these redistributive effects would 
average out (no impact) in the long run. For instance, the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (2014) identified that wealthier households receive a significant 
amount of financial and business income, whereas other households rely 
primarily on labour income or transfers. This survey indicated that “among 
working-age households in the U.S. the bottom 60 percent of the wealth 
distribution, “Main Street”, receive virtually none of their income from financial 
assets, whereas “Wall-Street,” the 5 percent wealthiest households, receive 41 
percent of their income from financial assets”. 
Controversially, in most of central banks mission statements, they have to 
promote the ‘social justice’ and the ‘good of the people’ objectives. But 
mainstream economists view of the ‘good of the people’ is to be focusing on one 
‘nominal objective’ a low and stable rate of inflation to generate financial and 
economic stability. Furthermore, these neoclassical economists have not even 
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allowed ‘social justice’ and distributive concerns to play a minimal role in their 
mandates. For instance, the BoE’s mission is to promote ‘the good of the people 
of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability’. For ECB, 
Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Lisbon 
Treaty) mention that the ESCB [European System of Central Banks] shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union. As long as it doesn’t jeopardize the 
price stability objective and it explicitly mentions social justice as one such 
objective. 
In addition to insufficient attention, the assumption of the long-term neutrality 
of money underpins mainstream and central bank approaches to the distributive 
impact of monetary policy. That is to say, even though generally central bankers 
generally accept that monetary policy could have some temporary redistributive 
effects in the short run, this does not hold in the long run. Moreover, the short-
run distributive consequences are unintended and for which little can be done 
about. For example, BoE officials such as David Miles (2012) argued that any 
monetary policy action will have some distributional impacts. In the same vein, 
Ben Bernanke emphasizes that the effects are temporary: 
“It is true that in the short run, some of the tools that we have involve changing 
asset prices, so higher stock prices and things of that sort, but we can’t affect 
those things in the long run. It is only a short-run transmission mechanism that 
is involved there” (Miles, March 2012). 
As discussed there are reasons to be doubtful of this. To repeat, the asymmetric 
nature of business cycles mitigates against any long-run corrections of short-run 
distributive consequences of monetary easing. As according to Nakajima (2015) 
there is a good chance that the redistributive effects do not average out 
because business cycles are known to be asymmetric. Thus more research is 
needed to identify these effects. 
The global financial crisis has, however, shifted the debate. Most strikingly, post 
2007-8 crisis central bankers almost uniformly recognize that the distributive 
effects of the unconventional monetary policy are not minor. The main 
mechanism identified is that the high level of asset purchases pushes up the 
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price of assets, which are disproportionally held by the wealthiest households 
(BoE, 2012). Carney (May 2014), governor of the BoE says: ‘the distributional 
consequences of the response to the financial crisis have been significant’. 
However, they continued to argue that these effects are ‘unintended and 
temporary’. For instance, ECB officials emphasize that the distributive effects of 
the unconventional monetary policy are ‘unintended consequences’, and 
Haldane (2014) from the BoE stresses that this policy ‘was taken with the best 
of intentions’. ‘collateral effects’, or ‘side effects’, thus all these central banks 
share the idea that the effects are temporary and unintended. 
Furthermore, they have also justified their actions in saving the global economy 
from collapse: ‘Extraordinary times heralded truly extraordinary measures.’ 
Further: ‘[A] central bank with a clear mandate to safeguard price stability needs 
to act forcefully when push comes to shove. These distributional side effects 
then need to be tolerated’ (Fontan et al. 2016). In addition, central bankers 
stress that the post-2007 policies will not stay with us for long, revert to the pre-
2007 policies soon. Carney from the BoE talks about ‘extreme circumstances, 
such as in the wake of a financial crisis’, and his colleague Haldane maintains 
that ‘extra-ordinary monetary measures will of course not last forever’ (Ibid). 
Arguably, major central banks argued that they cannot do much to address 
inequality. For instance, while emphasizing that the Fed cannot do much, 
Bernanke also gestures toward a sort of trickle-down effect: ‘We can only hope 
to address the overall state of the labour market and hope that a rising tide will 
lift all ships, so to speak.’ (Ibid) 
In sum despite central bankers’ recognition of the monetary policy 
consequences on inequality, they believe that fighting inequalities is not the 
mandate of any modern central bank and it doesn’t fall within central banking 
scope. In contrast to mainstream, post-Keynesians have been concerned with 




7.5 Post-Keynesians and inequality 
In his ‘General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money’ Keynes (1936, 
p.372) states that one of “the outstanding faults of the economic society [is] 
its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes”. 
Post-Keynesian economics, in contrast to mainstream, view inequality is as an 
inherent component of an unstable capitalist economy. The theories of John M. 
Keynes mainly inspire Post-Keynesian economics but “post-Keynesians [also] 
derive inspiration from a variety of [other] sources … such as Marx, … Kalecki, 
Kaldor, Leontief, Sraffa, Veblen, Galbraith, Andrews, Georgescu-Roegen, Hicks 
or Tobin, or from other disciplines (sociology, history, political science, 
psychology and anthropology)” (Lavoie, 2006, p.18). Further, “Issues of class, 
power and distribution of income and wealth are at the heart of [post- 
Keynesian] analysis.” (Arestis, 1996, p.114). 
In terms of income inequality, post-Keynesians distinguish between the 
functional and personal income distribution. The functional income distribution 
is a matter of class: it measures how much of the national income goes to 
workers (wage-share) and how much of the national income goes to capitalists 
and rentiers (profit-share); whereas the personal income distribution measures 
in how far the national income is equally distributed among 
individuals/households. Post-Keynesians argue that an increase in the 
functional income distribution tends to have negative impacts on the economy 
if the economy is wage-led (Onaran, 2014). Similarly, an increase in the 
inequality of the personal income distribution can have negative consequences 
for the stability of the economy because poorer segments of the population 
have a higher marginal propensity to consume than richer segments of the 
population. That is, an increase in income inequality is expected to lead to a 
decrease in aggregate consumption demand (Palley, 2002; Dutt, 2011; 
Stockhammer, 2012). Indeed, Keynes and Kalecki believed that an increase in 
inequality would lead to a weakened propensity to consume that in turn 
weakens demand for investment and consumption. 
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Furthermore, post-Keynesians argued that in a financialised economy inequality 
becomes more complex. Particularly, in theory, workers receive their income 
only out of wages, while capitalists receive their income out of profits, and 
rentiers receive their income through dividends, interest payments, rents, and 
capital gains. However, in reality many households occupy various contradicting 
class positions. e.g., capitalists and workers receive also rentier income, and 
managers are occupying the class position of capitalists (as they are executing 
power in firms), workers (as they are employed and receive wage income), and 
rentiers (through their stock options) at the same time (Stockhammer, 2004). 
Post-Keynesians found that the negative consequences of an increase in income 
inequality might not be immediately visible in a finance-dominated economy. 
In particular, the negative consequences of rising inequality may not be 
immediately apparent if the poorer segments of the population are able to 
accumulate debt to finance their consumption, due to greater availability of 
finance (such as mortgages) and because of rising asset prices (such as houses 
prices). 
However, the debt-led consumption model is unsustainable. That means that 
in the long-run income is redistributed from poorer households to richer 
households and the consumption of poor households consequently will be 
constrained. Eventually, this will most likely lead to a debt-burdened recession 
(Palley, 1994; Bhaduri et al., 2006; Dutt, 2006, 2011). Or, instead, translate 
into a financial crisis if rising asset prices and financial innovation enable poor 
households to engage in Ponzi finance to keep their living standards constant 
(Hein and van Treeck, 2008; Bhaduri, 2011). Further, Stockhammer (2011) 
found that the crisis could be understood as a combined effect of deregulation 
and rising inequality. 
Post-Keynesians, among other heterodox economists, draw on a wide range of 
income distribution theories. For instance, the Kaleckian approach of income 
distribution between labour and firms is based on the mark-up price power of 
firms as they protect their profit share (Goda, 2013). Furthermore, according 
to Barba and Pivetti (2009) that in “Production of commodities by means of 
commodities” Sraffa (1960) analyses the extent to which monetary authorities 
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can control the interest rate, recognizing the powerful position central bank has 
on improving banks’ liquidity. Furthermore, they argued that Sraffa explained 
that conflict of interest among firms, policymakers and the political class could 
put at risk the economy’s stability, giving place to even more conflicts among 
social classes. In addition, Sraffa identified that financial innovations accelerate 
when financial firms have liquidity problems and their growth is affected, and 
such acceleration makes monetary policy less effective and monetary 
authorities less influential. Sraffa’s approach to money and banking serves of 
as the basis for the analysis of distributive variables at a particular economic 
period and is of particular use when looking to the effects of financialisation on 
income distribution. 
To sum up, in contrast to mainstream dogma, post-Keynesians view inequality 
as a core element of the unstable capitalist economy, and they offer different 
approaches to understand this important matter. They view conflict among 
competing classes as a central component of distributive outcomes. Before 
these insights are integrated into our model, I first consider post-Keynesian 
approaches to interest rates and monetary policy. 
7.6 Post-Keynesians interest rates and monetary policy 
In contrast to neoclassical economics, post Keynesians focus more on the 
relation between interest rate and monetary policy, rather than on the relation 
of between the later and inflation. As discussed by Rochon/Setterfield (2007-
8a, 2007-8b), the interaction between interest rate and monetary policy is 
approached in two different ways in the endogenous money approach. The 
activist approach, consider the interest rate to move counter-cyclically, in order 
to ensure strong growth and full employment. The ‘parking-it’ approach, on the 
other hand, proposed to set nominal or real interest rates and change them 
carefully and in moderation. In addition, this approach recognizes that changes 
in interest rate do not always have the desired effects on unemployment, 
growth, and capacity utilization. What is more, the utilization of interest rate 
for macro stabilization is rather seen as uncertain and fiscal policy is preferred 
for such purpose. 
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Nevertheless, given the importance of the interest rate has on affecting real 
variables there are three views on how to use such a powerful tool.  The 
‘Smithin rule’ proposes that central bank should keep interest rate as low, and 
as close to zero as possible.  Similarly, the ‘Kansas City rule’ recommends a 
nominal interest rate equal to zero. In contrast, Pasinetti or Fair interest rule 
proposes to set the interest rate to a fair level, in relation to labour (Rochon, 
2009). 
In the Pasinetti rule the interest rate should be equal to the rate of growth of 
labour productivity, so when wage earners incur credit, they will always have a 
constant purchasing power, and rentiers are seen as a “necessary evil” (Lavoie, 
1996). Furthermore, in an economy where the profit rate is constant the growth 
rate, and therefore the fair rate, will be equal to the growth rate of wages. 
When the economy is subjected to price inflation, then the fair rate will be equal 
to the average rate of wage inflation (Lavoie, 1999). In other words, the fair 
interest rate is the one which maintains purchasing power in relation to labour 
hours and money borrowed or lent and maintains the distribution of income 
between borrowers and lenders over time. From the fair rate perspective, 
central bank inflation targeting as currently practiced are not distributionally 
neutral in that they enable the capitalist class to take favouravle financial 
positions. 
Brancaccio and Fontana (2011) proposed an interest rate rule that takes into 
consideration the solvency conditions of macro agents involved in the 
production process. And interrelates the Keynesian analysis of income and 
employment with the Sraffian analysis of income distribution, while it explicitly 
shows the relationship between real and monetary variables and the role of 
credit in the economy. They have used the rule to show how households’ 
unsustainable debt-financed consumption, along with increasing inequality on 
income distribution, led to the 2007 financial crisis in the USA. Central banks 
did not identify, nor addressed households’ growing indebtedness. The latter is 
the result of the FED’s policy that merely focuses on the financial sector’s 
liquidity, and as Taylor pointed out, its refusal to treat this crisis as a solvency 
crisis rather than a liquidity one. 
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In addition, Moore (1989) analysed the effects of the interest rate as a 
distributive tool between industrial capital, financial capital, and labour, and he 
argued that if the increase of interest rate was temporary, it would not have 
affected mark-up price, as firms would have absorbed the change. However, a 
permanent increase in the interest rate may affect the production costs, which 
leads to an increase in the mark-up price, affecting distribution between wage 
and non-wage income. That will result in a transfer of income from industrial 
to financial capital, as well as a decrease in the wage share in the national 
income. Further, Epstein (1992) analysed the impact that social groups have 
on central bank policymaking. He identified three social groups affected by 
central bank policy: labour representing wage earners, industry representing 
firms, and finance representing the financial sector. Using a Kaleckian and 
Marxian analysis he studied the weight each sector has on central bank 
policymaking, and in order to do so, he analysed the relation between capital 
and labour, finance and industry, central bank and the state, and nation with 
the world, to then interrelate the results. The study has shown that the 
Kaleckian approach is more comprehensive and able to relate to the real world, 
than the Marxian model. In addition, he found that by using the interest rate 
tool, the central bank set its policy in favour of the financial sector, instead of 
firms and wage earners, serving in this way only to certain social groups rather 
than the society as a whole. 
All the interest rate rules that are discussed above view the interest rate as a 
distributive variable and consider that monetary policy acts though changes in 
income distribution among wage earners and rentiers. As Lavoie (1996) has 
expressed “interest rate is an important determinant of the distribution of 
income between social classes and presumably between individuals”. In such 
sense, monetary policy could contradict itself over time, depending on whether 
the distributional purpose of the policy is to maintain the rentier class or not. 
In terms of Keynes’ own views, according to Lavoie et al. (2017), Keynes had 
originally planned a whole chapter not on the wage/profit relation but, instead, 
on the critical “Influence of Changes in the Distribution of Income between the 
Rentiers and Earners.” (Keynes 1979, p. 63). Further, Keynes (1923) identified 
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that an economy is consists of ‘the rentiers’ or the “Investing Class” and the 
“Business Class” and the “Earning Class”. He refers to the ‘rentiers ‘as the 
“functionless investor” as a separate income class whose interests were 
fundamentally opposed to those whom he considered as the productive classes 
of capitalist entrepreneurs and workers. For Keynes, in contrast to the 
mainstream view of the interest rate as a simple cost of borrowing, interest 
rates played a much more crucial role via the income channel or what we could 
describe as the income distribution transmission mechanism (Lavoie et al. 2017). 
He further wrote that, through central bank intervention: “The monetary 
authority often tends in practice to concentrate upon short-term debts and to 
leave the price of long-term debts to be influenced by belated and imperfect 
reactions from the price of short-term debts …” (Keynes 1936, p. 206; also see 
Seccareccia and Lavoie 2004, pp. 165-66) In that sense, monetary policy 
determined short-term rates and, in turn, representative opinion or rentier 
expectations of the future behaviour of the central bank would impact, albeit 
imperfectly, on the long-term rate of interest. Thereby making interest rates a 
“highly conventional” phenomenon instead of a “real” phenomenon determined 
by productivity and thrift, as in the loanable funds theory. Consequently, 
monetary policy decisions and conventions were at the very heart of interest 
rate determination. 
Turning to empirical evidence, Lavoie et al. (2017) measure the intensity of the 
transfer between the rentier and non-rentier sectors historically, using the 
Pasinetti Index for the United States and Canada 1926-2013 (Here Pasinetti 
Index, as measured in percentage terms, as the gap between real long-term 
interest rates and labour productivity growth per person employed). As shown 
in Figures 17 and 18 there was, for instance, a massive transfer in favour of 
rentiers during the Great Depression, which eventually turned in the opposite 
direction in favour of the non-rentier sector by the early post-war years which, 
with only minor fluctuations, lasted until the late 1970s. As is evident from the 
two figures in both the US and Canada, the 1980s witnessed “the revenge of 
the rentiers” (Smithin, 1996) as the transfer persisted in favour of rentier 
income until the mid1990s. There was a subsequent decline during the late 
1990s, but with some important fluctuations around a positive value until the 
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financial crisis. Broadly speaking, it appears that whenever the transfer in 
favour of rentiers was becoming positive, it would be associated with a 
recessionary environment. 
Figure 18 The Pasinetti Index for the United States, 1926-2013 
 
Source: (Lavoie & Seccareccia, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 19: The Pasinetti Index for Canada, 1926-2013 
 
Source: (Lavoie & Seccareccia, 2017) 
 
To summarise so far, there has been a marked increase in inequality in recent 
years. Distributional factors have been of secondary importance within 
neoclassical economics, which also views monetary policy as having no effect 
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on inequality in the long-run. For post-Keynesians, in contrast, distributional 
conflicts play a central role in capitalist development. As outlined here, the 
interest rate and monetary policy play an important role in the competition for 
resources. The following section substantiates our claim of the centrality of 
monetary factors in distribution using a SFC model. 
7.7 The SFC Model 
As advocated by Lavoie (1996a) and Setterfield (2006b) setting the real rate of 
interest equal to productivity growth allows rentiers to participate in the real 
growth and keeps distribution between rentiers firms and labourers constant 
(Pasinetti’s (1981) ‘fair rate of interest’). Since I have abstracted from 
productivity growth in our model, these two rules are essentially the same. 
Therefore, there is the following monetary policy rule: 
Equation 75: 
rcb = rpr + Pe  with (rpr) being given by medium-run productivity growth. 
Central banks will have to adjust their policy instrument, the nominal interest 
rate, so that a constant expected real rate of interest equal to medium run 
productivity growth emerges. That implies adjusting the nominal interest rate to 
expected inflation at the end of each period. Note that monetary policies in this 
approach should neither pursue an inflation target nor make any attempts at 
adjusting the employment rate to some target. Of course, monetary policies 
remain responsible for the orderly working of the monetary and financial system. 
The definition of credit standards for refinance operations with commercial 
banks (credit controls), the implementation of compulsory minimum reserves of 
different types to be held with the central bank, the role of a ‘lender of last 
resort’ in the case of systemic crises, and so on. Monetary policies by the central 
bank should neither aim at fine-tuning the economy in real nor in nominal terms. 
It should thus not interfere with the tasks of wage and fiscal policies, but should 
rather focus on stable distribution between rentiers, on the one hand, and firms 
and labourers, on the other hand in order to avoid destabilising distribution 
effects of changes in the interest rate. Coordination of macroeconomic policies 
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along these lines will be more promising for high employment and stable 
inflation rates than the NCM economic policy approach. 
Now, I model the effect of implementing the fair rate of interest on inequality 
using SFC modelling, which is based on two tables: a balance sheet matrix 
(stocks) and a transactions matrix (flows). Table 14 gives the transactions matrix 
that describes monetary flows between the five sectors of the economy. Every 
row represents a monetary transaction, and every column corresponds to a 
sector, which is fragmented in a current and a capital account, except in basic 
cases such as the government and that of households. Sources of funds appear 
with plus signs and uses of funds with negative signs, so every row must sum 
to zero seeing that each transaction always corresponds simultaneously to a 
source and use of funds. The sum of each column must also be zero since each 
account (or sub-account) is balanced. Table 15 gives the balance sheet matrix 
of our economy. Symbols with plus describe assets and negative signs indicate 
liabilities. The sum of every row is again zero except in the case of accumulated 
capital in the industrial sector. The last row presents the net wealth of each 
sector. 
It is important to note here that the main difference between the SFC model in 
this chapter compared to chapter 6, is the decomposition of household sector 
into two households (worker and capitalist). This to be able to differentiate the 
impact of monetary policy based on the fair rate of interest on income 
distribution between the two household’s sectors.   Furthermore, most of the 
rest of the equations are similar to the SFC model in chapter 6 with regard to 
firms, banks and government equations. In addition, I will highlight in bold font 
the main equations that are different compared to chapter 6.
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7.7.1 Capitalist Households Equations 
 
Our capitalist households model represents a financialised household. In 
equation (77) they earn income (Yhc) which is based on paid wages by firms (Wc) 
in return to their supply of work, here mainly employees. And dividends paid by 
firms (Fdh), interest paid on deposits (rm,-1* Mdc,-1) by banks, interest paid on 
treasury bills (rb,-1* Bhd,-1 ) , interest paid on government bonds (rbl,-1*pbl,-1 * BLhd,-
1) minus interest paid for loans (rl-1* Lhcd,-1) to banks. Equation (79) shows 
capitalist households disposable income (Ydc) is earned income (Yhc) net of taxes 
(Tc). However I added the changes of loans’ demand minus repayments of loans 
(ΔLhcd – Rephc) as it is available for consumption and financial decisions as well. 
Then, households make their consumption decision (Cc), equation (80) 
depending on their propensity to consume (α1) out of their expected disposable 
income (Ydce), based on adaptive expectation equation (81), and (α2) out of 
their previous wealth (Vc,-1). Household’s wealth accumulation function (Vc) 
depends on his previous wealth (V-1) and their savings out of their disposable 
income after consumption, a capital gain on equities will be added (cghc) to their 
wealth accumulation as well, equation (83). 
Equation 76: Households income 
Yhc = Wc + Fdhc + rm,-1* Mdc,-1 + rb,-1* Bhd,-1 + rbl,-1*pbl,-1 * BLhd,-1 - rl-1* Lhcd,-1 
Equation 77: capitalist Households wage share 
Wc = c* Ws Where c=0.45 
Equation 78: Households’ Disposable income 
Ydc = yhc – Tc + ΔLhcd – Rephc 
Equation 79 Households’ consumption function 
Cc = α1 * Ydce + α2* Vc,-1 where α1, α2 are coefficients parameters 
Equation 80: Households’ wealth accumulation 
Vc= Vc,-1 +( Ydc – Cc) + cghc 
Equation 81: Expected disposable income 
Ydce= Ydc,-1 
Equation 82: Capital gain out of equities 
cghc = Δpe * Ekhc 
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In the present financialised world, capitalist households have access to finance 
their consumption and financial investment, thus they are granted loans by 
banks based on their demand for loans. For simplicity, in equation (84), the 
demand for loans (Lhcd) is based on previous loans and a parameter (β) out of 
their consumption decision. The idea here is to present a consumption-debt-led 
behaviour, so households demand for loans is determined by their consumption 
level. 
Equation 83: Capitalist households’ demand for loans 
Lhcd = Lhcd,-1 + β*Cc  where β is a constant  
Equation 84: Capitalist households’ loans repayments 
Rephc = βhc* Lhcd,-1  where βhc is a constant 
Household’s portfolio choice is very important in the model here, as it is crucial 
to the dynamics of the demand for financial assets in a financial economy. They 
hold cash (Hhc) and allocate their financial wealth (Vfah) between treasury bills 
(Bhd), government bonds (BLhd), equities (Ekh) and deposits (Mdc). This allocation 
is based on some preference parameter (λ) and the rate of return to each 
financial asset. 
Equation 85: Capitalist Households’ demand for cash  
Hhc = Vc - Bhd - pbl * BLhd - pe * Ekh 
Equation 86: Capitalist Households’ financial wealth 
Vfah = Mdc + Bhd + pbl * BLhd + pe * Ekh 
Equation 87: Capitalist Households’ demand of treasury bills 
Bhd = Vfah,-1 * ( λ20 + λ22* rb,-1 - λ21* rm,-1 - λ24*rk,-1 - λ23* rbl,-1 - λ25* Ydc,-1/Vc)
 Where λ20, λ21, λ22, λ23, λ24, λ25 are constant parameters. 
Equation 88: Capitalist Households’ demand of government bonds 
BLhd * pbl = Vfah,-1 * ( λ30 - λ32* rb,-1 - λ31* rm,-1 - λ34*rk,-1 + λ33* rbl,-1 - λ35* Ydc,-
1/Vc) 
Where λ30, λ31, λ32, λ33, λ34, λ35 are constant parameters 
Equation 89: Capitalist Households’ demand of equities 
pe * Ekh = Vfah,-1 * ( λ40 - λ42* rb,-1 - λ41* rm,-1 + λ44*rk,-1 - λ43* rbl,-1 - λ45* Ydc,-1/Vc) 
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Where λ40, λ41, λ42, λ43, λ44, λ45 are constant parameters 
Equation 90: Capitalist Households’ demand of deposits 
Mdc = Vfah,-1 - Bhd - pbl * BLhd - pe * Ekh + Lhcd - Rephc 
7.7.2 Worker Households Equations 
 
In worker households l, workers earn income (Yhw), as in equation (92) which is 
based on paid wages by firms (Ww) in return to their supply of labour, interest 
paid on deposits (rm,-1* Mdh,-1) by banks, minus interest paid for loans (rl-1* Lhwd,-
1) to banks. Equation (93) shows worker households disposable income (Ydw) is 
earned income (Yhw) net of taxes (Tw). However I added the changes of loans’ 
demand minus repayments of loans (ΔLhwd – Rephw) as it is available for 
consumption and financial decisions as well. Then, worker households make 
their consumption decision (Cw), equation (94) depending on their propensity to 
consume (αw1) out of their expected disposable income (Ydwe), based on 
adaptive expectation equation (95), and (αw2) out of their previous wealth (Vw,-
1). Household’s wealth accumulation function (Vw) depends on his previous 
wealth (Vw,-1) and their savings out of their disposable income after consumption. 
Equation 91: Worker Households income 
Yhw = Ww + rm,-1* Mdw,-1 - rl-1* Lhwd,-1  
Equation 92: Worker Households wage share 
Ww = a* Ws  where a=0.55 
Equation 93: Worker Households’ Disposable income 
Ydw = yhw – Tw + ΔLhwd – Rephw 
Equation 94: Worker Households’ consumption function 
Cw = αw1 * Ydwe + αw2* Vw,-1  where αw1, αw2 are constants coefficients 
parameters 
Equation 95: Worker Households’ wealth accumulation 
Vw= Vw,-1 +( Ydw – Cw) 
Equation 96: Worker Households’ demand for deposits 




Equation 97: Worker’s expected disposable income 
Ydwe= Ydw,-1 
In a financialised world, worker households have access to finance their 
consumption. Thus they are granted loans by banks based on their demand for 
loans. For simplicity, equation (99), the demand for loans (Lhwd) is based on 
previous loans and a parameter (βw) out of their consumption decision. The 
idea here is to present a consumption-debt-led behaviour, so worker households 
demand for loans is determined by their consumption level. 
Equation 98: Worker Households demand for loans 
Lhwd = Lhwd,-1 + βw*Cw where  βw is a constant  
Equation 99: Worker Households’ loans repayments 
Rephw = βhw* Lhwd,-1  where βhw is a constant 
Worker households do not hold financial assets; they only have deposits which 
is used for consumption purposes, which in somehow represents a real-world 
situation. 
7.7.3 Firms Equations 
Following the theory of monetary production economy, firms need credit for 
‘initial finance’ in order for production to take place. In our model firms play 
an important role in terms of production, providing goods and services to all 
households (C) and the government (G) for consumption. However, in our 
growth model in equation (102), the demand of investment (Id) function grows 
by the desired rate of accumulation (grk) out of a capital target stock (Kt) plus 
depreciation (Da). Equation (101) represents the capital accumulation function, 
equation (103) is the firms’ profits (Ff) which is determined by output (Y) out 
of wages paid (Ws) to workers and employees. Which consists of the number 
of total workers (Nd) times wage (w), and interest payments for loans (rl* Lfd). 
Then they retained (Fu) a proportion (sf) of (Ff) and the rest is distributed (Fd) 
to capitalist households. 
Internal finance determines the desired investment financing decision, 
consisting of undistributed profits (Fu) ‘retained earnings’, and external finance, 
which consists of loans (Lfd) granted by banks. The difference between the 
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desired investment (Id) and the retained earnings (Fu) will determine the 
desired demand for loans (Lfd), equation (109). 
Equation 100: Capital Accumulation 
K = K-1 + Id – Da  where Da = δ * K-1  δ is a constant 
Equation 101: Desired Investment 
Id = grk * Kt + Da  where Kt = κ * Y-1  κ and grk are a constant 
Equation 102: Firms’ profits 
Ff = Y - Ws – rl-1* Lfd,-1   
Equation 103: Wages paid to workers 
Ws = w * Nd  where w is constant 
Equation 104: Demand for Labour 
Nd= Y/pr   
Equation 105: Productivity growth 
pr = pr-1 * (1 + rpr)  
Equation 106: Distributed profits 
Fd = (1-sf) * Ff   where sf is constant   
Equation 107: Undistributed profits 
Fu = Ff - Fd 
Equation 108: Firms desired demand for loans 
Lfd = Id - Fu 
Firms issue equities, equation (101), that grow depending on firms’ decision on 
desired investments, and between distributing profits and retained earnings, 
which is also a away to raise capital in the market instead of demanding loans 
by banks. 
Equation 109: Equities issues by firms 
Eks = Eks,-1 + (1-sf) * Id,-1/ pe where sf is a constant 
Equation 110: Equities issues by firms 
Eks = Eks,-1 + (1-sf) * Id,-1/ pe where sf is a constant 
Equation 111: Price to earnings ratio 
PE = pe / (Ff/ Eks,-1) 
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Equation 112: Equilibrium condition, equities demand equals equities supply 
Ekd = Eks 
Equation 113: Equities demand by capitalist households 
Ekh = Ekd - Ekb  
Equation 114: The rate of return of equities 
rk = Fd / (pe,-1* Eks,-1)  
Equation 115: Distributed profits to Banks 
Fdb = Fd * Ekb/ Eks 
Equation 116: Distributed profits to capitalist households 
Fdh = Fd - Fdb 
7.7.4 Banks Equations 
Banks are the main actors in the credit market. Following post-Keynesian 
endogenous money theory banks issue loans to firms and households on 
demand. By issuing loans they also create deposits, and they accept deposits 
from households as per equations (119, 120, 121). Equation (118) represents 
banks’ profit (Fb) which is being made up of dividends received by firms (Fdb), 
interest received on treasury bills (rb,-1* Bbd,-1), interest received on government 
bonds (rbl,-1*pbl,-1 * BLbd,-1), interest received on loans issued to firms (rl-1* Lfd,-1) 
and to households (rl-1* Lhd,-1). In addition to capital gains on holding equities 
(cgb), subtracting interest paid on deposits to households  (rm,-1* Ms,-1). 
Equation 117: Banks’ profit 
Fb = Fdb + rb,-1* Bbd,-1 + rbl,-1*pbl,-1 * BLbd,-1 + rl-1* Lfd,-1 + rl-1* Lsh,-1 - rm,-1* Ms,-1 + 
cgb  
Equation 118: Deposits to all households 
Ms = Mdc+ Mdw 
Equation 119: Loans supply based on Loans demand by firms 
Lsf = Lfd  
Equation 120: Loans supply based on Loans demand by households 
Lsh = Lhcd + Lhwd 
In a monetary production economy, banks play an essential role in order for 
investment and production to take place. However, they issue loans after 
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analysis of the creditworthiness of the firms, by analysing expected production 
plans, expected cash flow, and the borrower’s financial structure ability in 
making repayments. So, as mentioned in the firms’ section, in our model banks 
issues loans based the borrower’s risk (lrf), and if (lrf = 0) then firms finance 
the total amount of firms desired demand of loans as in the case of the 
‘horizontalists’ view. When banks foresees firms’ future profits then they will be 
willing to finance all the loans demanded, and if (lrf = 1) then banks refuse to 
finance firms demand for loans. This investigation is made according to their 
confidence in the state of long-term expectations of yields on capital assets, 
influencing what Keynes referred to as ‘animal spirits’. The state of confidence 
of banks is notably taken  into account by an exogenous variable (γ4). 
Banks charge interest on loans issued to firms and households (rl) as per 
Equation (122), with a mark-up over central bank’s policy rate (rcb). And taking 
into consideration the lender’s risk on firms’ leverage (lrb), equation (123) in 
addition to some fixed mark-up (add1). Further, banks also pay interest on 
deposits to households (rm) according to equation (124), based on central bank’s 
policy rate (rcb) subtracting a fixed parameter (sub1). In addition, banks receive 
capital gains from holding equities (cgb) as per equation (125). 
Equation 121: Iinterest rate charged on loans issued 
rl = rcb + lrb + add1 
Equation 122: 
lrb = γlrb + γlevb * (levf,-1 – levc) where γlrb, γlevb denote parameters, levc 
leverage target, lender’s risk 
 
Equation 123:  
rm = rcb - sub1 where sub1 exogenously determined interest paid on 
deposits 
Equation 124: Banks’ capital gain on equities 
cgb = Δpe * Ekb 
Banks’ portfolio choice is also important in our model, as it is vital to the 
dynamics of the demand for financial assets in a financial economy. They 
allocate their profit (Fb) between treasury bills (Bbd), government bonds (BLbd), 
and equities (Ekb) according to equations (126, 127). This allocation is based on 
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some preference parameter (λ) and the rate of return to each financial asset. 
However, as per equation (128), the demand for treasury bills is also based on 
balance sheet equilibrium where assets should equate to liabilities. Where loans, 
bonds, and equities are in the banks’ asset side, deposits and advances 
demanded by the central bank (equation 129) in addition to banks’ net profit. 
Further demand for advances depends on banks liquidity ratio ((Lsf + Lsh) / Bbd). 
Equation 125: Banks’ demand for government bonds 
BLhd * pbl  = Fb,-1 * ( λ60 – λ61* rb,-1 – λ62*rk,-1 + λ63* rbl,-1) where λ60, λ61, 
λ62, λ63, λ64, λ65 are constant parameters 
Equation 126: Banks’ demand for equities 
Ekb * pe = Fb,-1 * ( λ70 – λ71* rb,-1  + λ72*rk,-1 – λ73* rbl,-1 )  where λ70, λ71, 
λ72, λ73, λ74, λ75 are constant parameters 
Equation 127: Banks’ demand for treasury bills, a balance sheet equilibrium condition 
Bbd = Fb,-1 + Ms + Ad – Lsf - Lsh - pbl * BLbd - pe * Ekb 
Equation 128: Banks’ demand for advances by central bank 
Ad = Ad,-1 + z1 * (Lsf + Lsh) / Bbd where z1 a constant 
7.7.5 Central Bank Equations 
Central banks set the monetary policy rate and, in contrast to the NCM inflation 
targeting rule, our model emphasizes the role of the central bank in income 
distribution. The central bank will consider productivity growth. Thus, the 
monetary policy interest rate (rcb) function, equation (130) depends on a growth 
rate of productivity (rpr) and taking into consideration expected inflation (Pe). 
Equation 129 
rcb = rpr + Pe 
Equation 130 
Ṗ = (P – P-1) / P-1 
Equation 131 
Pe = P-1 
The central bank performs its lender of last resort function for both the 
government and the financial sector to ensure financial stability. Central banks 
accommodate government demand for spending purposes, and banks demand 
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on advances as in equations (133, 134, 135). The central bank will also hold 
treasury bills and government bonds which are not held by banks and 
households to ensure financial stability and its full control over its policy rate. 
And as the ultimate provider of currency, central bank issues currency on 
demand as encapsulated in equation (136). 
Equation 132: Central bank’s holding of treasury bills 
Bcb = Bs - Bbd – Bhd 
Equation 133: Central bank’s holding of government bonds 
BLcb = BLs - BLbd – BLhd  
Equation 134: Central bank’s supply advances to banks on demand 
As = Ad  
Equation 135: Central bank’s supply currency on demand 
Hs = Hh 
Equation (137) describes the central bank’s profit on holding treasury bills, 
government bonds and providing advances will be transferred to the 
government.  
Equation 136: Central bank’s profit 
Fcb = rb,-1* Bcb,-1 + rbl,-1 * pbl,-1 * BLcb,-1+ ra,-1 * As,-1 
Equation 137: Interest rate of treasury bills 
rb = rcb + add2  where add2 is mark-up 
Equation 138: Interest rate of advances 
ra = rcb + add3  where add2 is mark-up 
Equation 139: Interest rate of government bonds 
rbl = 1/pbl 
Equation 140 
pbl = pblpar for simplicity we assume government bonds price is fixed 
7.7.6 Government Equations  
The national income (Y) adds the household consumption (C), investment of 




Equation 141: National income 
Y = C + Id + G 
The government finances any deficit by issuing bills and government bonds so 
that the supply of treasury bills (B) and government bonds in the economy is 
identical to the stock of government debt. In other words, government’s new 
issue of bills is the sum of the previous period stock of debt plus its current 
deficit (DG) subtracting the change on government bonds as in equation (143). 
The current deficit of the government includes the redemption of the national 
debt. We assume that private banks give limitless credit to the government at 
the long-term rate of interest. 
Equation 142: Government’s new issues of bills 
Bs = Bs,-1 + DG - Δ BLs  
In the model, it is assumed that government expenditure (G) is always growing 
at a constant rate (grg), as per equation (144). Our model key element is the 
necessary coordination between the monetary and the fiscal policies, where the 
economy has a self-stabilizing tendency due to the coordination policy, through 
its impact on income distribution which leads to economic stability. 
Equation 143: Government expenditure 
G = G-1*(1 + grg)    government expenditure 
Government revenues come from collecting taxes (T) and central bank’s profit 
(Fcb) 
Equation 144: Taxes 
T = θ * (Yhc+ Yhw) 
Equation (146) shows the government deficit is the difference of government 
expenditure (G), interest paid on bills, repayment of matured bonds and the tax 
revenue (T) plus central bank’s profit (Fcb). 
Equation 145: Government deficit 
DG = G + rb,-1 * Bs,-1 + BLs,-1  - T - Fcb  
Equation 146: Government debt 
GD = Bs + BLs  
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7.8 Model, Simulations, and shock 
There are five sectors (with tow households) in the modelled economy: Capitalist 
households, Worker households, firms, commercial banks, the government and 
the central bank. Tables 14 and 15 depict the balance sheet and the transactions 
matrix, respectively. 
The capitalist households earn income (salaries) and get the distributed profits 
of firms and banks. They hold a portfolio for the part of their income not 
consumed, given that their propensity to consume is lower than capitalist 
household, that is saved in the form of deposits, bonds, equities and treasury 
bills. They also have access to loans for consumption and investment purposes. 
However, Worker households earn income (wages) and also have access to 
loans for consumption purposes, but they do not hold any portfolio as all their 
income goes for consumption due to their high propensity to consume. The 
macroeconomic model presented in the previous section was solved numerically 
using a plausible set of parameters values (see Appendix III) that is used in 
chapter 10 & 11 Godley & Lavoie (2007). I impose a negative productivity shock 
that reflects changes in income distribution based on the change of the interest 
rate of the central bank. Then explore the impact of this shocks on income 
distribution based on two scenarios: 1). Central bank follows the Pasinetti’s ‘fair 
rate of interest’. 2). Central bank follows ‘Inflation targeting’ rule.  
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7.8.1 First Scenario: A negative shock on productivity growth with a policy of 
fair rate of interest 
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7.8.2 First Scenario: Results 
 
The above graphs (figure 19) show the stabilizing effect of a fair interest rate 
rule with respect to income distribution. A decrease in productivity growth 
initially decreases the policy interest rate, which could stimulate the economy. 
The cost of borrowing is lower. Thus firms would increase their demand for loans 
to maintain their level of output, by hiring more workers. Due to an increase in 
demand for labour that increases the disposable income for workers 
accompanied with the increasing demand for loans due to a decrease in interest 
rate, that increases the worker’s consumption (high propensity to consume). 
Banks are willing to increase the supply of loans due to the increase in wages 
and increase in economic activity and private investment. Importantly capitalist 
wealth, firms’ profits and banks’ profits have some fluctuation after the shock. 
However they are stable in the long run which helps in reducing the income 
distribution gap. However, worker’s wealth in term of deposits increases due to 
the increase in the disposable income for workers accompanied with the 
increasing demand for loans due to a decrease in interest rate. All that leads to 
increases GDP growth, and it stays higher in the long run than the baseline 
scenario. 
7.8.3 Second Scenario: A negative shock on productivity growth with a policy 
of Inflation targeting 
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7.8.4 Second Scenario: Results 
 
In contrast to scenario 1, the graphs above (figure 20) show that a negative 
productivity shock will deteriorate the economy if inflation targeting is used. As 
a decrease in productivity growth initially decreases GDP growth before it gets 
back to the initial baseline scenario in the long run, due to a decrease in 
consumption from both households and more particularly the capitalist 
households. In contrast to the capitalist, the worker households increase the 
demand for loans in order to maintain their consumption; this is due to the fact 
that the propensity to consume is higher for workers than capitalist households. 
Notably, the demand for loans decreased for both capitalists and firms due to 
the decrease in private investment in the short and the long-run, which results 
in lower firms’ profit. Further, it appears that banks’ profit is higher than the 
baseline, mainly because of the increase in demand for loans from workers 
households and demand for equity as well. 
7.9 Discussion  
 
Our model illustrates that in contrast to the inflation targeting objective which 
deteriorates the economic activity after a negative productivity shock. Which 
impacted all the economic agents, deteriorating workers wealth, firms’ profits, 
and increasing the instability in the economy. The fair rate of interest helps to 
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restore economic activity and improve equality which leads to sustainable 
economic stability in the long-run. 
The model simulation analysis shows that a decrease in interest rate (Inflation 
targeting policy) following a negative productivity shock increases income 
inequality in the short run to medium run. This happens primarily due to the 
reduction in the macroeconomic activity channel, a decrease in privet investment 
and firms profits, a decrease in workers’ wages. However, given that capitalist 
households have access to the equity market, they reallocate their portfolio to 
acquiring more equity (that was the case since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
see Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2016)). In this case, firms increase the 
dividend income of richer households. Furthermore, due to the increase of the 
indebtedness channel, workers households increase their demand for loans to 
maintain their consumption after the fall of wages, which deteriorates their 
income and wealth. However, that doesn’t last for long, as gradually the 
macroeconomic activity channel prevails causing a reduction in unemployment 
that tends to reduce income inequality. 
In contrast, that was not the case when following the fair rate of interest which 
is linked directly to productivity growth. The interest rate will fall immediately 
following the negative productivity shock. That would help firms to borrow at a 
lower cost in order to maintain their level of output by hiring more workers. That 
would lead to an increase in worker’s disposable income, which in turns would 
rise consumption. That would lead that firms maintain their level of profits and 
workers to maintain their income and wealth, that then increases 
Macroeconomic activity at a later stage. In contrast to the inflation targeting 
policy, using the fair rate of interest as a policy rate causes a decline in capitalist 
households initially and stay at a lower level in the long-run. That mainly due to 
the reduction in interest income. 
Nevertheless, the SFC model, I have built and used to investigate and analyse 
this problematic matter, has its limitations. Because of the use of plausible 
parameters and initial values (theoretical values). Also, the model is quite 
complex, probably building a more straightforward model could capture the 
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dynamic in a precise way. Thus, further research is required using more real 
data and assumptions based on the case will be studied. 
7.10 Conclusion 
The impact of central banking on income distribution has increasingly gained 
attention not only by mainstream economists but also by professionals. Within 
this framework, the interest rate is viewed as either being irrelevant or having 
on short-run effects on inequality. In contrast, post-Keynesians emphasized that 
interest rate is a distributive variable long ago. In this chapter, I have built a 
post-Keynesians SFC model dividing the households sector to workers and 
capitalists to identify the impact of the monetary policy interest rate on income 
distribution. Imposing a negative productivity shock in tow scenarios (inflation 
targeting and fair rate of interest). In contrast to inflation targeting policy using 
the fair rate of interest, our findings and results are consistent with the post-
Keynesians’ views such as (Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2013; 2016), which 
is related to the role of central banks as a social regulator stabilizer by affecting 
income distribution between workers and capitalist’s households, without 
harming economic activity, but instead stabilizing economic activity. So, a central 
banking policy that incorporates income inequality matter in its mandate, such 
as fare rate of interest, will mitigate the negative impact that the unproductive 
rentier class has on the economy. 
Here, I am not proposing a rule that fits all. Instead, I am contributing to the 
ongoing debate on inequality. My main argument is that central banks should 
view inequality as an urgent matter, and they must be doing something to solve 
it rather than fueling it with their inadequate policy. However, monetary policy 
cannot effectively address the increasing inequality without the help of the 
government. Thus a combined fair rate of interest with income policies and long-
term public investment is vital to fight inequality.  
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7.11 Appendix III 
Table 16: Capitalist household 
 
Table 17: Worker household 
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Table 18: The firms sector 
 
Table 19: Banks sector 
 
  












































































Table 20: Government & Central Bank 
  
















Chapter 8:  Conclusion and Policy Reflections 
This thesis has focused on the central bank’s responsibilities in the economy and 
its role as ‘a government bank’, as ‘a banker’s bank’, and as ‘a social regulator’. 
Summarizing here some of the key points: Chapter 1 provides a brief history of 
central banking in the advanced economies. It gives an understanding of the 
different stages of central banking’s development in terms of functions, 
objectives, and roles. Particular attention is given to the relationship of central 
banks to governments, the banking sector, and the economy. Chapter 2 
introduces the post-Keynesian perspective of central banking in contrast to the 
New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) paradigm that dominated in the era 
before the recent financial crisis. The first two chapters aim to provide a clear 
basis for understanding the current issues on central banking from a post-
Keynesian perspective. 
Coming to my contributions in this thesis: Chapter 3 provides some robust 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that monetary policy has been less effective 
in the era of financialisation, particularly in the securitisation process. By using 
a panel VAR model focusing on the nine euro-area countries and the UK, I show 
how banks escaped policy interest rate tightening by speeding the securitisation 
process, thereby increasing their liquidity and profitability. Chapter 4 provides a 
theoretical survey of the competing theories on monetary-fiscal policy 
interaction. I show how FTPL, a branch of mainstream orthodoxy, has been 
regarded as unorthodoxy by giving fiscal policy more recognition as affecting 
the price level in cooperation with monetary policy. I show that even if this view 
could be seen as somehow consistent with the post-Keynesian perspective, post-
Keynesian theory of monetary-fiscal policy interrelation provides a much more 
comprehensive view. Chapter 5 then offers a theoretical survey of the existing 
macro modelling techniques, with the aim to present the stock-flow-consistent 
(SFC) model that is used in the following chapters. Chapter 6 investigates 
monetary-fiscal policy cooperation utilising an SFC model. The model developed 
identifies the transmission mechanisms linking cooperative monetary-fiscal 
policy decisions with private agents, who lend, borrow, make portfolio decisions, 
and determine aggregate demand. Most notably, simulation results show that a 
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cooperative policy provides a much better outcome than a noncooperative one. 
Finally, chapter 7 explores how central banking has an impact on inequality. I 
use an SFC model and consider a post-Keynesian fair rate of interest as a policy 
solution to reduce inequality. Unsurprisingly, simulation results provide 
supportive evidence that when monetary policy uses a fair rate of interest that 
is equal to productivity growth, income inequality is reduced. 
For the last ten years, many proposals have been put forward regarding the 
relationship between central banks and the banking sector. For instance, Basel 
III proposed a capital-adequacy ratio to be followed by stress testing, bank-
testing models to be applied by banks, and regulations on banks’ portfolios. 
These proposals are contained in what are called ‘Macroprudential and 
Microprudential policies’, which aim to achieve financial stability. An example is 
the BoE, for which the UK government explicitly introduced a dual mandate –
price stability and financial stability. However, these proposals are still far from 
what the economy needs to promote a sustainable and stable financial market, 
as well as sustainable and stable economic growth. That is because they are still 
based on the free-banking-school paradigm in which the banking sector is 
inherently stable in a freely competitive market, and in which government and 
central bank actions and regulations are destabilising. Further, adopting the 
money-neutrality assumption, treating money as a medium of exchange, and 
focusing monetary policy on inflation targeting are still the norms in mainstream 
economics even though in a monetary production economy, the separation 
principle between monetary and real sectors (which underlies these ideas) is 
unrealistic. Moreover, with the power given to central banks through the 
controversial quantitative-easing tool, where central banks buy junky assets in 
exchange for safe liquid assets, fiscal policy is still put forward as unnecessary. 
Fiscal policy being impotent, the focus (in this view) should be on balancing the 
budget. More importantly, CBI principle is still treated as a crucial matter for 
central bankers. 
While my thesis makes a contribution in bringing to light new aspects of central 
banking, it is definitely not the first to discuss the current state of central banking 
and central banking policy proposals in a modern economy. However, it is 
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distinctive in arguing that an alternative, post-Keynesian proposal on central 
banking should be put forward and thoughtfully considered, given that post-
Keynesianism provides a more coherent, comprehensive, and realistic approach. 
Such a proposal would recognise, first of all, that given that money is a social 
reality, the banking sector which is issuing money in response to society’s 
demand for it (endogenous money) should act responsibly in doing so. However, 
given the inherent instability of the financial system, there is also the need for 
a central bank to perform its macro and micro functions in pursuit of financial 
stability. Not only is the central bank a crucial public entity that sits between 
government and the banking sector and other financial institutions, it also has 
an important social dimension. It should act with responsibility for the wellbeing 
of our whole society. 
Let us start with the financial-stability responsibility, as it has been noted that 
banking crises frequently occurred in the period before the ‘Keynesian era’ or 
‘golden era’ and in the new consensus era (see table 1, Appendix I), mainly due 
to the free-banking perspective and deregulation. Learning from history, central 
banks in the Keynesian era were able to set policies that were proven effective 
in terms of regulating the banking sector. To return to such wisdom, the 
separation between commercial banks and investment banks is a very important 
start, as it prevents commercial banks, who are able to issue money on demand, 
from engaging in risky and speculative activities to increase their short-term 
profitability. This is of particular importance when looking to megabanks (‘too-
big-to-fail banks’) and their link to shadow banking activity, as the nonseparation 
was proven to be very dangerous to the whole economy.  
Further, capital or liquidity requirements were proven by the financial crisis to 
be ineffective, as banks used financial innovations such as securitisation to 
escape these requirements. That means that central banks should go a step 
further in their relationship with the financial sector in acting on their micro 
functions. They should conduct micro analyses of banking, shadow banking, and 
financial innovations to keep themselves not only apprised of new products and 
practices, but of the nature of these products and behaviors, and to engage 
more effectively on matters of this changing banking system. That will also allow 
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central banks to run analyses to see the implications of such behavior for the 
health of the whole economy, and then conduct the necessary policies to meet 
the financial-stability objective. What is more, as in the Keynesian era, credit 
control measures at the banking level are crucial, as they would enable central 
banks to control the credit volume rather than merely controlling technical ratios. 
Central banks can use credit controls to shift the direction of credit creation 
toward more productive projects that serve macroeconomic goals and objectives. 
Therefore, a central banking authority should provide a general direction for 
national banking policy and enforce prudential practices when they are needed. 
In terms of the lender-of-last-resort function, my position is critical of central 
banks’ behavior during and after the crisis. They engaged in quantitative easing 
targeted at privileged financial institutions and directed at all sort of assets, safe 
and unsafe (like MBS), as well as acting to save banks with insolvency problems. 
I believe instead that a Bagehot-type rule should be followed, where central 
banks in times of crisis should act to help banks with liquidity problems but not 
with insolvency issues. That is consistent with the moral-suasion principle in the 
Keynesian era, where banks take responsibility for their actions. Central banks 
should cooperate with and help the responsible banks while punishing the 
irresponsible ones. 
Looking now to the central bank-government relationship, this has also proven 
to be very crucial for macroeconomic stability, but it needs reform as well. 
Generally, central banks exist in the first place as governments’ banks, initially 
to help in war time, and later to engage in developmental and economic matters 
in the Keynesian era in line with governments’ policies. This relationship comes 
from the government’s need for a central bank: government’s spending decision 
comes first, and then credit creation is needed to finance this action. Much as 
central bank intervention as a lender of last resort is important to the banking 
sector to achieve financial stability, government interventions are very crucial in 
an economy that faces inherent instability and uncertainty. Government 
expenditure is important, as any increase in government deficit will lead to an 
increase in savings, which also leads to an increase in market investment and 
activities. ‘Reinventing’ fiscal policy as an active and permanent state 
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intervention to coordinate with monetary policy is vital to smooth and contain 
the inherent instability of the market system. Following Keynes (1936): 
“It seems unlikely that the influence of [monetary] policy on the rate of 
interest will be sufficient by itself. I conceive, therefore, that somewhat 
comprehensive socialization of investment will prove the only means of 
securing an approximation to full employment.” 
When the interest rate is zero, monetary policy is rather limited. Thus, there is 
a necessity for fiscal policy in order to reach economic stability and full 
employment, particularly at the time of a deep recession.  
What is at least as important is to understand that government bond issuance 
is necessary for the central bank in its interest-rate stabilization operations. As 
a government bond is considered a safe asset, one that carries the treasury’s 
risk-free rate, it provides an ultimate proxy to value all other market securities 
in the modern theory of finance. As I have shown in chapter 5, a coordinated 
and expansionary monetary-fiscal policy can restore confidence and reduce risk 
in the market, which also helps in achieving financial and economic stability. 
Furthermore, the function as lender of last resort to government is also crucial 
for the government to ensure confidence and stability in the economy.  
To allow for such coordination, the CBI principle should be regarded as 
operational independence but not goal independence. As Keynes argued, a 
central bank is not a subordinate department of the treasury but is an organ of 
the government at the same level of authority as the treasury. Accordingly, a 
powerful central bank that issues money and manages government’s debt and 
reserves should act with responsibility for the government’s needs and goals. 
Thus, it should act as a ‘government’s bank’. Here it is important to note that an 
accommodating ECB, acting as a ‘government’s bank’ for member states through 
having the power to make fiscal transfers across borders, is not only crucial, but 
it is also vital for the Euro-zone to survive. 
Last but not least, the central bank is a national and a public institution that 
must follow the public interest rather than private interest, acting with 
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responsibility towards the society. Given the impact of central banking on 
inequality, it should include in its mandate the notion of social justice so that it 
serves to mitigate inequality and act as a ‘social regulator’. Thus, the increasing 
inequality in our economy should be treated seriously by central banks. A 
proposal with such aim should be put forward. For instance, the ‘fair rate of 
interest’ proposal discussed and evaluated in chapter 7 would link interest rate 
to productivity growth in order to eliminate the unproductive rentier class. 
Further, central banks could set quantitative targets on some measures of 
inequality (say, a value for the Gini index of wealth). A more radical proposal is 
to engage in a people’s quantitative easing (similar to QE for banks) to allow 
people to repay their debt and increase their consumption level. Further, there 
is a need for coordinated central bank and government policies that promote full 
employment and other economic goals as well as social justice (while mitigating 
inequality). That could be done firstly by changing banking behavior and 
directing credit towards more productive and social investments such as 
healthcare, education, regional, and public-sector investments. Secondly the 
central bank could directly engage in ‘social investments’ by financing 
government policies and public investments, such as industrial, environmental, 
and regional investments, to create jobs, promote income equality, and promote 
economic growth. It can also directly support local and cooperative banking to 
fill the gaps left by the commercial banks. Thus, central banks must responsibly 
act as a ‘social regulator’ and promote social justice and fairness. 
Finally, central banks should comprehend and recognize the changing structure 
of the financialised world economy. They must face the increasing complexity, 
interdependency, uncertainty, innovations, and technological challenges in our 
economy. They should understand that economics is not an exact science in 
which uncertainty can be calculated. Thus discretion rather than rule following 
should be the norm. 
In sum, a modern central bank should act as a government’s bank, as a banker’s 
bank, and as a ‘social regulator’ in order to promote the well-being of our society. 
We need a new framework for central banking that fits our new era and 
incorporates all these roles.  
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